

The 2008 Presidential Nominating Contest: Structure, Substance, and Effect

By

Sarah E. Niebler

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2012

Date of final oral examination: 07/24/12

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Byron Shafer, Professor, Political Science

Charles H. Franklin, Professor, Political Science

Kenneth M. Goldstein, Professor, Political Science

Katherine Cramer Walsh, Associate Professor, Political Science

Dhavan Shah, Professor, Journalism & Mass Communication

Acknowledgements

Despite the fact that research and writing can seem solitary, graduate school and writing a dissertation are the works of a community. I never could have taken on this project without the support of many, many people. I am especially grateful to my committee members, each of whom enriched my life as a scholar and as an individual while I was at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Byron Shafer has been the most supportive advisor I could have asked for, providing me with space to do the type of research I wanted, but always being willing to meet and discuss the project with me any time I asked. His patience and generosity are unmatched. In addition, not only did he educate me about the presidential selection process and many other aspects of post-war American politics, he has also unwittingly shaped how I think about teaching and learning more broadly.

Without Ken Goldstein taking a chance on me early in my graduate school career and employing me to work on the 2008 Wisconsin Advertising Project, there is no way I would have written this dissertation. He likes to tell people that my interest in presidential nominating contests started with me asking him a simple question about how we knew when the presidential primary was over and the general election campaign began. I like to tell people I started doing this research because his answer was, "because I said so".

Kathy Cramer Walsh has been a constant source of support to me over the past five years. In addition to being a remarkable and generous mentor, she allowed me work with her for a couple of summers mapping the geographic landscape of the state of Wisconsin. In doing so, I learned a tremendous amount about how individuals think about where they are from and of what social classes they consider themselves members.

Charles Franklin provided much of my graduate school methodological training while simultaneously fostering my interest in campaigns and elections. I began graduate school in his "Introduction to Statistical Inference" class and am ending at his research assistant. I am so grateful to have had the opportunity to work with and learn from one of the country's top academic pollsters.

Dhavan Shah taught the first class I took on political communication and from there I was hooked on studying how candidates interact with the public and what effect those interactions might have. Dhavan encouraged me to think about combining various sources of data together in order to be able to answer more interesting questions, especially about how long campaign effects might last.

In addition to my committee, I had the opportunity to work with and learn from some outstanding professors. David Canon allowed me a huge amount of freedom in developing my teaching style as I served as the teaching assistant for the Communication B sections of his Introduction to American Politics class. John Zumbunnen let me stretch the comforts of my substantive knowledge when I was his teaching assistant for Introduction to Political Theory. I owe both David and John extra thanks for always being willing to talk about pedagogy.

I want to thank several individuals at the University of Wisconsin-Madison outside the Department of Political Science. Brad Hughes, who directs the Writing Center, became a true resource and helped me think about not only how to teach writing, but how to be a better writer myself. Nancy Linh Karls facilitated Dissertation Boot Camp during the summer of 2011, without which I am not sure this project ever would have gotten off the ground. I am grateful to Eileen Callahan in the Graduate School for supporting Dissertation Boot Camp.

Throughout my time in graduate school, I was fortunate enough to meet amazing people who quickly turned into friends, colleagues, and co-authors. Matt Holleque, Jake Neiheisel and I spent more hours than I care to count working on the 2008 Wisconsin Advertising Project. Doing so quickly cemented our friendship and I am grateful to both of them for all the time spent brainstorming ideas, talking about research, and working together. Carly Urban and I have very similar interests, but approach questions from different angles. This makes the research we do together extremely rewarding and I am grateful to her for being such an understanding and reliable collaborator. I am grateful to Amber Wichowsky for helping me to navigate the article-writing and submission process for the first time.

Writing a dissertation is a lot more enjoyable when you have friends who are eager to eat, drink, and play. I am particularly grateful to Deven Carlson, Jason Engle, and Leticia Bode for our mid-week "meetings" at Doty's. Together, we addressed (and solved!) many issues facing the department, the University, the state, and the nation. Dave Ohls was always up for a bike ride and makes amazing desserts that he is eager to share. Even though Lesley Lavery was in Madison only a short time, I benefited greatly from her friendship and organizational skills. Regina Wagner taught me about veganism through delicious dinners and baked goods. Peter and Kathryn Nelson introduced me to the world of Badger Women's Hockey, and in the few years I was in Madison, I was lucky enough to see two National Championship teams.

I would be remiss not to thank the professors I had at Muhlenberg College who encouraged me to go to graduate school. It was when I started working for Chris Borick at the Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion that I first realized that being interested in political science did not mean wanting to be a politician or a lawyer. Michele Deegan and Lanethea Mathews further encouraged my academic pursuits. I especially want to thank them

all, plus Jack Gambino, for inviting me back to Muhlenberg in the spring of 2012 to talk with current students about my research and about academia as a career. The trip revitalized me and made the home stretch of writing much more pleasant.

My family has been more supportive than I ever could have asked for. My parents, Faye and Steve Niebler taught me about politics over the dinner table. It wasn't until I got to college that I realized that not everyone knew (or cared about) school board elections and municipal utility boards. My grandmother, Janet Upton, is the most ardent supporter of higher education I have ever met. Her time working at Gettysburg College made her love academia and that love has been passed down through the generations. It is to her that I dedicate this entire project.

Finally, my most sincere appreciation and gratitude goes to Sarah Kersh, who has been, and will continue to be, my partner in all things. I am so grateful for her encouragement and love. So far, our journey has taken us to the South, then to the Midwest, and now back to the South again. I can't wait to see where our next adventure will be!

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	i
Chapter 1 – Introduction.....	1
Tables and Figures.....	27
Chapter 2 -- Fundraising Dynamics of the Presidential Nominating Contest: The Invisible	
Primary Stage.....	35
Tables and Figures.....	61
Chapter 3 -- Substance in Presidential Nominating Contests: Negativity and Issue Content.....	86
Tables and Figures.....	126
Appendix.....	139
Chapter 4 -- Campaign Effects and the 2008 Presidential Nominating Contests.....	142
Tables and Figures.....	175
Appendix.....	200
Chapter 5 – Conclusion.....	203
References.....	212

Chapter 1: Introduction

The 2008 presidential nominating contest was historic. Because President George W. Bush was term-limited out of office and Vice President Richard Cheney chose not to run for the Republican nomination, it was the first time in 56 years, neither a sitting president nor a sitting vice president competed for his party's nomination. Candidates vying for the Democratic nomination engaged in the longest, most drawn-out campaign governed by rules of the modern presidential nominating system. The candidate who emerged victorious was the first African American candidate to win the nomination of one of the two major political parties in the United States. On the Republican side, the eventual nominee experienced a near-collapse of his entire campaign only six months before the first votes were cast. Despite the noteworthy nature of both the Democratic and Republican contests, pundits and scholars alike often commented on the nominees afterward as though they were inevitable. And indeed, as soon as the primaries and caucuses were concluded, it became easy to identify flaws among the major challengers who came up short.

Following the conclusion of the 2008 presidential nominating contest – after Obama had secured the Democratic nomination – it seemed obvious to note that Hillary Clinton possessed high negative ratings and that John Edwards's personal problems were significant. On the Republican side, it was easy to forget that McCain's campaign had collapsed in the middle of 2007 and instead focus on the shortcomings of the various other Republican candidates: Romney's "Mormon problem"; Huckabee's small fundraising totals; and Giuliani's decision not to compete in the Iowa caucuses or the New Hampshire primary. Despite these well-known difficulties for the candidates who did not secure their party's presidential nominations, this

discussion of “inevitability” after the presidential nominating contests masks many of the fundamental factors that influence and affect candidate viability.

The introduction to this dissertation project aims, first, to provide background information on the modern presidential nominating system and on the political science literature dedicated to studying that institution. Secondly, it establishes a theory of candidate viability for the presidential nominating contest, to demonstrate that many of the candidates who ran for the 2008 Democratic and Republican party nominations fulfilled at least one, if not several, of the criteria needed to become his or her party’s presidential nominee. In particular, the fact that multiple candidates could have emerged as presidential nominees highlights the need to examine the nominating contest from a very early stage. So, the research contained in this dissertation starts by considering the "invisible primary" stage of the nominating contest. The term invisible primary, also known as money primary, refers to the period of campaigning prior to any votes being cast (Hadley 1976). The dissertation concludes by thinking about the generalizability of the 2008 contest, what we might be able to apply to the recently-completed 2012 campaign, and what avenues of study we should pursue going forward.

Presidential Nominating Contests in the Modern Era

The modern presidential nominating system, which is based largely on direct primaries and binding caucuses, resulted from a series of reforms instituted by the Democratic Party following their 1968 Presidential Convention. During that convention, party leaders nominated then-sitting Vice President Hubert Humphrey despite the strong primary performance of anti-war candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy. After securing the nomination, Humphrey was soundly defeated by Richard Nixon in the general election, carrying only 12 states and the District of

Columbia. Speculation arose that McCarthy, because of his strong anti-Vietnam War platform, may have fared better against the pro-Vietnam War candidate, Nixon. While Converse, Miller, Rusk, and Wolfe recommend taking any hypothetical reconstructions of votes in 1968 with a grain of salt, they do note the number of “defections to Nixon on the part of voters of liberal and Democratic predispositions, who reported sympathy toward McCarthy” (1969, 1094).

Soon after Nixon won the general election, the McGovern-Fraser Commission was established to examine and reform the conditions under which candidates were chosen for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. The committee was tasked with making recommendations designed to increase participation in the nominating process and enable better representation for minorities and women within the party. Some scholars argue that the reforms were instituted because of Humphrey’s failed candidacy. Atkeson and Maestas claim that delegates and protesters at the 1968 convention in Chicago were, “angered by their perception that Hubert Humphrey was an illegitimate party nominee; he had received the nomination without entering a single primary” (2009, 59). Other scholars, however, look beyond the 1968 election results and argue that the reformers “declined to judge the party’s experience in 1968 in terms of the usual criteria of political success and failure [and instead institute reforms based on] radically different ideas about what ought to be the nature, purposes, and operating principles of a political party” (Center 1974, 326). No matter the specific reason the McGovern-Fraser Commission was instituted, however, its recommendations forever changed the way the political parties select their presidential nominees.

Less than nine months after its creation, the McGovern-Fraser Commission produced a report that recommended guidelines for state parties and steps that were desirable for state parties to take. The reforms were designed to, “introduce some degree of uniformity into the crazy-quilt

pattern of delegate selection systems and increase decisively the political influence of those who in the past had had only marginal impact upon party policy making and candidate selection,” specifically women, blacks, and young people (Center 1974, 334). While the reforms were clearly aimed at amplifying the voice of the average voter, many other consequences arose. Potential presidential nominees must raise significant sums of money, gain national notoriety, campaign actively in multiple states (often simultaneously), all while appealing to both party leaders and the broad electorate. In recent presidential nomination contests, nearly an entire year of campaigning has occurred before any votes are cast. This “invisible primary” is vitally important. It sets the stage for which of the potential nominees is actually able to secure delegates during the nominating contests, and which candidate ultimately perseveres to go on and win his or her party’s presidential nomination.

The recommendations of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, like many public policy innovations, became a topic of research among political scientists. Scholars attempted to identify and articulate implications of the reforms, and in doing so, more thoroughly understand the landscape of the modern presidential nominating system. Ceaser's (1979) work considers the previous 200 years of presidential nominating contests. He argues that the history of nominating contests in the United States can be divided into five distinct eras - the fifth of which is the post-reform era.

In the first era, which was marked by the political philosophy put forth by the nation's Founders, presidents were not supposed to be chosen based on their popularity. Instead, the Founders promoted a system that could "elevate a man who stood out from others on the basis of his reputation for merit" (Ceaser 1979, 87). This first era of presidential selection was effectively nonpartisan and lasted only a decade. A second era emerged alongside political

parties in the U.S. Thomas Jefferson was concerned that, without the constraint of political parties, "unscrupulous leaders of the opposition party would seize on popular passions in an effort to raise themselves to the presidency" (Ceaser 1979, 29). Jefferson believed that political parties would be more moderate than might some individuals vying for the U.S. presidency. Specifically, during the Jeffersonian era of presidential selection, two major reforms to the electoral institutions were made. First, a Congressional caucus, or King Caucus, was created, and secondly, the Twelfth Amendment was passed, which separated the electors' choices for president and vice-president.

A third era of presidential election then emerged, Ceaser argues, when Martin Van Buren established permanent party competition for presidential nominations. By putting the presidential nominating process squarely in the hands of two political parties, potential candidates had to align their views with parties that were "safe and moderate in their principles" (Ceaser 1979, 30). During this era, the Congressional Caucus failed and was instead replaced by national party conventions that, on their surface, look much like the national party conventions we are familiar with today.

Ceaser's fourth era of presidential selection was articulated most eloquently by Woodrow Wilson. Wilson believed political parties had become too overbearing. In response, he argued for a "national primary to enhance the status of individual candidates during the electoral process, freeing them from the constraints of traditional parties and allowing them to create a popular constituency of their own making" (Ceaser 1979, 31). The shift from having Congressional or party leaders choose presidential nominees to having members of the public select presidential candidates laid the groundwork for the modern presidential nominating system.

Ceaser argues that the history of presidential selection in the United States can "best be viewed as a struggle between two different models of the national electoral process, one having its origin in the view of Martin Van Buren and the other in the thought of Woodrow Wilson and the Progressives" (1979, 213). The modern presidential nominating system, his fifth era, with its binding primaries and caucuses is an institutionalization of the Wilsonian ideals.

Interestingly, the post-reform era is the only one of Ceaser's time periods not to be aligned with one particular political figure. In this way, Ceaser's analysis of this era mirrors the democratic nature of the reforms. No one person is responsible for, or perhaps capable of articulating the democratic shift from conventions to binding primaries and caucuses.

The scholarship of Polsby (1983) and Shafer (1988) provides careful consideration of the effects of reforms to the institution of presidential selection. Polsby (1983) examines many of the unintended consequences of modern reforms and ultimately argues that, "changing the rules of politics changes the incentives for political actors; changing the incentives leads to changes in political behavior; and that changing behavior changes political institutions and their significance in politics" (5). Shafer (1988) studies the Democratic and Republican national party conventions, claiming that although the 1968 reforms institutionalized the removal of the official nominations from the conventions themselves, as early as 1952, "the disappearance had already, informally, effectively occurred" (Shafer 1988, 39). At the most basic level, both Polsby and Shafer argue that rules matter. While political actors cannot always anticipate all the effects of policy changes, scholars can compare conditions both before and after the policy change to understand how changing the rules has altered real-world politics.

Polsby (1983) focuses on the implications of reform for political parties, the institution of the presidency, as well as for the media and mobilization of the electorate. Polsby argues that

reforms to the nominating process led to a centralization of the nomination, meaning that state-level political parties had less authority over how to select delegates to their statewide conventions, and thus also less authority over which presidential candidate those delegates would support. This shift of power away from state party leaders toward members of the electorate meant that candidates had to behave differently: "Rather than build coalitions, they [needed to] mobilize factions" (Polsby 1983, 65). Campaigning under the new rules was more complicated than before, so candidates also began to rely more heavily on campaign professionals or consultants. The new party nominating contest rules required potential presidential candidates to take their appeal to the people directly. Presidential nominees could no longer bypass significant numbers of primaries and caucuses and rely on state-level surrogates to achieve the nomination.

With respect to governing, Polsby noted that the qualities that used to make a good candidate - building coalitions, working within the confines of a political party - were also useful in governing. Because these qualities were not as important in the campaigning process, candidates did not practice them, and thus had more difficulty governing as well. Finally, whereas political parties used to be the essential intermediary between candidates and the electorate, under the new rules, new intermediaries arose. Media, especially television media, became the most fundamental intermediary and led Polsby to note that, "the most important [plot of news stories] in the context of primary elections is no doubt the deviation from expectations: 'wins' and 'losses' by various candidates are evaluated by news professionals in the light of how well they 'expected' to do, or were expected to do by some consensus of observers" (1983, 143-144). The rise of importance of the news media is a theme throughout much of the scholarship evaluating the effects of reforms to the nominating process and remains a principal topic of research.

Shafer (1988) uses the Democratic and Republican national party conventions as mediums through which to study the democratization of the presidential nominating system. Beginning in the mid-19th century and continuing to the mid-20th century, national party conventions existed solely to choose the presidential candidates for each party. Convention attendees - delegates and alternates, candidates and their supporters, interest group representatives and issue specialists, private citizens, and the press - may have performed other functions while at the party convention, but there could be no denying that their fundamental purpose was to select the party's nominee. In the mid-20th century, however, the task of nominating presidential candidates disappeared from the national party conventions and instead moved to the people themselves.

Fundamentally, Shafer argues that the nationalization of politics led imminently to this shift, but that several key factors contributed to the nationalization of politics. Specifically, he claims that the growth of national government, the rise of national media, the decline of local political parties, and rising affluence and partisan independence all contributed to the nationalization of politics. In other words, together, "all the individual elements of the nationalization of politics played a part in this change in the focus of key participants, and eventually in the location of the presidential nomination itself" (Shafer 1988, 31).

Shafer argues that the disappearance of the nomination from the convention occurred in approximately 1952, although he recognizes that "hindsight makes discernment of the departure of the presidential nomination a far easier task than it could conceivably have been for observers enmeshed in the entire complex development" (1988, 18). While the exact date of the movement of the nomination from the national party convention to the broader electorate may be a point of

contention, there is no arguing that the consequences Shafer notes have only been exacerbated and ensconced in the years since the McGovern-Fraser Commission.

The work of Aldrich (1980) and Bartels (1988) examines the effects of the democratization of the nomination process not on the institution itself, but instead on the behavior of candidates and members of the voting public. Aldrich's (1980) work thoroughly examines the presidential selection system following the 1968 reforms and makes an argument about how candidates must operate under the new rules. Specifically, he puts forth three premises. First, he claims that the "institution of party nominations - the rules, laws, procedures, and norms that describe how presidential hopefuls become party nominees - plays a major role in structuring the politics of nominations and consequently, in the behavior of candidates and the outcome of their campaigns" (Aldrich 1980, 2). In other words, the rules of the game matter.

Secondly, Aldrich posits that, "presidential candidates are rational political actors who have well defined preferences and who act so as to maximize their chances of realizing those preferences" (1980, 3). Taken with the first premise then, Aldrich argues that candidates are able to understand the rules of the nominating contest and make decisions about how to campaign that will maximize their likelihood of being the party's nominee. The third premise Aldrich puts forth is less about the candidates, but instead about the nominating process itself. He claims that "nomination campaigns can not be understood properly in anything but dynamic terms" (Aldrich 1980, 3). Because the rules of the contest are such that states go to the polls or caucus on different days, the outcome of preceding contests has an effect on subsequent contests.

This line of research, particularly the dynamic nature of the presidential nominating contest would later be picked up and more thoroughly discussed by Bartels (1988). Bartels's (1988) work picks on Aldrich's argument about the dynamic nature of the modern presidential

nominating system and argues that "momentum" is largely responsible for which candidates are ultimately successful in winning their parties' presidential nominations. Bartels summarizes the post-reform presidential nominating system as such:

...perhaps most importantly, the modern presidential nominating process has a dynamic aspect unmatched by any other electoral process. Its key institutional feature is that individual primaries are spread over a period of three and a half months. As the focus of attention moves around the country from week to week, politicians, journalists, and the public use results in each state to adjust their own expectations and behavior at subsequent stages in the process. One week's outcome becomes an important part of the political context shaping the following week's choices. Thus, each primary must be interpreted not as a final result by as a single episode in the series of interrelated political events that together determine the nominee (1988, 5-6).

In other words, because primaries and caucuses do not take place in all states at the same time, as the general election does, the results of previous contests change various aspects of subsequent contests such as campaign strategy, how the media covers the campaigns, and knowledge of members of the electorate.

Bartels argues that the mid-20th century reforms to the presidential nominating process have resulted in major changes in who holds the power of nominating and how candidates and other actors must behave. First, he claims that the dramatic increase in the number of primaries has taken power away from party elites and put it into the hands of those voters who choose to go to the polls and vote or caucus on behalf of their candidate of choice. Second, Bartels shows the delegates to the national party conventions are no longer tasked with deliberating among themselves to choose the party's nominee and instead are "increasingly subservient to the candidate organization they are elected to support" (Bartels 1988, 60). Third, the importance of early-primary and early-caucus states has been solidified. If candidates truly rely on momentum to propel themselves to their parties' nominations, then it is paramount that they have early success. The easiest way to do this is to win in either Iowa or New Hampshire. Thus, the

binding nature of the primaries has — as Aldrich (1980), Shafer (1980), and Polsby (1983) argued as well— moved the nominating process out of the national party conventions. Doing so alters both the people who are responsible as well as the timing at which that nomination occurs.

Finally, Bartels notes in great detail the changing nature of the role of the media in the presidential nominating process. Candidates are reliant upon the media to make themselves known to the public. However, especially for candidates who are not well known at the outset of the campaign, this is problematic and the single best way for them to become worthy of media coverage is to "demonstrate their 'seriousness' [as potential nominees] in the currency most valued by the press - electoral success" (Bartels 1988, 60). In addition to simply providing coverage of candidates, the media set the expectations for performance in early primaries and caucuses, and also evaluates the degree to which the candidates met or fell short of those expectations.

While it is hard to disagree with Bartels that the media matters, I argue that the media's role is just as important, and maybe even more important, before any voting occurs. This is the point at which potential voters know the least, and therefore the point at which the media can have the most effect. Thus, Chapter 2 of the dissertation examines the relationship between media coverage, candidate fundraising, and public opinion during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, beginning long before any votes are cast. Much of the most recent literature on the presidential nominating system has tended to focus on more recent changes to the nominating system's rules such as frontloading and delegate-selection procedures. Political science research studying the impact of divisive primaries on general election outcomes has also been updated in recent years.

Frontloading of presidential primaries and caucuses has increased dramatically since the reforms of the mid-20th century as states move their electoral contests earlier in the calendar year of the presidential election. The precise effect of the early states of Iowa and New Hampshire on the ultimate outcome of the presidential contest is debatable (Adkins and Dowdle 2001; Steger, Dowdle, and Adkins 2004; Vavreck, Spilotes, and Fowler 2002), but scholars generally agree that as frontloading of presidential primaries and caucuses increases, the invisible primary increases in importance and notoriety. As Adkins and Dowdle note, “frontloading the primary schedule means that candidates must not only raise money earlier but also simultaneously organize multi-state campaigns in the bellwether and battleground states in which they hope to compete” (2002, 258). I ultimately agree with this argument, and throughout much of this dissertation project, I begin my study of the nominating process long before any votes are cast.

Despite the fact that the McGovern-Fraser Commission rules shifted the power of selecting presidential nominees from the political parties more toward the voting electorate, the Commission did not specify how exactly that process was to occur. Thus, some states have primaries, while others still prefer caucuses. Furthermore, states and parties allocate their delegates in different ways, some as winner-take-all, some proportionally by state, and some with mixed allocation systems. Recently, political scientists have begun to try to understand how presidential nominating contests might look differently under different sets of rules. Cooper (2001) uses computer simulations to compare the results of a sequential primary season to two alternatives, a single national primary and a national primary followed by a runoff election. She finds that a primary followed by a runoff yields similar results to a sequential primary season, while a single national primary yields results not dissimilar to those created by random selection.

Two more recent articles specifically consider aspects of the 2008 nominating season.

Shafer and Wichowsky (2009) take advantage of a unique circumstance. The Democratic Party of Texas held both a primary and a caucus on the same day, which allows the authors to ask what effect the different modes of elections has on who votes. Despite the fact that Clinton won the primary and Obama won the caucus in Texas, Shafer and Wichowsky find that most of the difference in who voted in each mode of election can be attributed to social class as opposed to race or ethnicity. Arbour (2009) asks whether the rules governing the Democratic Party's nominating contest cost Hillary Clinton the 2008 Democratic nomination. Ultimately, he finds that the rules did matter for the Democratic Party in 2008, however, had that particular contest been run under the 2008 Republican Party rules, it would still have been won by Obama. The difficulty with studying the impact of rules in nominating contests is that candidates adapt their campaign strategies to the rules at hand. Thus, ascribing different rules to a contest after the fact seems somewhat disingenuous to the candidates and the process overall. Instead of undertaking this type of analysis, I rely on observational data as much as possible and ask how candidates employ different strategies given the rules in place.

Literature on divisive primaries is particularly interesting because it is one of the only areas of research that considers the entire election process, spanning the invisible primary through the general election. Presidential primaries are thought to be inherently divisive because they pit members of the same political party against one another. Scholars and members of the popular press note that if an intraparty contest is particularly divisive, then the eventual nominee may have difficulty reuniting the party and mobilizing party supporters to turn out to vote in the general election. In general, studies of presidential elections tend to find that divisive primaries do more harm than good (Kenney and Rice 1987; Lengle 1980; Lengle, Owen, and Sonner 1995; but see also Atkeson 1998; Wichowsky and Niebler 2010).

Ultimately, because this literature asks whether a highly competitive election within one party harms that same party within the context of the general election, the implication is that effects of the campaign can, and do, have long-lasting effects. My interest in the divisive primary literature within the context of the dissertation project is just that: can campaigning that occurs during the early part of the nominating contest have lasting effects on members of the voting public?

The underlying premise of much of the aforementioned literature is the idea that mid-20th century reforms to the institutional structure of the presidential nominating system affected how players in that system operated. Candidates focused more on campaigning in early-primary and early-caucus states. Members of the media were more able to cover the horse-race aspect of the campaign, highlighting which candidates are ahead at any point in time. Members of the electorate responded to previous outcomes and considered both ideology and electability when deciding for whom to vote.

The Party Decides, by Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, however, argues that despite all the reforms to the presidential nominating system in the United States, party activists are still fundamentally responsible for choosing presidential nominees, and therefore not much has changed over the past 150 years. Ultimately, while the authors agree that party leaders lack formal control over the nominating process, they claim that "parties should not be defined in terms of leadership structures. They should be understood as...a coalition of interest groups, social group leaders, activists, and other 'policy demanders' working to gain control of government on behalf of their own goals" (Cohen et. al. 2008, 6). Because they define political parties broadly, the authors argue that the presidential nominating process in the United States can be, and is, still influenced heavily by political parties.

Specifically, Cohen and colleagues argue that endorsements from party leaders are the single most important factor in presidential nominations. When party leaders endorse candidates, the authors claim, they are providing two benefits. First, the endorsement itself often brings news coverage to the candidate, raising his or her profile and name recognition. Second, endorsements from party leaders in particular are often accompanied by work done on the candidate's behalf. This work might include mobilizing voters and/or hosting fundraising events for the candidate. Because Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller believe endorsements are so important to the presidential nominating process and because they claim the most important endorsements are those made by party leaders, they argue that political parties remain the fundamental players in presidential nominations. Ultimately, then, The Party Decides argues that the "demise of parties has been exaggerated...Parties remain major players in presidential nominations. They scrutinize and winnow the field before voters get involved, attempt to build coalitions behind a single preferred candidate, and sway voters to ratify their choice" (Cohen et. al. 2008, 3).

My dissertation aims to study the presidential selection process from several angles. First, I look at the relationship between structural factors such as media coverage, fundraising, and public opinion, during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Second, I examine the substance of nominating contests as I study when candidates utilize negativity and how they employ issues in their televised campaign advertisements. Finally, I look at whether campaigning in early-primary and early-caucus states has any lasting influence on the individuals living in those states in terms of the individuals' propensity to participate in politics, rate the candidates, or vote for a particular candidate.

A Brief Theory of Viability

In order for a potential presidential candidate to be a viable option for his or her party's nomination, I argue that a series of criteria must be fulfilled, falling into four distinct categories: fundraising, media coverage, campaign activity, and appeal to voters. I discuss various pieces of this theory throughout the remainder of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, on the structure of presidential nominating contests, I consider the relationship between fundraising, media coverage, and public opinion. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth look at issues covered and the tone of campaign activity. Chapter 4 considers whether campaign activities that occurred during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest have influences that last into the time period of the general election. First, though, I walk through each of the criteria above and discuss the 2008 Democratic and Republican contests.

Fundraising

With respect to fundraising, much political science literature points to the fact that candidates must raise significant amounts of money in order to be considered viable for their party's presidential nomination. As Christenson and Smidt (2011) claim, "These days, to run a successful campaign requires, at a minimum, the ability to raise and spend increasingly large amounts of money **before** the primary is under way" (2011, 6). Candidate fundraising reports filed with the Federal Election Commission become key benchmarks every quarter, measuring the degree to which candidates are likely to be able to continue to compete for their party's nomination. If candidates underperform their fundraising expectations, or see their fundraising efforts dwarfed by other candidates, they may be forced to suspend or disband presidential campaigns.

In addition to the total amount of money raised, however, I argue that another monetary factor ought to be considered when thinking about candidate viability. The amount of money raised via large- versus small-dollar contributions is important as well. When a candidate first declares her intention to run for federal office, specifically the presidency, it seems likely that the majority of early campaign contributions will come from a personal network of donors who are likely to contribute the maximum dollar amount allowed by law.¹ However, as the campaign continues, candidates must raise campaign contributions in smaller dollar amounts. These small-dollar contributions indicate that the candidates have increased their levels of support beyond a personal network. In other words, the candidates have a message that is reaching a larger audience, an audience that will potentially vote in primaries or caucuses. Without public support via small donations, a candidate's chances of winning his or her party's nomination are minimal.

Much of the existing literature on fundraising, particularly in presidential nominating contests, looks solely at the total amount of money raised. It argues that the more money raised, the more campaigning the candidate can do and, consequently, the more likely he or she is to be successful in the nominating contest. In Tables 1 and 2, we see that in neither the Democratic nor the Republican contest did the candidate that raised the most money in 2007 ultimately end up winning his or her party's nomination.

Table 1 shows that on the Democratic side, during 2007, Clinton raised nearly \$20 million more than Obama. Clinton and Obama, however, did have a significant advantage in fundraising over the rest of the Democratic field. Obama's total of \$71 million raised in 2007

¹ The maximum contribution level for federal candidates, including the president during the nomination contest, for 2008 was \$2,300. In 2000, the individual contribution limit was \$1,000. In an attempt to limit "soft money" contributions, the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) raised the "hard money" individual contribution limit to \$2,000, which was in effect for the 2004 presidential election cycle. BCRA also indexed the individual contribution limit to inflation. The limit for the 2012 presidential cycle is \$2,500 for both the nominating contest and the general election.

was more than all the rest of the candidates' totals combined, which was approximately \$59 million. Based on fundraising totals alone, certainly two Democratic candidates could be seen as viable candidates for their party's nomination. Looking just at the first quarter of 2007 (through March), however, Edwards is clearly seen as viable. I discuss fundraising more thoroughly in the next chapter, but it is interesting to note that multiple candidates could be seen as serious contenders for the Democratic nomination based on their early ability to raise money.

Table 2 shows that on the Republican side, McCain, the eventual Republican nominee, actually raised the third-most of any of the potential nominees. Over the course of 2007, Giuliani raised the most money – nearly \$52 million – and nearly doubled McCain's 2007 total. Romney, supported by a significant amount of his own personal money – raised the second-highest total. Christenson and Smidt (2011) summarize the 2007 Republican fundraising totals, saying, "Although, given that Romney's personal fortune was partly at his disposal, these two [Giuliani and Romney] were effectively tied in financial strength. [Fred] Thompson and, somewhat surprisingly, Paul were not far behind McCain, making Huckabee the only obvious long shot" (2011, 10). In other words, based solely on fundraising totals during the invisible primary stage of the 2008 Republican presidential nominating contest, five potential nominees – Giuliani, McCain, Paul, Romney, and F. Thompson – were viable candidates.

Media Coverage

National media coverage is paramount if a candidate is to make a viable case for becoming her party's presidential nominee. At a minimum, prospective voters must recognize a candidate's name. The most likely way for voters to learn about candidates is via media coverage of the campaign. Arguing against the "minimal effects" theory of media effects, McQuail argues that the media have several roles to play in raising awareness of politics, saying,

“First, the media can attract and direct attention to problems, solutions or people...Second, the mass media can confer status and confirm legitimacy. Third, in some circumstances, the media can be a channel for persuasion and mobilization” (1979, 21). The effects of mass media, while heterogeneous, are significant when considering the viability of potential presidential candidates. Candidates must achieve recognition in national press outlets if they are to be taken seriously by the electorate.

Thinking about the influence of media coverage throughout a presidential campaign is challenging because the direction of causality is nearly impossible to determine. Do candidates become viable because they receive significant amounts of press coverage? Or, do viable candidates get covered by the national press? Regardless of whether press coverage drives public opinion or vice versa, press coverage is essential to a winning campaign.

Table 3 shows the total number of mentions each Democratic candidate received in *The New York Times* by month during 2007. The eventual Democratic nominee - Obama - did have the most media coverage during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. However, Clinton did not receive the second-most coverage, despite her being engaged in the drawn-out nomination contest with Obama. Edwards received nearly twice the number of mentions in *The New York Times* as compared to Clinton. These three candidates received, on average, more than one mention per day in *The New York Times*. Based just on the number of mentions of each candidate in this particular media outlet, there are at least three viable candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination.

On the Republican side, Giuliani received the most press coverage, while McCain received the second-most. There were three Republican candidates who received, on average, more than one mention per day in *The New York Times*. Giuliani, McCain, and Romney were all

relatively close in terms of their newspaper mentions throughout the course of the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Interestingly, however, Huckabee received nearly half of his *New York Times* mentions in the final month of 2007. Was the media reacting to a surge in public opinion or fundraising? Or, was the media leading the way, educating members of the electorate, and leading to higher levels of public support for Huckabee? These are the types of questions I aim to address in Chapter 2.

Campaign Activity

I argue that two types of campaign activity are vital if a candidate is to be taken seriously in a presidential nominating contest. First, the candidate must be active in holding campaign events. Because of the momentum created by victories (or exceeding expectations) in early states like Iowa and New Hampshire (Bartels 1988), visits in some states may be more paramount than visits in other states whose presidential primary or caucus is held later. Especially in early-primary states, voters participating in primaries and caucuses expect to meet the candidates or at least see them in person. Solely running an online or a television-based campaign is not likely to be a successful strategy in a presidential nominating contest. Vavreck, Spiliotes, and Fowler (2002) claim that personal campaign contact in presidential primaries is particularly important, arguing, “[personal contacts] not only bypass the filtering and interpreting functions of the news media and political elites, but they also involve nonverbal cues. In addition, some types of direct contact, such as attendance at a rally, involve mobilization effects because voters must do something such as go to the town hall, rather than simply receive a message” (2002, 596).

In addition to visits, though, television advertising has become a key factor in presidential nominating contests. In part because of the frontloading of campaigns, serious candidates may

not be able to visit all the necessary states during the course of the presidential nominating system. One way they may be able to compensate for this shortcoming is by airing campaign advertisements on television in states, or regions of states, they are unable to visit. Thus, in order to be considered a serious candidate, I argue that potential presidential candidates will need to air at least some campaign advertisements on television during the invisible primary stage. Not advertising via television also serves as a signal that a potential candidate is not serious about being a presidential nominee. It may signal a lack of sufficient funds, which is a deal-breaker in terms of being a national party's presidential nominee.

The significance of advertising on television during the invisible primary is a signal that a campaign is serious. While I think the lack of television advertising could be overcome with other forms of campaign activity, such as personal visits and/or local campaign offices, I still argue that advertising on television is crucial if a candidate aims to be considered viable for his or her party's presidential nomination.

Table 5 shows that on the Democratic side of the 2008 presidential nominating contest, most of the candidates reached the benchmark of at least airing some ads on television. The only two not to air any advertisements were Kucinich and Vilsack. While Obama did air the most advertisements during 2007, with over 16,000, neither Clinton nor Edwards were too far behind as they aired 13,764 and 10,518 ads respectively. If the viability of potential nominees is based on whether they aired television ads at all, then nearly all Democratic candidates can be considered to be serious competitors. If, however, viable candidates must air enough ads not to be dwarfed by their competition, then perhaps only Obama, Clinton, and Edwards should be thought of as serious.

Table 6 shows that on the Republican side, the only candidates that did not air any campaign advertisements were Brownback, Keyes, and T. Thompson. Romney out-advertised the rest of the Republican field by a significant margin, airing over 27,000 advertisements on television during 2007. McCain was the next-closest, though still quite distant, airing 3,371 while four other candidates – F. Thompson, Giuliani, Huckabee, and Paul – were not too far behind McCain. From these figures, it cannot be the case then that advertising alone is enough to propel a candidate to his party's nomination. Interestingly, if the number of ads aired by McCain during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest is the figure we consider to be necessary for a candidate to be considered viable, then two additional Democratic challengers also have to be considered to be viable: Richardson, who aired 5,868 ads, and Dodd, who aired a total of 3,860 television ads during 2007. Chapter 4 considers the effects that both television advertisements and candidate visits have on members of the electorate.

Appeal to Voters

Appealing to voters, the fourth criterion, is paramount. Because the modern presidential nominating process requires binding caucuses and primary elections, candidates cannot win their parties' nominations if they do not have supporters who are willing to vote or caucus for them. Turnout in nominating contests is much lower than turnout in general elections. Party activists are, by and large, considered to be more likely to turn out to vote in primaries and also to be more ideologically extreme than general-election voters (Polsby 1983; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Carmines and Woods 2002; but see Geer 1988; Norrander 1989).

Despite the difference in turnout between caucuses, primaries, and the general election, potential presidential nominees must still have sufficiently broad appeal to be considered electable by the general-election electorate. Candidates must not be considered so extreme or

ideological that they cannot appeal to more ideologically moderate voters, as they are the voters who often determine the outcome of the general election. Party activists know that extremely ideological candidates are not likely to be successful in a general election environment and so sometimes consider the “electability” of their party’s potential nominee before voting in the nominating contest. Abramowitz (1989) argues that when choosing their party’s presidential candidate, Republican and Democratic primary voters weighed electability in addition to their general evaluations of the candidates.

Table 7 shows public support of Democratic candidates by month. Again, we see that Clinton led the field throughout the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Her support in public opinion polls throughout 2007 was, on average, nearly 20 points higher than her nearest competitor. Obama was that second-place candidate for the entirety of the invisible primary, even at the outset, when conventional wisdom said he was less well-known than Edwards. Despite having run for president once before, Edwards struggled to stay within close proximity to Clinton and Obama. Edwards's highest levels of public support are seen at the conclusion of the first quarter, when perhaps not coincidentally he also posted robust fundraising numbers. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between fundraising and public opinion more systematically.

Table 8 shows public support of Republican candidates during 2007. Giuliani led throughout the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, yet did not experience that same level of success once voting in primaries and caucuses began. Interestingly, the public's support of Fred Thompson's campaign both rose and fell during the course of the invisible primary. His support doubled between January and February of 2007 (3.4 to 6.4 percent) and then again between February and April 2007 (6.4 to 12.4 percent) and rose as high as almost 19

percent during the summer of 2007. By the end of the year, however, Thompson's support was barely above double-digits.² Finally, the trajectory of McCain's support from the public illustrates the collapse of his campaign in the middle of 2007, but it is difficult to know whether the decline in public support was a cause or consequence of other actions, such as decreased fundraising or decreased media coverage.

Outline of the Dissertation Project

In its entirety, this dissertation aims to examine the structure, substance, and effects of the 2008 Democratic and Republican presidential nominating contests. Chapter 2 examines structural factors of the 2008 nominating contests. I consider how public opinion, fundraising, and media coverage interact with one another during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest for the entire fields of Democratic and Republican candidates. I also examine the same structural relationships for individual candidates in an attempt to determine whether any of these relationships might be illustrative of which candidates are ultimately likely to be their parties' nominees.

Chapter 3 looks at the substance of the nominating contests. Here, I examine the contexts under which candidates use negativity in their campaigns. Using data on televised campaign ads that candidates aired during both the invisible and visible stages of the 2008 Democratic and Republican nominating contests, I analyze the degree to which candidates air negative ads against both members of their own party as well as members of the opposing party. I also examine more thoroughly how candidates in an intraparty contest employ issues within their television advertising.

² Interestingly, this rapid rise and decline in support was seen multiple times during the 2012 Republican nominating contest. In the conclusion of the dissertation, I think about whether there are structural factors that will make this pattern more likely in future nominating contests of both parties.

Chapter 4 shifts gears slightly. Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 examine the nominating contest largely from a candidate perspective, Chapter 4 thinks about how members of the electorate receive and process campaign information. Here, I use national public opinion data and the geographic variation in campaigning that occurs during presidential nominating contests to analyze the degree to which individuals learn from campaigns. I also consider whether individuals who see a large number of ads or experience a large number of candidate visits during the nominating contest are more likely to participate in politics in various ways during the general-election stage of the election.

All in all, the chapters proceed from examining the nominating contest from a macro-level to a micro-level. Chapter 2 uses national-level data from the entire invisible primary stage of the nominating contest to examine trends between fundraising, media coverage, and public opinion. Chapter 3 compares negativity and issues in television advertising between the invisible primary and visible primary stages of the nominating contest and also looks at several early-primary and caucus states. Chapter 3 also examines the effects of campaigns on individual members of the electorate asking whether survey respondents are more likely to participate in politics if they live in states that received a significant amount of campaign activity.

Finally, in the concluding chapter of the dissertation I think about the degree to which the Democratic and Republican nominating contests of 2008 can inform us about presidential nominating contests writ large. Did the fact that no incumbent competed in the 2008 contest in either side drastically affect the ways in which candidates interacted with one another? Did the historical nature of Obama's candidacy influence the Democratic nominating contest specifically and the totality of the nominating contests more generally? What effects will changes in rules and procedures governing nominating contests, including frontloading, delegate selection

procedures, and campaign finance laws, have on subsequent nominating contests? By asking these questions, essentially I consider the degree to which my research on the 2008 presidential nominating contests is generalizable to both previous years as well as future nominating contests.

Table 1. Fundraising by Democratic Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Biden	Clinton	Dodd	Edwards	Gravel*	Kucinich	Obama	Richardson	Vilsack
January	\$68,700	\$2,248,306	\$36,152	\$2,355,398	\$700	\$14,200	\$1,247,547	\$355,910	\$208,700
February	\$247,700	\$3,787,175	\$260,700	\$2,161,144	\$1,700	\$31,450	\$3,158,173	\$2,236,500	\$295,400
March	\$1,897,980	\$17,555,742	\$3,421,268	\$7,559,794	\$3,850	\$69,206	\$15,584,252	\$2,979,618	\$16,900
April	\$169,725	\$1,926,503	\$239,350	\$762,229	\$16,058	\$63,809	\$4,668,363	\$1,234,042	\$24,200
May	\$300,325	\$4,972,203	\$179,600	\$970,595	\$23,105	\$57,245	\$7,632,834	\$1,335,501	\$98,350
June	\$1,810,990	\$17,016,619	\$2,605,513	\$3,858,762	\$11,727	\$75,367	\$12,225,316	\$2,966,163	\$16,915
July	\$223,524	\$1,704,266	\$105,650	\$308,701	\$24,124	\$66,388	\$1,602,992	\$622,843	\$12,950
August	\$543,200	\$5,323,527	\$115,800	\$569,246	\$10,505	\$149,103	\$3,782,118	\$510,388	\$42,000
September	\$627,709	\$14,105,658	\$1,037,609	\$3,040,832	\$13,655	\$140,632	\$8,488,254	\$2,583,326	\$5,100
October	\$308,774	\$5,469,825	\$266,635	\$462,798	\$25,650	\$81,465	\$2,105,073	\$505,003	\$0
November	\$522,074	\$6,032,205	\$497,457	\$555,619	\$19,340	\$240,192	\$4,239,045	\$927,336	\$200
December	\$465,090	\$9,923,034	\$337,700	\$986,353	\$6,442	\$123,993	\$6,530,117	\$922,097	\$0
2007 Total	\$7,185,791	\$90,065,063	\$9,103,434	\$23,591,471	\$156,856	\$1,113,050	\$71,264,084	\$17,178,727	\$720,715

* Gravel left the Democratic Party to become a member of the Libertarian Party in March of 2008. Because his departure took place after the invisible primary of the Democratic contest, he is still included in these tables. He pursued the presidential nomination of the Libertarian party, but came in fourth at the convention.

Table 2. Fundraising by Republican Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Brownback	F. Thompson	Gilmore	Giuliani	Huckabee	Hunter
January	\$142,805	\$0	\$37,800	\$189,925	\$15,200	\$49,550
February	\$153,886	\$0	\$16,000	\$3,111,906	\$145,875	\$198,950
March	\$153,903	\$0	\$100,025	\$10,215,424	\$309,840	\$146,820
April	\$125,229	\$0	\$31,350	\$2,353,281	\$88,150	\$64,650
May	\$261,700	\$0	\$33,400	\$5,452,527	\$241,153	\$69,610
June	\$258,735	\$3,045,051	\$78,700	\$8,119,586	\$267,782	\$116,288
July	\$144,467	\$1,172,138	\$1,000	\$1,922,391	\$68,850	\$48,850
August	\$127,293	\$948,809	\$0	\$2,610,744	\$211,929	\$31,950
September	\$76,348	\$3,260,199	\$0	\$5,267,406	\$371,871	\$81,030
October	\$39,528	\$1,625,924	\$0	\$2,408,558	\$737,345	\$46,950
November	\$33,100	\$1,058,274	\$0	\$4,987,026	\$1,249,792	\$76,352
December	\$6,900	\$994,691	\$0	\$5,176,904	\$2,100,139	\$72,420
2007 Total	\$1,523,894	\$12,105,086	\$298,275	\$51,815,678	\$5,807,926	\$1,003,420
	Keyes	McCain	Paul	Romney	Tancredo	T. Thompson
January	\$1,900	\$1,279,912	\$55,650	\$6,873,019	\$48,360	\$22,223
February	\$5,282	\$2,377,965	\$180,755	\$4,653,099	\$138,716	\$70,098
March	\$1,125	\$6,892,020	\$157,244	\$7,977,161	\$94,584	\$225,670
April	\$1,000	\$1,554,950	\$120,812	\$1,610,844	\$94,076	\$138,091
May	\$0	\$2,634,866	\$471,814	\$2,699,578	\$113,436	\$114,205
June	\$1,100	\$5,192,002	\$627,228	\$6,897,750	\$125,905	\$141,793
July	\$7,648	\$1,165,891	\$451,309	\$685,189	\$53,361	\$92,301
August	\$1,000	\$802,173	\$739,176	\$1,829,836	\$56,694	\$72,064
September	\$7,451	\$1,625,919	\$1,509,469	\$5,080,883	\$36,684	\$6,000
October	\$15,950	\$1,005,296	\$1,132,881	\$1,438,334	\$13,750	\$5,800
November	\$43,640	\$1,247,703	\$2,782,026	\$2,631,024	\$62,455	\$2,300
December	\$30,683	\$2,157,668	\$3,321,198	\$3,009,222	\$10,350	\$22,766
2007 Total	\$116,779	\$27,936,365	\$11,549,562	\$45,385,939	\$848,371	\$913,311

Table 3. *New York Times* Coverage of Democratic Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Biden	Clinton	Dodd	Edwards	Gravel*	Kucinich	Obama	Richardson	Vilsack
January	28	20	0	35	0	4	90	9	9
February	22	34	2	51	1	3	109	11	7
March	6	23	0	56	1	2	89	17	4
April	12	28	2	73	4	8	110	21	1
May	4	15	1	47	4	2	94	12	0
June	8	35	0	57	4	7	82	17	0
July	11	35	2	69	4	12	94	15	8
August	11	27	2	55	4	4	79	18	2
September	15	44	0	64	7	4	96	11	2
October	24	46	5	63	2	3	98	12	0
November	19	50	5	86	4	11	112	18	4
December	18	63	7	111	4	11	166	18	2
2007 Total	178	420	26	767	39	71	1,219	179	39

* Gravel left the Democratic Party to become a member of the Libertarian Party in March of 2008. Because his departure took place after the invisible primary of the Democratic contest, he is still included in these tables. He pursued the presidential nomination of the Libertarian party, but came in fourth at the convention.

Table 4. *New York Times* Coverage of Republican Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Brownback	F. Thompson	Gilmore	Giuliani	Huckabee	Hunter
January	18	1	0	32	6	2
February	9	1	0	47	6	4
March	8	4	1	56	3	3
April	8	5	2	57	3	1
May	5	8	3	65	11	7
June	7	13	2	59	4	3
July	12	20	2	53	4	0
August	9	10	1	67	10	3
September	8	16	2	88	9	4
October	8	23	1	105	27	12
November	5	17	1	104	30	3
December	2	16	1	92	121	5
2007 Total	99	134	16	825	234	47
	Keyes	McCain	Paul	Romney	Tancredo	T. Thompson
January	0	49	1	20	1	0
February	2	73	1	30	3	5
March	0	68	3	23	1	0
April	0	99	2	51	9	3
May	0	61	13	51	10	4
June	0	46	4	50	5	4
July	1	58	12	48	3	1
August	0	37	9	55	7	2
September	2	67	4	59	3	0
October	2	65	15	81	10	0
November	0	62	15	75	8	0
December	5	85	18	134	11	1
2007 Total	12	770	97	677	71	20

Table 5. Television Advertising by Democratic Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Biden	Clinton	Dodd	Edwards	Gravel*	Kucinich	Obama	Richardson	Vilsack
January	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	272	0
May	0	0	657	59	0	0	0	890	0
June	0	0	1,456	84	0	0	66	713	0
July	0	0	23	401	0	0	470	824	0
August	442	358	0	0	0	0	1,343	1,350	0
September	180	1,328	0	0	0	0	1,524	291	0
October	0	1,589	209	0	0	0	2,183	309	0
November	0	2,805	582	3,165	0	0	3,348	707	0
December	2,086	7,684	933	6,809	62	0	7,631	512	0
2007 Total	2,708	13,764	3,860	10,518	62	0	16,575	5,868	0

* Gravel left the Democratic Party to become a member of the Libertarian Party in March of 2008. Because his departure took place after the invisible primary of the Democratic contest, he is still included in these tables. He pursued the presidential nomination of the Libertarian party, but came in fourth at the convention.

Table 6. Television Advertising by Republican Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Brownback	F. Thompson	Gilmore	Giuliani	Huckabee	Hunter
January	0	0	0	0	0	149
February	0	0	0	0	0	118
March	0	0	0	0	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0	22
May	0	0	0	0	0	13
June	0	0	0	0	0	0
July	0	0	0	0	0	0
August	0	0	0	0	0	33
September	0	12	0	0	0	0
October	0	0	0	0	0	0
November	0	1,514	0	824	258	0
December	0	509	0	2,107	2,702	18
2007 Total	0	2,035	0	2,931	2,960	353
	Keyes	McCain	Paul	Romney	Tancredo	T. Thompson
January	0	0	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	0	365	0	0
March	0	0	0	963	0	0
April	0	0	0	623	0	0
May	0	0	0	1,423	0	0
June	0	0	0	1,071	0	0
July	0	0	0	822	0	0
August	0	0	153	1,076	0	0
September	0	5	0	3,781	0	0
October	0	402	36	2,828	0	0
November	0	750	721	4,716	82	0
December	0	2,214	872	9,352	17	0
2007 Total	0	3,371	1,782	27,020	99	0

Table 7. Public Support of Democratic Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Biden	Clinton	Dodd	Edwards	Gravel*	Kucinich	Obama	Richardson	Vilsack
January	2.5	37.9	0.5	12.6	0.1	0.8	19.0	2.6	0.0
February	1.5	38.0	0.2	12.1	0.3	0.6	23.7	2.9	--
March	1.6	36.3	0.2	16.0	0.2	0.6	22.6	2.6	--
April	2.0	36.7	0.8	15.0	0.0	0.9	24.3	3.0	--
May	1.8	37.0	0.5	11.9	0.3	1.1	24.0	2.6	--
June	2.2	38.9	0.6	13.0	0.6	1.9	23.2	2.7	--
July	2.2	41.3	0.4	11.6	0.1	1.7	23.9	3.1	--
August	2.2	40.8	0.8	12.8	0.6	2.7	23.2	2.7	--
September	2.0	41.5	0.8	11.3	0.1	1.6	21.4	3.3	--
October	2.1	44.6	0.8	11.8	0.1	1.8	22.4	2.8	--
November	2.8	43.8	0.9	12.1	0.1	1.7	23.8	3.2	--
December	2.3	43.4	0.2	12.7	0.1	2.3	29.7	1.7	--

* Gravel left the Democratic Party to become a member of the Libertarian Party in March of 2008. Because his departure took place after the invisible primary of the Democratic contest, he is still included in these tables. He pursued the presidential nomination of the Libertarian party, but came in fourth at the convention.

-- indicates that no polls were taken asking that candidate's name during that month, so a value could not be calculated.

Table 8. Public Support of Republican Presidential Candidates in 2007

	Brownback	F. Thompson	Gilmore	Giuliani	Huckabee	Hunter
January	1.7	3.4	1.4	39.6	1.1	0.8
February	1.7	6.4	0.1	41.3	1.6	0.8
March	1.5	9.9	1.0	35.3	1.6	0.5
April	1.2	12.4	0.2	30.3	2.0	1.1
May	1.4	14.1	0.8	27.9	2.3	1.2
June	1.2	18.4	0.2	28.3	2.3	0.8
July	1.1	18.7	0.3	29.9	2.0	1.0
August	1.2	18.7	--	28.5	3.6	0.9
September	1.3	18.5	--	27.2	5.3	1.3
October	--	16.4	--	30.1	7.3	1.6
November	--	13.2	--	25.6	15.4	1.5
December	--	10.0	--	18.0	19.3	1.4
	Keyes	McCain	Paul	Romney	Tancredo	T. Thompson
January	--	28.6	1.0	7.9	1.1	0.9
February	--	25.1	1.1	8.2	1.0	1.4
March	--	21.3	0.8	8.6	0.6	2.8
April	--	20.9	0.4	9.3	1.2	1.9
May	--	17.9	1.1	10.0	1.2	0.6
June	--	17.0	1.3	9.0	1.1	1.6
July	--	14.2	1.8	10.7	1.0	1.5
August	--	13.6	1.9	11.0	0.8	--
September	--	13.8	2.5	9.8	1.0	--
October	1.5	14.2	2.9	11.8	1.0	--
November	0.4	13.3	4.2	13.0	0.5	--
December	0.9	22.4	3.9	13.9	--	--

-- indicates that no polls were taken asking that candidate's name during that month, so a value could not be calculated

Chapter 2: Fundraising Dynamics of the Presidential Nominating Contest: The Invisible Primary Stage

Much of the literature dealing with the structural aspects of presidential nominating contests focuses on the rules of the presidential primaries and often begins by considering the Democratic Party reforms of 1968. The McGovern-Fraser Commission, established after the riotous party convention in Chicago, required that all delegate selection procedures be open, which meant that party leaders could no longer pick convention delegates secretly. An unforeseen consequence of these recommendations was that many states shifted from holding caucuses to primaries (Polsby 1983). Following the McGovern-Fraser Commission, a voluminous political science literature emerged as scholars studied the effects of rules changes on the presidential nominating process (see Norrander 1996 for a thorough review of this literature).

Existing research examined the changes to the rules system, including what types of candidates could be elected under the new rules as opposed to the old. Additional studies consider the demographic composition of the electorate that was now fundamentally responsible for choosing the party's nominees. Polsby's (1983) work examines how the reforms of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, as well as the reforms of the campaign finance rules in 1974 affected the presidential nominating process. He argues that following the reforms, the nominating convention was simply a rubber stamp, approving the party's nominee who was already chosen through individual state primaries and caucuses. Further, reforms altered the way in which candidates competed in the nomination process. Instead of relying on state parties for support, candidates had to run their own campaigns and build their own personal organizations in each state in which they wanted to compete.

Shafer's (1988) work traces the changes in the role of the nominating conventions and also tells of the important functions conventions still perform. The most fundamental change to the national party conventions since the mid-1950s, Shafer argues, is the removal of the nomination from the institution. The true effect of the party reforms of the 1960s was thus to institutionalize the nationalization of politics. The national party conventions became not about actually nominating a presidential candidate, but instead about launching the general election campaign; debating platform issues; and deciding rules for the party's next nominating contest (291-295).

Other scholars (Ranney 1972; Lingle 1981; but see Geer 1989) argue that under the new primary system, candidates are likely to be more extreme. Prior to the reforms, state party leaders could select the candidate they thought was most palatable to the general electorate. Under the new rules, candidates must appeal to more extreme voters, because they are the ones more likely to turn out to vote in a primary election.

Still other research focused instead of the placement of the individual state primaries and caucuses in the overall nominating contest. In the years since the changes to the presidential nominating contest institutionalized by the 1968 reforms, frontloading of primaries and caucuses has persisted into even the most recent electoral cycles. In 2008, the Democratic Party withheld the delegates from Florida and Michigan because those two states violated the party's rules about the earliest date on which a state was permitted to hold a primary contest. Because such large amounts of resources are spent in states holding primaries or caucuses early (Goff 2004), and because nomination contests are decided earlier than they had been prior to reform, states have an incentive to schedule primaries early in the electoral cycle as a way to be relevant in the nominating process.

The frontloading of primaries, according to Bartels (1988), has made “momentum” a fundamental factor in presidential nominating contests. Aldrich (1980) formalizes the dynamic aspect of the presidential nominating campaign and shows that winning an early primary or caucus state like New Hampshire or Iowa can have a major role in shaping the rest of the primary campaign. Because of the significant benefit to be gained from winning an early state, candidates are increasingly strategic about how and where to spend campaign resources.

Mayer's (1987) work demonstrates the importance of the two early states, arguing that the Iowa caucuses tended to winnow the candidate field, but that New Hampshire remained a major test of strength between the potential presidential nominees. Adkins and Dowdle (2001) expand upon this point, claiming that the New Hampshire primary plays a role in determining the ranking of candidate finishes, but that it does not necessarily have a deterministic effect on the winner of the party nomination. Steger, Adkins, and Dowdle (2004) later argue that results of the New Hampshire primary do improve forecasting models for presidential nominations, indicating that the state can have a corrective effect on the relative standings of some candidates seeking the presidential nomination, but that the effect is greater for Democratic candidates than for Republican candidates.

Bartels (1988) shows how momentum is created when individuals in the electorate have expectations about what will happen in the primary nominating contest and vote according to those expectations. Bartels illustrates four different varieties of momentum and argues that each plays a unique role in the translation of voters' expectations into outcomes during the nominating contest. Yet, overall, momentum amounts to the idea that individual voters want to support a winner. Voters in the primary want to support a candidate they believe has the capability of winning the general election. As Bartels notes, “no matter how attractive a candidate may be

... it makes little sense to nominate him if he cannot win the general election” (1988, 109).

Again, the dynamic, over-time element of the primary nominating process allows voters to weigh the outcomes of previous primaries and caucuses when making their own electoral decisions. In this fundamental way, the primary nominating process differs greatly from the general election and deserves careful and separate inquiry. Taken together, the work of Aldrich and Bartels demonstrates that all players in the nominating contest— delegates, activists, donors, and voters— make tradeoffs between supporting the candidate whose issue positions and ideology is most closely in line with their own and supporting the candidate whom they believe can win both the party’s nomination and then, later, the general election contest.

Summarizing much of the political science literature on primary nominating contests, Norrander (1996) points out that while scholars tend to acknowledge that rules matter in the presidential nominating context, we do not have as solid an understanding of how multiple structural influences, rules included, interact with one another. We know that proportional allocation can prolong a nominating contest (Kirschner and Richie 2008); we know that campaign finance rules constrain the ways candidates administer and implement their campaigns (Plouffe 2009); we know that money can be paramount if a candidate is to endure in the nominating contest (Norrander 2006). What I aim to do in this chapter is to explore how various components of the presidential nominating contest interact with one another.

The fundamental difficulty with studying the effects of rules on candidate strategy, as Norrander (1996) points out, is that candidates respond to the rules on the books at the time they run for election. David Plouffe, in his book The Audacity to Win, writes extensively about the Obama campaign’s understanding of the delegate allocation rules for the 2008 Democratic Party and discusses candidate strategy in light of those rules:

[On Super Tuesday] New Jersey offered a total of 107 delegates in the primary, Idaho only 18. [Clinton] won New Jersey comfortably by 10 points but netted only 11 delegates: the delegate margin was 59 to 48. [Obama] won Idaho with over 80 percent of the vote, winning 15 of the 18 total delegates, netting 12. The result was [Obama] netted 1 more delegate out of tiny Idaho than [Clinton] did out of big New Jersey. That's the real story of Super Tuesday (2009, 172-173).

The unstated assumption here is that Obama campaigned in Idaho with the goal of mitigating the delegate advantage Clinton was likely to rack up in New Jersey. Had delegate apportionment rules been different, perhaps Obama would not have campaigned in Idaho with as much vigor. In other words, studying the campaign strategy behind the delegate allocation process is notoriously difficult, and studying alternative rules schemes is even more difficult. Cooper (2001) attempts to simulate primary elections under a variety of rules systems, but her scholarship does not directly consider candidate strategy.

In this chapter, I aim to examine some of the structural aspects of primary campaigns, most especially the role that money and fundraising play in modern presidential nominating contests. Since the 1968 reforms and the rise of primaries and caucuses, the nominating process has become more candidate-centered. Candidates can no longer rely on the party faithful alone to guarantee their nomination, and party nominating conventions have become little more than a rubber stamp for the candidates already chosen by the voters through primaries and caucuses (Lengle and Shafer 1976; Polsby 1983; Shafer 2010; but see Zaller et.al. 2009).

Goff (2004) shows that early fundraising and large sums of money are significant factors in determining later success in nominating contests. However, in The Money Primary, he considers only the total amount (or tonnage) of money raised. Norrander (2006) provides evidence that candidates lacking in initial assets often drop out of the nominating contest early and argues that, "higher levels of early campaign fundraising will result in longer candidacies"

(490). Both these authors, however, focus solely on the total amount of money raised during the nominating contest.

Christenson and Smidt (2011) recognize the dynamic heterogeneity in the size of campaign contributions, pointing out that it is, “clear that candidates benefit from different types of contributors during the invisible primary and primary contest months. In accord with our characterization of structural and dynamic factors of contributions, we find that, even among just the big donors, there is a difference in the size of the donation conditional on whether that donation is made in the invisible primary or during the primary months” (21-22). The authors however, stop short of examining the in-depth relationship between small and large-dollar amount donations and instead just show that the average dollar amount contributed to both the Obama and Clinton campaigns was smaller in 2008 than in 2007.

This chapter examines several aspects of the fundraising process during the invisible primary stage of the 2008 Democratic and Republican presidential nominating contests. I consider not only the total amounts of money raised throughout the course of the invisible primary, but also: the percentage of contributions that are of small-dollar amounts; the percentage that are large-dollar contributions; and the amount of money raised by the candidate relative to the money raised by the candidate raising the most. The 2008 nominating contests were particularly interesting because in neither party did the candidate who raised the most money in 2007 go on to win his/her party's nomination in 2008.

Much was made of the fact that Obama secured large numbers of small donations (Malbin 2010), while Clinton was thought to be the candidate of the establishment and therefore privy to large-dollar contributions from the party faithful. But, as social scientists, we should be able to ask whether it matters if a candidate's contributions come through smaller-dollar or

larger-dollar amounts, a task I undertake here. Specifically, I aim to consider individual-level contributions prior to the period when any caucus or primary votes were cast. Examining the period referred to as the “invisible primary” (Hadley 1976), I examine the various aspects of candidate fundraising as well as whether any of those measures has a significant effect on public opinion or news coverage. Doing so will allow us to better understand the complicated dynamics of candidate fundraising during presidential nominating campaigns.

Thus, this chapter puts forth three sets of empirical analyses. First, descriptively, I aim to show the heterogeneity in individual-level contributions during each quarter of the invisible primary stage of the presidential nominating contest. I do this by examining various measures of fundraising in each quarter of 2007 for both the Democratic and Republican parties. Second, I ask whether any of the measures I described influence either public opinion in the national electorate or news coverage of the candidates. In this section, I also consider the reverse hypothesis – that is, whether polling and/or news coverage affects how much money candidates are able to raise. Finally, I look at differences between the candidates, to see if there is any way to measure whether a candidate is distinctively viable in his or her party's nominating contest and/or whether that candidate might be considered to be more ideological in nature.

Data and Methods

Data on individual campaign contributions were gathered from Opensecrets.org, which compiles and organizes data reported by the candidates to the Federal Election Commission. Candidates must report every campaign donation \$200 or more. If an individual donates smaller amounts that eventually total \$200 or more, those too must be reported to the FEC.³ From these

³ Since the candidates are not required to report monetary contributions smaller than \$200, my results may understate the impact and significance of small dollar contributions. When I discuss small donations, I recognize the

data, I calculate measures of the percentage of contributions donated to each candidate that I deem to be small-dollar (\$500 or less) and large-dollar (\$2,000 or more).⁴ For each party's contest I also determine which candidate is leading the fundraising contest in each week and, for each candidate, calculate the percentage of the total amount he or she raised. This is a measure of how far a candidate trails in the fundraising contest without relying on dollar measures. I also aggregate the total number of contributions in a given week.

Data on public opinion come from Pollster.com's aggregation of individual polls throughout the presidential nominating contest. Because there are not daily poll results, I aggregate all polling data to the week. During the invisible primary, then, I have a total of 52 weeks of data. In general, a week is measured from Wednesday through Tuesday, but I take some liberties with both the first and last weeks of the invisible primary, and make them slightly longer than seven days in order to best represent the polling data I have. The final week of the invisible primary (Week 52) thus captures eight days' worth of data and goes from December 26, 2007 through January 2, 2008. The first week of the invisible primary (Week 1) captures nine days' worth of data and ranges from January 1, 2007 through January 9, 2007. Aggregating the polling data in this way leaves me only three weeks (for most candidates) with no polling information. Throughout the majority of the analyses presented here, I simply employ linear interpolation to estimate the missing public opinion during those weeks.⁵

shortcoming of this measure. However, I believe any results that exist for small dollar donations will be understated, rather than overstated because the reported number of small-dollar donations is certainly smaller than the number of small-dollar donations the campaigns actually received.

⁴ The limit for individual campaign donations was \$2,300 during the 2008 presidential election cycle.

⁵ When candidates drop out of the race during the invisible primary stage of the campaign (as Democrat Tom Vilsack did in November of 2007), they are no longer included in public opinion polls, and so their polling measure drops to zero. Likewise, when candidates do not join the nominating contest until later in 2007 (as Republican Fred Thompson did in March of 2007), they are not necessarily included in public opinion polls starting in January. If candidates were missing polling results at either the beginning or end of time period I consider in this analysis, their public opinion numbers were zero. If there were polling values for the candidate both before and after the missing date, I use linear interpolation to calculate the missing week of polling data.

Data on media coverage of the presidential candidates are gleaned from Lexis-Nexis, and refer to any mention of the particular candidate in the *New York Times*. While some may argue that the NYT is not representative of the national media environment, previous scholarship has shown the agenda-setting power of the *New York Times* for newspapers throughout the nation (Roberts and McCombs 1994). This measure is not intended to represent precisely the amount of news coverage in any one particular week, but instead to capture differences in coverage over the course of the invisible-primary stage of the nominating contest.

When conducting the multivariate analyses, I examine the effect of a series of independent variables on two distinct dependent variables: a candidate's polling number, and the total number of news stories that appeared mentioning the candidate. Standard errors were clustered at the candidate-level to account for non-independence of observations. The equation below presents the polling and news models in more formal language:

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta x_t + \beta x_{t-1} + \varepsilon$$

Where:

y_t = the value of polling (or news coverage) in a particular week (t)

α = an intercept term

x_t = a vector of independent variables also measured at time t

x_{t-1} = a vector of independent variables measured at time t-1

ε = an error term

The independent variables in all models are: total dollars raised (logged to account for outliers); total number of contributions; percent of contributions that were \$500 or less; percent of contributions that were \$2,000 or more; percent of candidate's total-dollar amount compared

to weekly fundraising leader; and three dichotomous variables accounting for the end of each quarter of the fundraising period (March 31, 2007; June 30, 2007; and September 30, 2007), which were weeks 13, 26, and 39 respectively. In addition to the presence of these independent variables in the models presented below, I also include one lagged variable for each of the fundraising measures to account for the fact that campaign information may take some time to reach the electorate. Because the observations for each candidate are not independent of one another, I cluster the standard errors at the candidate level.

Polling is important because, prior to any votes being cast, it is the single best way that all relevant players in the nominating contest can gauge the relative position of the candidates to one another. Candidates as well as donors are aiming to translate their fundraising ability into favorable polling numbers. A candidate who is unable to translate contributions into an increase in polling numbers may be also unlikely to garner votes when the time comes for primaries and caucuses to begin.

News coverage of the campaigns is significant because the media is the vehicle through which a significant amount of information arrives at the voters themselves. The set of models estimating news coverage asks whether fundraising variables are able to affect the amount of coverage in one of the nation's premier newspapers. Thus, I consider whether news coverage and polling might also influence the total amount of money candidates are able to raise.

Perhaps it is the case that fundraising variables do not actually affect polling and/or news coverage, but the reverse: polling and news coverage influence and affect the amount of money candidates raise during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. This model follows the same framework as those above, but takes the logged amount of contributions as its

dependent variable and includes both news coverage and polling at times "t" and "t-1" as independent variables.

In the subsequent results section, I first discuss descriptive results, then move to the multivariate results. Within the multivariate results, I first examine the relationship between fundraising variables and polling for all Democratic and Republican candidates, then the relationship between fundraising variables and news coverage for all Democratic and Republican candidates. Next, I consider the relationship between fundraising variables, news coverage, and polling on the amount of money candidates raised for all Democratic and Republican candidates. Finally, I end the results portion of the chapter by considering all the previous models for individual candidates in an attempt to discern whether candidates who are more successful in the nominating contest have different profiles from those candidates who are less successful in the delegate-gathering portion of the nominating contest.

Descriptive Results

The 2008 Democratic and Republican nominating contests are particularly interesting to study for the reason that 2008 marked the first time since 1952 that neither a sitting president nor vice-president competed for his party's nomination. As such, both parties' contests were open and highly competitive. A different aspect of the nominating contest that could not have been known in advance, was that 2008 also marked an instance when neither party's nominating contest was won by the candidate who raised the most money during the invisible primary stage of the campaign. In all the tables that follow, the candidates are presented in reverse order of when they dropped out of their respective party's nominating contest. In other words, the eventual nominees are first, followed by the last person to formally withdraw and so forth. The

final candidate in each party's tables was the first candidate to announce the end of his or her bid to seek the party's nomination.

As evidenced in Table 1, Hillary Clinton led the Democratic fundraising in three out of the four quarters of 2007, trailing Barack Obama only in the second quarter of the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Overall, Clinton raised \$90,067,042 during 2007, while Obama raised \$71,477,172, or 79 percent of Clinton's total. Edwards trailed these two candidates with a total of \$23,627,408, which was 26 percent of Clinton's total. No other Democratic candidate raised over \$20 million. We can think about grouping the candidates based not just on their fundraising totals, but also on their ability to fundraise consistently throughout the invisible primary year. In terms of total funds raised, we have three candidates who raised large amounts of money (greater than \$20 million): Obama, Clinton, and Edwards. Richardson raised a middling amount of money (between \$10 million and \$20 million), and the rest of the field (Kucinich, Biden, Dodd, and Vilsack) raised low amounts of money (less than \$10 million).

In addition to the total amount raised, however, we can also look at how the candidates performed by quarter, defined here as stable, declining, or rising. I consider a candidate to be a rising fundraiser if the amount in the final quarter was two or more times the amount raised in the first quarter. I consider a candidate to be a declining fundraiser if the amount raised in the final quarter was half or less the amount raised in the first quarter. All other candidates are considered to be stable fundraisers. Based on these definitions, the only candidate in the Democratic contest who was a rising fundraiser was Kucinich. Edwards, Richardson, Dodd, and Vilsack were declining fundraisers, and Obama, Clinton, and Biden were stable fundraisers. Overall, then, Obama and Clinton were high-stable fundraisers; Edwards was high-declining;

Kucinich was low-rising; Richardson was middle-declining; Biden was low-stable; and Dodd and Vilsack were low-declining.

On the Republican side, which is presented in Table 2, we see that Giuliani led the candidates in individual-level fundraising, garnering \$51,834,178 throughout the course of 2007. Mitt Romney raised the next-highest total with \$45,517,612, which was 88 percent of Giuliani's total. The eventual Republican nominee, John McCain raised the third-largest amount of money during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, with \$27,936,666, or 54 percent of Giuliani's total. As with the Democratic candidates, we can categorize the potential nominees in accordance with how much total money they raised during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. The three candidates who are considered high fundraisers are McCain, Romney, and Giuliani. Paul and F. Thompson are middle-fundraisers, and all other Republican candidates (Keyes, Huckabee, Hunter, Tancredo, Brownback, T. Thompson, and Gilmore) are low-fundraisers.

Here, too we can also categorize the Republican candidates based on stability of their fundraising throughout the invisible primary. According to the earlier definitions, Paul, Keyes, and Huckabee were rising-fundraisers, while Giuliani and F. Thompson were stable fundraisers. All other Republican candidates, including the eventual nominee, McCain, were declining fundraisers (also Romney, Hunter, Tancredo, Brownback, T. Thompson, and Gilmore). Overall, then, the candidates are categorized as follows: McCain and Romney were high-declining; Paul was middle-rising; Keyes and Huckabee were low-rising; Giuliani was high-stable; F. Thompson was middle-stable; and Hunter, Tancredo, Brownback, T. Thompson, and Gilmore were all low-declining.

What we learn from these two tables is that at least during the 2008 nominating contest, having raised the most money during the invisible primary did not lead directly to electoral success. Despite scholarly and popular evidence to the contrary (Norrande 2006; Biersack 2012), having raised the most money obviously does not guarantee that a candidate will win his or her party's nomination. Moreover, it is not the case that an eventual nominee must be a stable fundraiser throughout the course of the invisible primary, as evidenced by McCain's ascension to the Republican party nomination. While I am cautious about making broad generalizations using these data alone, what we do notice is that candidates who are low-declining fundraisers tend to be the first to drop out of their party's nominating contests. In both the Democratic and Republican contests, all the low-declining candidates had dropped out of the nominating contest before any other candidates.

In addition to showing the total amount of money raised during the invisible primary stage of the presidential nominating contest, Tables 1 and 2 also show the percentage of contributions of small-dollar (less than \$500) and large-dollar (\$2,000 or more) amounts individuals contributed to each candidate's campaign. In general, I expect that most candidates raise money via large-dollar donations early on during the invisible primary. In doing so, they are appealing to their personal donor networks that exist as a result of previous political involvement or personal connections. As the campaign continues, however, I expect that most candidates will need to increase the percentage of their contributions that come from small-dollar amounts. This would indicate broader support among a mass electorate, which is needed if a potential presidential nominee is to be a truly viable candidate for his her party's nomination. While simply looking at one year of data does not allow us to make causal inferences about the

influence of small- versus large-dollar donations, we can begin to examine the degree to which raising money in this way might lead to electoral success.

During the first quarter, we see that 43 percent of Obama's contributions were small-dollar amounts, while 37 percent were large-dollar amounts. Throughout the year of the invisible primary, as expected, the percentage of Obama's small-dollar donations increased, while the percentage of his large-dollar contributions decreased. During the final quarter of 2007, 70 percent of Obama's campaign contributions from individuals were less than \$500, while 12 percent were \$2,000 or more. Interestingly, when we look at small- versus large-dollar contributions among other Democratic candidates, we see that Richardson and Biden most closely mirrored Obama's fundraising patterns, yet neither of those candidates had much success at the ballot box during the nominating contests themselves.

On the Republican side, McCain's fundraising patterns somewhat mirrored Obama's. During the first quarter, 35 percent of McCain's contributions came via small-dollar donations, while 41 percent were large-dollar donations; during the fourth quarter, those percentages has shifted, and 71 percent of McCain's contributions were small-dollar donations, while 10 percent were large-dollar donations. Throughout the entirety of the invisible primary, both Giuliani and Romney relied much more heavily on large-dollar contributions than did the eventual winner of the Republican nomination, McCain.

Interestingly, there were three candidates for whom the total amount of money raised was high, but the proportion of the overall money raised from large-dollar contributions was, perhaps, too high for the candidates to be considered viable. Clinton, Giuliani, and Romney all raised high levels of money during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, but even in the fourth quarter of 2007 more than one-quarter of their overall total was raised via

contributions that were \$2,000 or more. Such a high percentage of large-dollar contributions late in the year preceding the presidential election may be an indication that the candidates have not been able to convert their financial support into more popular support. The persistence of large-dollar support may suggest that Clinton, Giuliani, and Romney were simply returning to the same donor pool rather than broadening their contributor bases. Certainly raising large amounts of money - regardless of whether it is via large- or small-dollar donations - is preferable to raising small amounts of money; however, the results of the 2008 presidential nominating contests among both the Democrats and Republicans suggest that it is imperative that candidates broaden their contributor bases and appeal to individuals that give them smaller amounts of money.

The next part of this chapter turns to multivariate analysis in an effort to gauge the impact that total fundraising, as well as the percentage of those contributions that were less than \$500 and more than \$2,000 had on a candidate's polling numbers and the coverage they received from the popular press.

Multivariate Results

The preceding descriptive facts about fundraising by individual nomination candidates in 2008 lead naturally to multivariate examinations of the Democratic and Republican fields as a whole with regard to fundraising. I first examine the effect of campaign fundraising variables on polling in the 2008 Democratic contest.

Table 3 shows the global results for the degree to which fundraising variables affect polling for all the Democratic candidates. Here, we see that the percent of the fundraising-leader's total a candidate raises in a particular week has a statistically significant relationship to

his or her polling status in that week. Furthermore, the percentage of the fundraising-leader's total that a candidate raised in the previous week has an additional positive influence on the candidate's polling numbers. In other words, the higher the percentage of the fundraising-leader's total a candidate raises at time "t" and at time "t-1," the higher the candidate's polling numbers are at time "t". The only other statistically significant variable in the model is the dummy variable indicating the week the first-quarter FEC report was released (March 31, 2007). The negative coefficient on this variable indicates that after controlling for all financial variables, including the amount of money reported by the candidates, the issuing of the report actually had a slightly negative impact on Democratic candidates' polling numbers.

Table 4 presents an identical model for the Republican candidates. By and large, the results are the same. Both the percent of the fundraising-leader's total that the candidate raised at both time "t" and at time "t-1" have positive and statistically significant effects on the polling numbers of Republican candidates. There are no quarterly-report effects on the Republican side, but there is a small negative effect of the number of contributions on Republican candidates' polling numbers. In other words, after controlling for total amount of money raised by the candidates, the actual number of contributions has a small negative effect on the public opinion numbers of the candidates.

In neither the Democratic nor Republican model are any of the small-dollar or large-dollar contribution variables statistically significant. Likewise, the total amount of money raised by the candidates does not have a direct effect on that candidate's polling numbers in any given week, meaning that having a particularly good fundraising week does not guarantee a simultaneous or one-week-delayed positive jump in the polls.

The same kind of analysis can be done from the models that predict news coverage of candidates based on their fundraising characteristics. Table 5 shows the results for Democratic candidates. Here, we see that the number of contributions has a statistically significant positive effect on the number of news stories appearing about a candidate. This holds true for both the number of contributions at time "t" and at time "t-1". In other words, the more contributions a candidate receives in a given week, the more news stories that candidate has written about him/her. The number of contributions a candidate receives in the previous week also has a positive effect on the number of news stories that appear about that candidate. Again, we see a negative first-quarter effect on news coverage for the Democratic candidates, meaning that after controlling for the fundraising aspects, Democratic candidates experience less-than-expected news coverage the week the first-quarter FEC report is released.

On the Republican side, we see somewhat different results for news coverage. Table 6 shows that the only independent variable affecting the news coverage Republican candidates receive is the percent of the party leader's fundraising totals they raise. In other words, Republican candidates who raise large amounts of money compared to their co-partisans receive more news coverage. This is above and beyond what they receive just as a function of the total amount of money they raise. As with polling numbers in the Republican contest, there is no effect of the first-quarter FEC report. There is also no effect of the number of contributions a candidate receives on his or her news coverage among Republican candidates. Interestingly, the total amount of funds raised in a particular week does not affect Republican nor Democratic candidates' polling numbers or the amount of newspaper coverage they receive.

Since the models indicate that the total amount of money raised does not have a statistically significant impact on the candidates' polling numbers or the amount of news

coverage they receive, I turn to considering whether the amount of news coverage or polling affects how much money the candidates are able to raise. I include the independent variables measuring small- and large-dollar amounts as well, to see whether one or the other has a larger impact on the total amount of money a candidate is able to raise in a given week. Table 7 presents the results for the Democratic candidates, and indicates that neither polling numbers nor news coverage has a statistically significant effect on the total amount of money raised in a particular week. Many of the other fundraising variables, however, do have statistically significant effects. Both small-dollar and large-dollar contributions have positive effects on the total amount of money raised. This indicates that Democratic candidates do not experience a drop-off in the total amount of money they raise if they are raising a higher percentage of that money via contributions that are \$500 or less. Additionally, after controlling for the type of contributions a candidate is receiving, the number of contributions candidates receive still have positive effects on their total fundraising amounts. In other words, no matter whether the contribution is small- or large-dollar, more contributions leads to more money being raised. Again, it is not the case that if a candidate receives more small-dollar contributions that his or her fundraising total is diminished.

On the Republican side, we see that all the variables that were statistically significant in the Democratic models are also significant in the Republican model. Full results are displayed in Table 8. Again, higher percentages of small- and large-dollar contributions are associated with larger total amounts of money being raised. The one-week lag variables of both small- and large-dollar contributions are also statistically significant. Additionally, as with the Democratic model, candidates who have larger percentages of the fundraising leader's total are raising more actual dollars, and even controlling for all other fundraising variables, the number of

contributions still has a positive, statistically significant effect on the total amount of money raised in a given week. One important difference between the Democratic and the Republican models predicting the amount of money raised is with respect to news coverage. In the Republican model, the number of stories in the *New York Times* appearing about a candidate at time "t-1" has a statistically significant positive effect on the amount of money a candidate raises at time "t". The direction of this relationship is present in the Democratic model, but does not achieve statistical significance.

The single variable that has the most consistent effect across all models discussed so far is the percent of the party leader's fundraising total the individual candidate has raised. Candidates who are leading the fundraising contest, or at least close behind, are also receiving the predominant amount of news coverage as well as doing better in the polls. Recall however, as noted earlier, neither the Democratic Party candidate nor the Republican Party candidate who led in fundraising throughout the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest ultimately went on to win her or his party's nomination once voting commenced.

A Comparison of Candidates

The preceding analyses lead naturally to an examination of the same relationships, but for individual candidates as opposed to all candidates simultaneously. The goal is to see whether certain candidates— either those who ultimately ended up being serious contenders for their party's nomination, or those who were later considered only ideological standard-bearers— exhibited distinctive relationships between their fundraising, news coverage, and poll status.

First, let us consider the effect of fundraising variables on individual Democratic candidates' polling numbers throughout the course of the invisible primary. Table 9 displays

these results and shows that for the majority of the Democratic candidates, fundraising variables did not have an effect on polling status. One notable exception is for Obama: as he raised a larger percentage of Clinton's total (who was the party fundraising leader for much of the invisible primary), he performed better in the polls. It is perhaps the case that by demonstrating his fundraising ability in keeping pace with Clinton, Obama was able to demonstrate that he was a viable candidate who would actually be capable of winning the Democratic nomination. The other candidate for whom fundraising variables had a statistically significant impact on polling was Vilsack. The statistically significant results we see for Vilsack are likely idiosyncratic based completely on what his fundraising numbers happened to be the week of and before he polled above zero percent.

Table 10 presents the results of the corresponding Republican model predicting individuals candidates polling numbers based on their fundraising. The first thing to note is that for McCain, the eventual nominee, there was no relationship between fundraising and poll numbers at all. McCain's campaign all but collapsed in the middle of 2007, but any downturn in fundraising experienced as a result of that collapse did not appear to have a significant negative effect on McCain's polling numbers. By contrast, Huckabee's polling numbers appear to be most positively affected by the number of contributions his campaign received. Both the number of contributions his campaign raised at time "t" and at time "t-1" had a statistically significant positive effect on his polling numbers at time "t".

For Romney, on the other hand, the amount of money raised appeared to be more influential. Romney's polling numbers at time "t" were positively affected by the logged amount of money he raised at time "t-1". Giuliani's campaign during the invisible primary presents the most puzzling set of results with respect to the relationship between fundraising and polling

numbers. For him, both the percentage of small-dollar and the percentage of large-dollar contributions (and their lags) had a positive effect on his polling numbers, but the overall number of contributions in a particular week actually led to lower poll numbers in that week.

I now turn to examining the results predicting the effect of fundraising variables on news coverage. Beginning again with the Democrats, whose results are presented in Table 11, we see that there appear to be few systematic differences between the candidates. Obama experiences no positive impact on his news coverage based on any of the fundraising variables and his news coverage, in fact, is diminished the weeks of the second and third FEC quarterly reports. Clinton and Edwards experience slight upticks in their news coverage when they have fundraising weeks with high percentages of small-dollar contributions, although Clinton's effects are delayed by a week while Edwards's are more instantaneous.

On the Republican side, whose results are displayed in Table 12, we see very few impacts of fundraising variables on news coverage. Huckabee appears to benefit from an increased number of individual contributions as his news coverage is positively affected. No other serious Republican candidate has any positive relationship between his fundraising variables and the volume of news coverage he receives in a given week. Moreover, there do not appear to be any systematic differences between candidates who stayed in the nominating contest longer versus those who dropped out earlier.

Finally, I look to see whether polling numbers or news coverage positively affected the amount of money any of the individual candidates were able to raise, again controlling for all the other fundraising variables. Democratic results are presented in Table 13 and show that the only candidate whose polling affected the amount of money raised was Biden, and the relationship between those two variables was negative. In other words, when Biden's polling numbers were

higher at time "t-1" the amount of money he raised at time "t" was lower than expected.

Republican results, presented in Table 14, show that some candidates did experience positive relationships between polling or news coverage and the amount of money they were able to raise. McCain's total fundraising increased at time "t" when the volume of his news coverage was high at time "t-1". Keyes, Romney, and Brownback all experience upticks in the total amount of money they were able to raise at time "t" when their polling numbers were higher at time "t-1", and Brownback and Tancredo's fundraising numbers were higher at time "t" when simultaneously their polling numbers were high.

To conclude, when looking at individual-candidate differences, we do not see much of a relationship between polling, fundraising variables, and news coverage. However, it is interesting to note two specific points. First, it appears as though candidates who are least successful in their parties' nominating contests actually have their polling numbers influenced more by polling and news coverage than do candidates that are ultimately more successful. A spike in fundraising or news coverage can propel these lower-tier candidates forward in the polls, just as a surge in the polls can quite dramatically increase their news coverage or fundraising for a week or two. For candidates who already have a high degree of name recognition, the stakes are higher. They are not likely to be able to dramatically increase their standing in the polls by increasing their news coverage or fundraising totals in a particular week. A second point worth noting is that we get much more purchase from these variables when grouping candidates together than we do looking at candidates individually.

Discussion and Conclusion

Ultimately, I am hard-pressed to see systematic evidence of differences in the relationships between fundraising variables, news coverage, and polling between those candidates who perform well in their respective nominating contests and those that do not. Moreover, there appear to be no systematic differences in these relationships between candidates that are considered viable and those that are more ideological in nature. We would imagine it to be the case that viable candidates are able to play one resource (money, news coverage, polling status) off another and grow the effect of these multiple resources while non-viable (issue-based or ideological candidates) are not. Yet, this seems not to be the case. Candidates who ultimately went on to achieve electoral success did not appear to vary systematically from those candidates who dropped out early in the nominating contest. During the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, the individual structural pieces of the contest— fundraising, media, and polls— seem only loosely connected rather than tightly connected. Candidates may be able to marshal their resources with varying levels of individual success, but it does not appear to be the case that ultimately successful candidates in 2008 always had a particular relationship between money, media, and polling while ultimately unsuccessful candidates did not.

Despite the lack of clear-cut relationships between different types of candidates with respect to polling, news coverage, and the total amount of money raised, I argue that there are several contributions of this chapter. First, we have dismissed the notion that the candidates who ultimately perform best in the nominating contest are those who are most successful in their fundraising efforts in the early stages of the contest. The descriptive analyses shown here underscore the fact that heterogeneity exists in how candidates raise money, and that in 2008,

neither the Democratic nor Republican candidate who raised the most money during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest went on to win her or his party's nomination.

Second, we have clearly moved beyond just considering the total amount of money raised during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest and begun to consider the manner in which those contributions were raised (either via small- or large-dollar contributions).

Multivariate analyses predicting the total amount of money raised by candidate during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest demonstrate that candidates do not experience a decline in fundraising when a larger percentage of their money comes from small-dollar donations. While the descriptive tables make it seem unlikely that candidates can be considered viable if they raise money only from small-dollar donations, successful candidates do experience a natural increase in their support from small-dollar donations as the invisible primary continues.

Third, we have seen that money does not beget money and money does not directly lead to votes. Just because a candidate is able to raise the most money does not mean he or she will be able to ultimately transform that money into electoral success. Furthermore, raising significant sums of money in the first quarter of the invisible primary does not guarantee that a candidate will be able to sustain that level of fundraising through the rest of the invisible primary year of the campaign. The multivariable relationships between fundraising, polling, and news coverage do not lead to any simple conclusions, but do illustrate the complexity of the campaign and the difficulty present in isolating any one specific path that produces successful candidates.

Lastly, returning to the categorization of the candidates based on both their level of fundraising and their stability of fundraising efforts, I put forth the idea that candidates who are high-stable fundraisers have the highest likelihood of winning their party's nominating contests, but that other paths to the nomination are possible. Candidates who are high and declining, as

well as those who are middle or low and rising need an early primary or caucus victory to prove to the electorate that they are capable of winning. Candidates who are low and declining fundraisers have nearly no hope at winning their party's nomination to become president and appear to be some of the first to drop out of the nominating contest altogether.

Table 1: Democratic Fundraising During 2007, by Quarter

Candidate	Quarter	Amount	Number of Contributions	Percent \$500 or Less Contributions	Percent \$2,000 or More Contributions	Percent of Party Leader
Obama	1	\$ 19,989,972	17,163	43.03	37.33	84.73
	2	\$ 24,526,513	25,747	50.86	26.22	100.00
	3	\$ 13,873,364	15,723	53.97	24.68	65.65
	4	\$ 13,087,323	20,874	69.82	11.80	61.08
	Total	\$ 71,477,172	79,507			
	Percent Change			26.79	-25.53	
Clinton	1	\$ 23,591,223	15,168	26.46	54.36	100.00
	2	\$ 23,915,325	17,854	31.44	43.55	97.51
	3	\$ 21,133,451	18,826	37.74	33.60	100.00
	4	\$ 21,427,043	20,460	45.84	30.33	100.00
	Total	\$ 90,067,042	72,308			
	Percent Change			19.38	-24.04	
Edwards	1	\$ 12,076,336	9,791	38.42	39.08	51.19
	2	\$ 5,591,586	6,370	56.39	20.41	22.80
	3	\$ 3,918,779	5,893	69.78	12.01	18.54
	4	\$ 2,040,707	4,319	83.24	5.51	9.52
	Total	\$ 23,627,408	26,373			
	Percent Change			44.81	-33.57	
Kucinich	1	\$ 114,856	172	71.51	10.47	0.49
	2	\$ 196,421	355	77.75	7.04	0.80
	3	\$ 356,123	596	76.01	9.90	1.69
	4	\$ 448,450	991	85.97	4.34	2.09
	Total	\$ 1,115,850	2,114			
	Percent Change			14.46	-6.13	
Richardson	1	\$ 5,572,028	4,431	38.66	39.16	23.62
	2	\$ 5,535,706	5,686	51.55	23.18	22.57
	3	\$ 3,716,557	4,309	59.50	20.58	17.59
	4	\$ 2,458,487	3,553	69.60	14.61	11.47
	Total	\$ 17,282,778	17,979			
	Percent Change			30.94	-24.55	
Biden	1	\$ 2,214,380	1,690	25.56	36.98	9.39
	2	\$ 2,281,040	1,669	34.39	39.07	9.30
	3	\$ 1,394,433	1,403	47.33	23.24	6.60
	4	\$ 1,310,588	1,936	67.61	11.21	6.12
	Total	\$ 7,200,441	6,698			
	Percent Change			42.05	-25.77	

Table 1, continued

Candidate	Quarter	Amount	Number of Contributions	Percent \$500 or Less Contributions	Percent \$2,000 or More Contributions	Percent of Party Leader
Dodd	1	\$ 3,718,120	2,722	28.36	42.65	15.76
	2	\$ 3,024,463	2,265	28.21	40.18	12.33
	3	\$ 1,259,059	1,181	45.05	32.26	5.96
	4	\$ 1,101,792	1,095	49.13	26.67	5.14
	Total	\$ 9,103,434	7,263			
	Percent Change			20.77	-15.99	
Vilsack	1	\$ 521,000	564	56.21	26.95	2.21
	2	\$ 139,465	84	26.19	64.29	0.57
	3	\$ 60,050	34	8.82	73.53	0.28
	4	\$ 200	1	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total	\$ 720,715	683			
	Percent Change			-56.21	-26.95	

Table 2: Republican Fundraising During 2007, by Quarter

Candidate	Quarter	Amount	Number of Contributions	Percent \$500 or Less Contributions	Percent \$2,000 or More Contributions	Percent of Party Leader
McCain	1	\$ 10,549,897	8,127	35.14	40.89	54.09
	2	\$ 9,381,818	8,720	42.22	34.28	58.91
	3	\$ 3,593,983	5,818	65.09	16.02	36.67
	4	\$ 4,410,968	7,870	71.14	9.86	35.03
	Total	\$ 27,936,666	30,535			
	Percent Change			36.00	-31.03	
Paul	1	\$ 393,649	447	57.94	20.36	2.02
	2	\$ 1,219,854	1,775	70.08	11.49	7.66
	3	\$ 2,699,954	4,657	74.55	7.00	27.55
	4	\$ 7,272,978	15,184	82.80	4.02	57.76
	Total	\$ 11,586,435	22,063			
	Percent Change			24.86	-16.33	
Keyes	1	\$ 8,307	24	91.67	0.00	0.04
	2	\$ 2,100	4	75.00	0.00	0.01
	3	\$ 16,099	28	75.00	3.57	0.16
	4	\$ 91,523	233	88.84	2.58	0.73
	Total	\$ 118,029	289			
	Percent Change			-2.83	2.58	
Huckabee	1	\$ 470,915	398	41.96	34.42	2.41
	2	\$ 597,085	620	50.97	21.13	3.75
	3	\$ 652,650	945	69.21	11.43	6.66
	4	\$ 4,102,176	4,854	62.03	17.43	32.58
	Total	\$ 5,822,826	6,817			
	Percent Change			20.07	-16.99	
Romney	1	\$ 19,503,279	13,639	29.23	51.84	100.00
	2	\$ 11,208,172	11,067	46.47	27.74	70.38
	3	\$ 7,595,908	8,222	52.65	23.55	77.50
	4	\$ 7,210,253	7,498	49.60	26.42	57.27
	Total	\$ 45,517,612	40,426			
	Percent Change			20.37	-25.42	
Giuliani	1	\$ 13,517,255	9,067	28.28	53.03	69.31
	2	\$ 15,925,394	11,939	31.34	45.08	100.00
	3	\$ 9,800,541	9,652	41.44	32.45	100.00
	4	\$ 12,590,988	11,253	38.23	31.18	100.00
	Total	\$ 51,834,178	41,911			
	Percent Change			9.95	-21.84	

Table 2, continued

Candidate	Quarter	Amount	Number of Contributions	Percent \$500 or Less Contributions	Percent \$2,000 or More Contributions	Percent of Party Leader
F. Thompson	1	\$ -	-	-	-	0.00
	2	\$ 3,045,051	2,240	36.88	44.15	19.12
	3	\$ 5,381,146	5,936	53.25	20.54	54.91
	4	\$ 3,707,289	6,187	74.09	11.49	29.44
	Total	\$ 12,133,486	14,363			
	Percent Change			37.22	-32.66	
Hunter	1	\$ 395,320	400	52.75	28.75	2.03
	2	\$ 250,548	372	66.67	9.14	1.57
	3	\$ 161,830	238	68.49	11.76	1.65
	4	\$ 196,742	367	79.56	7.08	1.56
	Total	\$ 1,004,440	1,377			
	Percent Change			26.81	-21.67	
Tancredó	1	\$ 281,660	485	76.91	7.22	1.44
	2	\$ 333,417	744	86.29	3.49	2.09
	3	\$ 146,739	404	90.35	1.98	1.50
	4	\$ 86,555	290	91.03	3.10	0.69
	Total	\$ 848,371	1,923			
	Percent Change			14.13	-4.11	
Brownback	1	\$ 450,594	619	63.00	16.48	2.31
	2	\$ 645,664	778	55.78	18.51	4.05
	3	\$ 348,108	557	69.66	9.87	3.55
	4	\$ 79,528	66	46.97	40.91	0.63
	Total	\$ 1,523,894	2,020			
	Percent Change			-16.04	24.43	
T. Thompson	1	\$ 317,991	245	33.47	40.41	1.63
	2	\$ 394,089	406	56.16	24.14	2.47
	3	\$ 170,365	220	64.09	21.82	1.74
	4	\$ 30,866	19	26.32	63.16	0.25
	Total	\$ 913,311	890			
	Percent Change			-7.15	22.75	
Gilmore	1	\$ 153,825	106	29.25	46.23	0.79
	2	\$ 143,450	113	39.82	39.82	0.90
	3	\$ 1,000	1	0.00	0.00	0.01
	4	\$ -	-	-	-	0.00
	Total	\$ 298,275	220			
	Percent Change			-29.25	-46.23	

Table 3. Polling as a function of Fundraising Variables,
All Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.183	(0.184)
lag1_logamt	-0.379	(0.297)
numconts	0.001	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.001	(0.001)
per500l_we	0.005	(0.018)
lag1_per500l	0.017	(0.027)
per2000m_we	-0.023	(0.017)
lag1_per2000m	0.000	(0.027)
perofmax	0.174*	(0.056)
lag1_perofmax	0.147**	(0.035)
q1	-4.409*	(1.671)
q2	-3.144	(1.690)
q3	-0.819	(2.440)
intercept	1.863	(1.990)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 408, clusters = 8

Table 4. Polling as a function of Fundraising Variables,
All Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.361	(0.228)
lag1_logamt	0.166	(0.216)
numconts	-0.002*	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	-0.001	(0.001)
per500l_we	-0.028	(0.020)
lag1_per500l	-0.026	(0.022)
per2000m_we	-0.008	(0.042)
lag1_per2000m	0.001	(0.045)
perofmax	0.162**	(0.042)
lag1_perofmax	0.068*	(0.023)
q1	0.373	(1.049)
q2	0.117	(0.958)
q3	0.254	(0.870)
intercept	0.617	(1.335)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 608, clusters = 12

Table 5. News Coverage as a function of Fundraising Variables,
All Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.458	(0.320)
lag1_logamt	-0.264	(0.210)
numconts	0.003*	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.002*	(0.000)
per500l_we	0.024	(0.037)
lag1_per500l	0.039	(0.035)
per2000m_we	-0.067	(0.042)
lag1_per2000m	-0.023	(0.032)
perofmax	0.035	(0.037)
lag1_perofmax	0.036	(0.016)
q1	-5.245*	(1.992)
q2	-6.897	(3.972)
q3	-5.370	(2.519)
intercept	0.000	(1.214)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 408, clusters = 8

Table 6. News Coverage as a function of Fundraising Variables,
All Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.383	(0.215)
lag1_logamt	0.315	(0.182)
numconts	0.000	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.001)
per500l_we	-0.026	(0.015)
lag1_per500l	-0.032	(0.019)
per2000m_we	-0.044	(0.029)
lag1_per2000m	-0.040	(0.025)
perofmax	0.073*	(0.027)
lag1_perofmax	0.049	(0.025)
q1	-1.290	(1.224)
q2	-3.777	(1.847)
q3	-1.010	(1.287)
intercept	0.183	(0.343)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 608, clusters = 12

Table 7. Amount of Funds Raised as a function of Polling, News Coverage, and other Fundraising Variables, All Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	-0.039	(0.040)
lag1_polling	0.036	(0.030)
newsstories	0.020	(0.017)
lag1_newsstories	0.006	(0.019)
numconts	0.001*	(0.000)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.000)
per500l_we	0.073**	(0.013)
lag1_per500l	0.026**	(0.006)
per2000m_we	0.103**	(0.004)
lag1_per2000m	0.015	(0.010)
perofmax	0.025*	(0.008)
lag1_perofmax	0.009	(0.006)
q1	0.641	(0.417)
q2	0.670	(0.297)
q3	0.693	(0.493)
intercept	1.986	(1.125)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 408, clusters = 8

Table 8. Amount of Funds Raised as a function of Polling, News Coverage, and other Fundraising Variables, All Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	0.001	(0.015)
lag1_polling	0.009	(0.011)
newsstories	0.029	(0.015)
lag1_newsstories	0.043*	(0.017)
numconts	0.001*	(0.000)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.000)
per500l_we	0.068**	(0.005)
lag1_per500l	0.034**	(0.006)
per2000m_we	0.097**	(0.004)
lag1_per2000m	0.012*	(0.005)
perofmax	0.019**	(0.005)
lag1_perofmax	0.015**	(0.003)
q1	0.650	(0.590)
q2	1.015*	(0.344)
q3	-0.174	(0.565)
intercept	0.753*	(0.276)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N = 608, clusters = 12

Table 9. Polling as a function of Fundraising Variables, Individual Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	OBAMA		CLINTON		EDWARDS		KUCINICH		RICHARDSON	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.889	(1.473)	-0.260	(0.655)	-0.039	(0.201)	0.428	(0.309)	-0.078	(0.211)
lag1_logamt	0.376	(0.663)	0.297	(0.635)	-0.171	(0.182)	-0.013	(0.306)	0.122	(0.180)
numconts	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.007)	0.000	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.006)	0.000	(0.001)
per500l_we	-0.122	(0.080)	0.165	(0.088)	0.011	(0.053)	0.002	(0.016)	0.013	(0.021)
lag1_per500l	0.034	(0.075)	-0.008	(0.082)	-0.050	(0.051)	0.017	(0.016)	-0.018	(0.020)
per2000m_we	-0.120	(0.090)	0.044	(0.108)	0.057	(0.076)	-0.029	(0.023)	-0.006	(0.029)
lag1_per2000m	-0.048	(0.086)	-0.076	(0.101)	-0.016	(0.071)	0.014	(0.021)	-0.021	(0.024)
perofmax	0.034*	(0.015)	0.039	(0.029)	-0.039	(0.024)	-0.001	(0.075)	0.002	(0.006)
lag1_perofmax	0.025	(0.014)	0.036	(0.028)	-0.022	(0.020)	0.076	(0.072)	0.007	(0.005)
q1	-6.581	(4.447)	-1.084	(5.380)	-0.409	(4.300)	-0.725	(0.832)	-0.434	(0.918)
q2	-4.357	(4.480)	4.426	(4.951)	-3.595	(3.233)	0.403	(0.859)	-1.093	(0.831)
q3	-4.103	(3.064)	10.886*	(5.139)	-1.804	(3.480)	-0.974	(0.987)	-0.211	(1.047)
intercept	9.555	(20.370)	28.370**	(3.250)	17.342*	(6.899)	-3.880	(2.646)	3.005**	(0.652)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 9, continued

Variable	BIDEN		DODD		VILSACK	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	-0.142	(0.127)	-0.024	(0.042)	0.002	(0.005)
lag1_logamt	0.013	(0.101)	0.053	(0.043)	-0.002	(0.005)
numconts	-0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	0.003**	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.000)	-0.002**	(0.001)
per500l_we	0.010	(0.012)	0.002	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.000)
lag1_per500l	-0.017	(0.010)	-0.008	(0.005)	0.001	(0.000)
per2000m_we	-0.016	(0.013)	-0.004	(0.005)	0.000	(0.000)
lag1_per2000m	-0.024	(0.012)	-0.009	(0.006)	0.000	(0.000)
perofmax	0.034	(0.024)	0.008	(0.013)	-0.024**	(0.007)
lag1_perofmax	-0.020	(0.021)	-0.018	(0.011)	0.030**	(0.005)
q1	1.489	(1.770)	0.372	(0.583)	-0.063	(0.058)
q2	0.467	(1.597)	0.839	(0.550)	-0.037	(0.055)
q3	-0.004	(0.826)	-0.565	(0.469)	0.011	(0.054)
intercept	4.892**	(0.704)	1.013**	(0.285)	-0.001	(0.012)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 10. Polling as a function of Fundraising Variables, Individual Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	MCCAIN		PAUL		KEYES		HUCKABEE		ROMNEY	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	8.849	(5.967)	0.139	(0.417)	0.023	(0.036)	-0.075	(0.244)	0.534	(1.438)
lag1_logamt	-5.675	(5.902)	0.082	(0.196)	0.004	(0.037)	-0.028	(0.222)	3.798*	(1.479)
numconts	-0.013	(0.011)	0.000	(0.000)	0.014	(0.019)	0.014**	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.002)
lag1_numconts	0.010	(0.009)	0.000	(0.000)	0.039	(0.022)	0.021**	(0.003)	-0.004*	(0.002)
per500l_we	0.218	(0.332)	0.003	(0.030)	-0.001	(0.003)	0.002	(0.023)	-0.041	(0.075)
lag1_per500l	0.305	(0.329)	0.002	(0.021)	0.000	(0.003)	0.004	(0.022)	0.153	(0.076)
per2000m_we	0.370	(0.384)	0.000	(0.041)	-0.137	(0.078)	0.001	(0.028)	-0.067	(0.075)
lag1_per2000m	0.421	(0.374)	-0.008	(0.030)	-0.009	(0.015)	0.010	(0.029)	0.023	(0.080)
perofmax	0.041	(0.057)	-0.004	(0.015)	-0.106	(0.341)	0.061*	(0.028)	-0.015	(0.023)
lag1_perofmax	-0.043	(0.061)	0.019	(0.014)	0.218	(0.399)	-0.109**	(0.038)	-0.012	(0.023)
q1	9.340	(11.457)	-1.192	(1.030)	-0.008	(0.475)	-1.468	(1.733)	-1.004	(3.316)
q2	0.303	(8.831)	-1.734	(1.076)	-0.036	(0.465)	-0.546	(1.752)	-0.118	(3.799)
q3	-3.640	(7.903)	-0.418	(1.093)	4.289	(2.697)	0.405	(1.742)	1.756	(3.556)
intercept	-69.017	(83.117)	-1.337	(3.342)	-0.058	(0.110)	1.152	(1.141)	-44.984*	(22.120)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 10, continued

	GIULIANI		F. THOMPSON		HUNTER		TANCREDO		BROWNBACK	
Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	4.219	(2.359)	0.678	(1.057)	-0.209	(0.352)	0.245**	(0.084)	0.140	(0.085)
lag1_logamt	5.232	(2.651)	-0.656	(1.023)	0.156	(0.150)	0.212*	(0.093)	0.219*	(0.100)
numconts	-0.010*	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.006)	-0.007	(0.012)	-0.017**	(0.005)	0.001	(0.005)
lag1_numconts	0.007	(0.004)	0.001	(0.004)	0.002	(0.008)	0.000	(0.005)	-0.003	(0.005)
per500l_we	0.574*	(0.244)	0.031	(0.114)	0.006	(0.008)	0.020	(0.011)	-0.013*	(0.006)
lag1_per500l	0.516*	(0.227)	0.054	(0.108)	0.016*	(0.007)	-0.008	(0.008)	-0.008	(0.006)
per2000m_we	0.442*	(0.198)	-0.014	(0.193)	0.016	(0.011)	-0.024	(0.020)	-0.012	(0.008)
lag1_per2000m	0.388*	(0.167)	0.195	(0.193)	-0.002	(0.008)	0.016	(0.020)	-0.020*	(0.010)
perofmax	-0.153	(0.085)	0.048	(0.051)	0.068	(0.092)	0.100	(0.053)	-0.026	(0.037)
lag1_perofmax	0.036	(0.074)	0.030	(0.053)	-0.022	(0.081)	-0.102	(0.051)	-0.021	(0.033)
q1	19.539*	(7.475)	5.052	(4.783)	-0.161	(0.642)	-0.624	(0.453)	-0.448	(0.658)
q2	7.150	(6.346)	0.395	(5.924)	-0.092	(0.592)	0.182	(0.429)	-0.830	(0.565)
q3	4.225	(6.988)	5.187	(7.304)	0.575	(0.563)	-0.413	(0.406)	-0.165	(0.586)
intercept	-144.714**	(47.944)	5.281**	(1.069)	0.037	(2.343)	-3.641**	(1.312)	-0.071	(0.372)

* = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01

N for each candidate = 51

Table 10, continued

Variable	T.THOMPSON		GILMORE	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.130	(0.082)	-0.038	(0.033)
lag1_logamt	0.129	(0.074)	0.039	(0.034)
numconts	0.001	(0.012)	0.003	(0.025)
lag1_numconts	0.008	(0.010)	-0.016	(0.010)
per500l_we	-0.003	(0.005)	0.007*	(0.003)
lag1_per500l	0.013*	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.003)
per2000m_we	-0.010	(0.008)	0.017**	(0.004)
lag1_per2000m	-0.008	(0.007)	0.004	(0.003)
perofmax	0.070	(0.056)	-0.397	(0.216)
lag1_perofmax	-0.050	(0.051)	0.115	(0.178)
q1	1.319	(0.781)	1.211	(1.028)
q2	0.727	(0.740)	-0.642	(0.446)
q3	-0.299	(0.749)	-0.065	(0.339)
intercept	-0.187	(0.290)	0.065	(0.067)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 11. News Coverage as a function of Fundraising Variables, Individual Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	OBAMA		CLINTON		EDWARDS		KUCINICH		RICHARDSON	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	-0.564	(4.100)	0.324	(0.650)	0.563	(0.570)	0.528	(0.451)	-0.153	(0.538)
lag1_logamt	1.869	(1.846)	-0.802	(0.630)	0.317	(0.516)	-0.005	(0.447)	0.295	(0.459)
numconts	0.005	(0.004)	0.002	(0.001)	0.008	(0.004)	0.005	(0.011)	0.001	(0.002)
lag1_numconts	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.005	(0.009)	-0.001	(0.002)
per500l_we	0.371	(0.222)	-0.041	(0.088)	0.416**	(0.149)	-0.025	(0.024)	0.085	(0.053)
lag1_per500l	0.083	(0.208)	0.175*	(0.081)	0.226	(0.145)	-0.007	(0.023)	-0.078	(0.052)
per2000m_we	0.218	(0.250)	-0.064	(0.107)	0.243	(0.214)	-0.026	(0.034)	0.062	(0.074)
lag1_per2000m	0.048	(0.238)	0.037	(0.100)	0.390	(0.202)	0.019	(0.031)	-0.078	(0.062)
perofmax	0.000	(0.043)	-0.028	(0.029)	-0.059	(0.069)	0.107	(0.109)	-0.032*	(0.014)
lag1_perofmax	-0.085*	(0.039)	0.060*	(0.028)	-0.040	(0.057)	0.170	(0.105)	0.026	(0.013)
q1	-21.646	(12.379)	-5.233	(5.340)	-17.599	(12.178)	0.227	(1.214)	-1.685	(2.346)
q2	-36.725**	(12.470)	-9.150	(4.915)	-15.549	(9.157)	0.159	(1.254)	1.946	(2.124)
q3	-20.066*	(8.529)	-6.014	(5.101)	-17.963	(9.855)	-2.716	(1.441)	-0.213	(2.676)
intercept	-24.928	(56.698)	4.278	(3.226)	-47.940*	(19.536)	-1.415	(3.862)	1.887	(1.666)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 11, continued

Variable	BIDEN		DODD		VILSACK	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.286	(0.446)	0.131	(0.101)	0.029	(0.102)
lag1_logamt	-0.476	(0.353)	0.027	(0.103)	0.022	(0.102)
numconts	0.003	(0.008)	0.000	(0.001)	0.029	(0.018)
lag1_numconts	0.001	(0.003)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.044*	(0.017)
per500l_we	0.057	(0.043)	-0.004	(0.010)	0.004	(0.009)
lag1_per500l	-0.061	(0.036)	-0.005	(0.011)	0.006	(0.009)
per2000m_we	-0.028	(0.047)	-0.009	(0.013)	-0.006	(0.011)
lag1_per2000m	-0.069	(0.042)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.002	(0.010)
perofmax	0.101	(0.084)	-0.026	(0.031)	-0.245	(0.141)
lag1_perofmax	-0.112	(0.075)	0.012	(0.027)	0.413**	(0.115)
q1	3.952	(6.215)	0.832	(1.407)	0.221	(1.243)
q2	0.473	(5.607)	-0.236	(1.327)	0.905	(1.191)
q3	1.295	(2.900)	-0.538	(1.132)	-0.468	(1.169)
intercept	8.256**	(2.470)	0.125	(0.687)	0.360	(0.265)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 12. News Coverage as a function of Fundraising Variables, Individual Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	MCCAIN		PAUL		KEYES		HUCKABEE		ROMNEY	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	5.345	(5.218)	0.069	(0.748)	0.064	(0.046)	-0.291	(0.677)	6.629	(4.222)
lag1_logamt	-0.415	(5.162)	-0.018	(0.351)	0.029	(0.047)	-0.264	(0.617)	5.903	(4.342)
numconts	-0.004	(0.009)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.031	(0.024)	0.027**	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.006)
lag1_numconts	0.005	(0.008)	0.000	(0.001)	0.121**	(0.027)	0.013	(0.008)	-0.006	(0.005)
per500l_we	0.477	(0.290)	0.023	(0.053)	-0.002	(0.003)	0.017	(0.063)	0.117	(0.220)
lag1_per500l	-0.011	(0.288)	0.021	(0.038)	0.000	(0.004)	-0.014	(0.060)	0.141	(0.223)
per2000m_we	0.401	(0.336)	0.015	(0.073)	-0.059	(0.098)	0.054	(0.077)	-0.294	(0.220)
lag1_per2000m	-0.072	(0.327)	-0.001	(0.053)	0.006	(0.018)	0.026	(0.079)	0.029	(0.235)
perofmax	0.050	(0.050)	-0.004	(0.028)	0.141	(0.429)	0.107	(0.079)	-0.063	(0.066)
lag1_perofmax	-0.007	(0.053)	0.033	(0.025)	-1.889**	(0.501)	0.038	(0.106)	0.035	(0.067)
q1	2.463	(10.019)	0.170	(1.847)	-0.237	(0.597)	-3.474	(4.812)	1.057	(9.739)
q2	-9.556	(7.723)	-0.484	(1.929)	-0.040	(0.585)	-1.730	(4.864)	-2.023	(11.157)
q3	-7.223	(6.912)	-2.268	(1.960)	2.355	(3.392)	-3.751	(4.836)	5.998	(10.441)
intercept	-84.742	(72.688)	-2.774	(5.993)	-0.063	(0.139)	2.284	(3.169)	-143.635*	(64.956)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 12, continued

	GIULIANI		F. THOMPSON		HUNTER		TANCREDO		BROWNBACK	
Variable	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	1.700	(1.903)	-0.129	(0.354)	0.084	(0.813)	0.002	(0.301)	-0.489	(0.250)
lag1_logamt	2.716	(2.139)	-0.643	(0.343)	-0.285	(0.346)	-0.243	(0.333)	0.386	(0.296)
numconts	0.004	(0.003)	0.000	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.028)	-0.004	(0.017)	0.014	(0.015)
lag1_numconts	-0.002	(0.003)	0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.018)	0.015	(0.016)	0.007	(0.013)
per500l_we	-0.118	(0.197)	0.065	(0.038)	0.006	(0.019)	0.036	(0.038)	-0.004	(0.017)
lag1_per500l	-0.056	(0.184)	0.074*	(0.036)	0.009	(0.015)	0.034	(0.027)	-0.004	(0.019)
per2000m_we	-0.267	(0.160)	0.036	(0.065)	-0.012	(0.026)	0.018	(0.071)	0.023	(.024)
lag1_per2000m	-0.318*	(0.135)	0.114	(0.065)	-0.004	(0.019)	0.041	(0.071)	-0.044	(0.028)
perofmax	-0.025	(0.069)	0.010	(0.017)	-0.029	(0.211)	0.144	(0.191)	0.177	(0.110)
lag1_perofmax	-0.103	(0.060)	0.024	(0.018)	0.259	(0.188)	-0.064	(0.183)	-0.023	(0.099)
q1	-1.693	(6.032)	-0.884	(1.602)	1.038	(1.480)	0.237	(1.628)	-1.211	(1.944)
q2	-6.532	(5.120)	-1.931	(1.984)	-0.953	(1.365)	-0.983	(1.541)	0.024	(1.669)
q3	0.125	(5.639)	-0.217	(2.446)	1.021	(1.298)	-0.556	(1.457)	1.472	(1.732)
intercept	-3.539	(38.685)	0.884*	(0.358)	1.606	(5.407)	-3.212	(4.713)	2.471*	(1.099)

* = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01

N for each candidate = 51

Table 12, continued

Variable	T.THOMPSON		GILMORE	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
logamt	0.143	(0.110)	-0.048	(0.056)
lag1_logamt	0.133	(0.099)	0.007	(0.058)
numconts	-0.022	(0.016)	-0.042	(0.042)
lag1_numconts	-0.002	(0.014)	-0.024	(0.017)
per500l_we	-0.003	(0.007)	0.012*	(0.006)
lag1_per500l	-0.014	(0.008)	0.004	(0.005)
per2000m_we	-0.014	(0.010)	0.001	(0.007)
lag1_per2000m	-0.013	(0.009)	-0.007	(0.006)
perofmax	0.046	(0.074)	0.535	(0.373)
lag1_perofmax	-0.029	(0.068)	0.445	(0.307)
q1	1.809	(1.037)	0.712	(1.778)
q2	-0.323	(0.983)	-0.171	(0.772)
q3	-0.289	(0.995)	-0.314	(0.585)
intercept	0.040	(0.386)	0.314*	(0.116)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 13. Amount of Funds Raised as a function of Polling, News Coverage, and other Fundraising Variables, All Democratic Candidates, 2007

Variable	OBAMA		CLINTON		EDWARDS		KUCINICH		RICHARDSON	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	0.016	(0.020)	0.002	(0.049)	-0.128	(0.148)	0.149	(0.108)	0.043	(0.180)
lag1_polling	-0.003	(0.018)	-0.016	(0.046)	0.180	(0.146)	0.028	(0.106)	0.083	(0.194)
newsstories	-0.001	(0.007)	0.008	(0.048)	0.029	(0.051)	0.080	(0.070)	0.010	(0.072)
lag1_newsstories	0.003	(0.007)	-0.034	(0.049)	0.040	(0.058)	0.057	(0.074)	0.080	(0.074)
numconts	0.001**	(0.000)	0.001**	(0.000)	0.003**	(0.001)	0.017**	(0.003)	0.004**	(0.001)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.001*	(0.001)	0.002	(0.003)	0.000	(0.000)
per500l_we	-0.018	(0.009)	0.107**	(0.016)	-0.033	(0.047)	-0.004	(0.010)	0.070**	(0.012)
lag1_per500l	0.000	(0.009)	0.016	(0.014)	-0.007	(0.044)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.029**	(0.010)
per2000m_we	0.004	(0.011)	0.128**	(0.021)	0.020	(0.062)	0.028*	(0.013)	0.124**	(0.013)
lag1_per2000m	0.002	(0.009)	-0.004	(0.019)	0.002	(0.061)	0.002	(0.013)	0.030*	(0.012)
perofmax	0.001	(0.002)	0.016	(0.008)	0.001	(0.020)	0.005	(0.047)	-0.003	(0.007)
lag1_perofmax	0.002	(0.002)	0.000	(0.007)	0.011	(0.016)	-0.049	(0.049)	0.005	(0.007)
q1	-1.917**	(0.452)	-3.322*	(1.511)	-6.393	(3.462)	0.601	(0.529)	-1.754	(0.966)
q2	-2.143**	(0.468)	-2.453	(1.443)	-3.653	(2.742)	0.519	(0.545)	-0.959	(0.923)
q3	-0.984**	(0.356)	-2.236	(1.585)	-3.857	(2.839)	0.096	(0.670)	-2.283*	(1.053)
intercept	13.126**	(1.064)	2.605	(1.976)	12.261*	(5.685)	6.991**	(1.030)	1.103	(0.908)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 13, continued

Variable	BIDEN		DODD		VILSACK	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	-0.260	(0.218)	-0.616	(0.648)	3.367	(5.977)
lag1_polling	-0.515*	(0.191)	0.825	(0.608)	7.645	(5.767)
newsstories	0.021	(0.062)	0.379	(0.272)	-0.157	(0.349)
lag1_newsstories	0.125*	(0.057)	-0.142	(0.271)	-0.280	(0.231)
numconts	0.010**	(0.003)	0.004	(0.002)	0.014	(0.039)
lag1_numconts	-0.002*	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.008	(0.036)
per500l_we	0.046**	(0.016)	0.060**	(0.013)	0.061**	(0.010)
lag1_per500l	0.000	(0.014)	0.020	(0.012)	0.015	(0.012)
per2000m_we	0.056**	(0.016)	0.087**	(0.015)	0.087**	(0.008)
lag1_per2000m	0.021	(0.016)	0.034*	(0.014)	0.001	(0.008)
perofmax	0.058	(0.033)	0.093	(0.048)	0.218	(0.305)
lag1_perofmax	0.004	(0.029)	-0.045	(0.045)	0.123	(0.311)
q1	-4.781*	(2.298)	-0.103	(2.248)	2.569	(2.046)
q2	-4.229*	(2.038)	-0.334	(2.191)	0.077	(1.930)
q3	-0.266	(1.115)	-0.981	(1.857)	-0.880	(1.800)
intercept	7.220**	(1.609)	3.030*	(1.182)	0.634	(0.452)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 14. Amount of Funds Raised as a function of Polling, News Coverage, and other Fundraising Variables, All Republican Candidates, 2007

Variable	MCCAIN		PAUL		KEYES		HUCKABEE		ROMNEY	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	0.001	(0.004)	-0.053	(0.134)	-2.065	(1.323)	-0.083	(0.210)	0.013	(0.019)
lag1_polling	0.003	(0.005)	0.174	(0.117)	2.840*	(1.327)	0.224	(0.229)	0.041*	(0.018)
newsstories	-0.002	(0.005)	0.019	(0.056)	1.100	(0.573)	-0.094	(0.089)	0.011	(0.008)
lag1_newsstories	0.020**	(0.006)	0.010	(0.058)	-1.063	(0.611)	0.003	(0.081)	-0.007	(0.009)
numconts	0.002**	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.024	(0.083)	0.006	(0.003)	0.001**	(0.000)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.313	(0.130)	0.000	(0.004)	0.000	(0.000)
per500l_we	-0.004	(0.009)	0.000	(0.017)	0.055**	(0.008)	0.063**	(0.014)	-0.016	(0.008)
lag1_per500l	0.004	(0.009)	0.058**	(0.008)	0.008	(0.008)	0.035**	(0.013)	-0.003	(0.008)
per2000m_we	0.023*	(0.011)	-0.015	(0.022)	-0.220	(0.335)	0.074**	(0.017)	0.003	(0.008)
lag1_per2000m	0.000	(0.010)	0.055**	(0.013)	0.038	(0.059)	0.032*	(0.016)	0.001	(0.009)
perofmax	0.000	(0.001)	0.026**	(0.008)	2.135	(1.474)	0.001	(0.027)	0.008**	(0.002)
lag1_perofmax	0.000	(0.002)	0.007	(0.008)	5.666*	(2.088)	0.008	(0.038)	-0.004	(0.002)
q1	-1.097**	(0.248)	0.029	(0.624)	-1.343	(2.012)	1.156	(1.314)	-0.683	(0.362)
q2	-0.384	(0.216)	0.973	(0.655)	-0.591	(1.986)	1.613	(1.305)	-0.803	(0.397)
q3	-0.500*	(0.219)	1.170	(0.648)	12.261	(11.462)	0.687	(1.401)	-1.014**	(0.366)
intercept	10.962**	(0.821)	6.123**	(1.665)	0.731	(0.423)	2.052*	(0.808)	12.185**	(0.741)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 14, continued

Variable	GIULIANI		F. THOMPSON		HUNTER		TANCREDI		BROWNBACK	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	0.016	(0.010)	0.002	(0.052)	0.051	(0.121)	0.785*	(0.290)	0.665*	(0.303)
lag1_polling	0.020	(0.010)	0.022	(0.054)	0.038	(0.109)	-0.152	(0.278)	0.650*	(0.315)
newsstories	0.019	(0.013)	-0.067	(0.078)	-0.044	(0.052)	-0.039	(0.092)	-0.163	(0.102)
lag1_newstories	-0.011	(0.015)	-0.010	(0.080)	0.007	(0.052)	-0.079	(0.106)	0.193	(0.102)
numconts	0.001**	(0.000)	0.002	(0.001)	0.029**	(0.005)	0.038**	(0.008)	0.025**	(0.009)
lag1_numconts	0.000	(0.000)	-0.001*	(0.001)	0.000	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.008)	0.014	(.008)
per500l_we	-0.065**	(0.015)	0.098**	(0.009)	-0.014*	(0.005)	-0.051*	(0.019)	0.048**	(0.008)
lag1_per500l	-0.006	(0.013)	0.031**	(0.009)	0.010*	(0.005)	0.002	(0.010)	0.019*	(0.009)
per2000m_we	-0.020	(0.015)	0.158**	(0.015)	-0.002	(0.006)	0.011	(0.038)	0.082**	(0.007)
lag1_per2000m	-0.013	(0.013)	-0.008	(0.015)	-0.006	(0.005)	-0.038	(0.034)	-0.002	(0.008)
perofmax	0.011*	(0.005)	0.018*	(0.008)	0.141*	(0.064)	-0.009	(0.105)	0.129	(0.078)
lag1_perofmax	0.000	(0.005)	0.017*	(0.007)	0.125*	(0.058)	0.104	(0.100)	-0.049	(0.069)
q1	-1.319*	(0.508)	-0.228	(0.786)	0.852	(0.451)	0.698	(0.894)	-0.801	(1.262)
q2	-0.141	(0.439)	0.726	(0.967)	0.119	(0.453)	-0.343	(0.833)	1.192	(1.089)
q3	-0.011	(0.379)	1.048	(1.144)	0.501	(0.409)	0.409	(0.809)	-0.689	(1.107)
intercept	13.955**	(1.930)	0.025	(0.226)	8.575**	(0.493)	11.678**	(1.683)	0.463	(0.767)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Table 14, continued

Variable	T.THOMPSON		GILMORE	
	Beta	(Std. Err.)	Beta	(Std. Err.)
polling	0.466	(0.316)	-0.800	(0.824)
lag1_polling	0.285	(0.329)	0.073	(0.609)
newsstories	0.343	(0.232)	-0.193	(0.504)
lag1_newstories	-0.162	(0.230)	0.634	(0.488)
numconts	0.069**	(0.020)	0.248*	(0.118)
lag1_numconts	0.014	(0.019)	-0.031	(0.049)
per500l_we	0.036**	(0.008)	0.063**	(0.014)
lag1_per500l	0.037**	(0.008)	0.006	(0.015)
per2000m_we	0.080**	(0.008)	0.091**	(0.020)
lag1_per2000m	0.006	(0.008)	0.009	(0.016)
perofmax	-0.101	(0.109)	-0.259	(1.169)
lag1_perofmax	-0.020	(0.100)	0.231	(0.924)
q1	-1.875	(1.577)	-7.464	(5.266)
q2	-0.162	(1.468)	-1.981	(2.329)
q3	-1.202	(1.418)	-0.417	(1.712)
intercept	0.528	(0.554)	0.417	(0.400)

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$

N for each candidate = 51

Chapter 3: Substance in Presidential Nominating Contests: Negativity and Issue Content

This second empirical chapter considers the substance of presidential nominating contests. Throughout the chapter, I focus on two aspects of substance: tone and content. While there is extensive literature in political science about the divisiveness of nominating campaigns and its effect on general election outcomes, as well as negativity in a general election environment, there is less scholarly work about negativity during presidential nominating campaigns themselves. However, in nominating contests, candidates from one party compete against each other, which drastically alters the characteristics of the conflict compared to general elections. In nominating contests, candidates are able to say negative things about members of opposing political parties (as in general elections) but also about members of their own political party. In terms of issue content, existing literature focuses on "issue ownership," the differences between Democratic- and Republican-owned issues, yet we know much less about how candidates use issues in an intraparty campaign environment such as a nominating contest.

Pundits often assert that divisive primary campaigns harm political parties and provide advantages to the opposing party. This was particularly true during the drawn-out 2008 Democratic presidential nominating contest, when David Broder of *The Washington Post* commented, "That is why so many Democrats are praying for this divisive primary campaign to end. They sense, correctly, that the longer it goes on, the better it is for John McCain" (Broder 2008). Negativity in presidential nominating contests, however, is often studied in the context of its effect on general election outcomes. Instead of focusing on the longer-term effects of negativity or divisiveness, however, I am interested in negativity throughout the nominating campaign.

In this chapter, I examine the tone of the 2008 presidential nominating campaigns and ask whether some candidates are more inherently negative than others, or whether the negativity of the contest is affected by other factors, such as the competitiveness of the race, or the number of candidates involved in the contest. Thus, rather than using negativity within the nominating contest as an independent variable that affects other political factors, I examine negativity of campaign advertisements during presidential nominating contests as the dependent variable. This is similar to the work done by Haynes and Rhine (1998) and Ridout and Holland (2010), though I make several adjustments to existing work.

First, I consider campaign advertising as a way to measure how negative the campaigns actually are. This is an improvement over measures of negativity within the media, as advertisements are communications between the candidates and the public without any intermediary. Second, I utilize the entire 2008 Wisconsin Advertising Project database of campaign advertising. This allows me not only to speak to whether a candidate is airing negative ads on a particular day, but also to discuss the volume and percentage of negativity aired by a particular candidate at a particular juncture of the nominating contest. Third, I use graphical displays to illustrate how the nominating contest varies over time and geographically, and I take this variation into account in my analysis. Finally, in my statistical analysis, I run separate models for each political party, which allows the determinants of negativity to vary in a way that existing empirical work on this topic does not.

Negativity in General Election Campaigns

Much of the literature about the substance of campaigns has focused on negativity within the general election environment. Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994), and

Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997) definitively argue that campaigns, and specifically negative advertising, demobilize the American electorate. In an experimental study where they varied the tone of advertising, the authors claim that exposure to negative advertisements decreased intentions to vote by five percent. When replicating their study using observational data, the authors find a less severe but still significant drop in turnout. These results lead Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino to conclude that their studies “demonstrate attack advertising extracts a toll on electoral participation” (1994, 835). In other words, for Ansolabehere and his coauthors, the causal relationship between conflict and participation is clear: the more negativity in campaign advertising, the more disengaged and disinterested the American electorate will be.

Other scholars have not been as convinced. Finkel and Geer (1998) and Geer (2006) argue that voters may learn from negative campaigns and thus be more likely to vote. Specifically, Geer argues there are “real and substantial democratic payoffs to negativity” (2006, 136). Using observational studies of campaign advertising, Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, and Ridout (2007) argue that not only does negative advertising not decrease turnout but that it actually increases the likelihood that individuals will vote. They argue that there exist “good theoretical and normative reasons to believe that campaign advertising— even ads that were strikingly negative— might inform, engage, and stimulate voters” (Franz, Freedman, Goldstein, and Ridout 2007, 136).

In other words, the causal relationship between negativity of campaigns and voter participation and engagement for Geer and Franz et.al. is exactly opposite of Ansolabehere's findings. Still other scholars find no statistical relationship between negativity and turnout. See Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, et al. (1999) and Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner (2007) for two meta-analytic views of the literature on negative campaign advertising and voter participation.

What all this literature has in common, however, is its focus on negativity as an independent variable. These studies question whether negative campaigning has an effect on voter turnout, vote choice, or, normatively, democracy itself. Yet little has been written about negativity as a dependent variable. Through the lens of presidential nominating contests, this chapter of my dissertation will examine negative campaigning as a dependent variable, asking questions like: Are some candidates more inherently negative than others? Does the negativity of a presidential nominating contest differ when there is an open presidential race or a sitting incumbent running for reelection? Does proximity to the general election influence the negativity of presidential nominating campaigns? Are candidates more likely to run negative campaigns when the field narrows as opposed to when there are more candidates in the contest?

Negativity in Presidential Nominating Contests

Presidential nominating contests are assumed to be divisive, in that candidates from the same party are forced to compete for votes, generally by appealing to factions and attacking one another (Polsby 1983). Much of the political science literature on divisive presidential primaries claims that the more divisive – most frequently measured as competitive – the contest is, the more harm it does to the candidate in the general election contest (Kenney and Rice 1987; Lingle 1980; Lingle, Owen, and Sonner 1995; but see Atkeson 1998; Wichowsky and Niebler 2010).⁶ Despite this theory of the effects of divisive nominating contests on general election outcomes, few political science studies examine solely the amount and characteristics of negative advertising within the contest of presidential nominating contests.

⁶Ware (1979) points out that divisiveness of a nominating campaign is not the same as the competitiveness of the contest; the two terms are theoretically quite distinct. Wichowsky and Niebler (2010) argue that the tone of the campaign can be measured by examining the percentage of campaign advertisements that were negative.

In one study that does ask when and how negative campaigning functions in presidential nominating contests, Haynes and Rhine (1998) develop a theory about when candidates utilize negative campaigning, saying, “We assume that there are certain conditions that increase the probability that a candidate will or will not attack an opponent and that it will be reported by the news media. ... We have divided the hypotheses into three categories: competitive positioning, reward factors, and media-related conditions” (1998, 699). While these factors were developed to apply to intermediated attacks from candidates, I argue that many of the hypotheses put forth by Haynes and Rhine are likely to apply as candidates attack via their own televised campaign advertising.

Ridout and Holland (2010) come closest to examining negativity in presidential nominating contests in the way I aim to do. Despite using data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project, which is significantly more comprehensive than media coverage (Haynes and Rhine 1998), Ridout and Holland in effect throw away a lot of what makes the Wisconsin Advertising Project data interesting. They measure negativity of the presidential nominating contest in a dynamic fashion, which is an improvement, but they do not take advantage of the fact that different numbers of ads are aired on different days. Thus, their dependent variable measuring negativity is just a binary variable indicating whether a particular candidate aired a negative ad in a particular state on a particular day. Theoretically, there are disadvantages to this measure. Imagine a candidate deciding to air negative ads at a particular stage of the nominating contest. A candidate may choose to air a total of 100 advertisements, all of which are negative. Or, a candidate may choose to air a total of 100 ads, only one of which is negative. Ridout and Holland (2010) would operationalize both of these measures as negative, but make no distinction between the two.

Candidates in presidential nominating contests are able to “go negative” in two distinct fashions. First, they are able to air negative advertisements against a fellow partisan. Alternatively, they are able to air negative ads against the presumed nominee (or sitting president) of the opposing party. In subsequent analyses in this chapter, I focus on two similar but distinct sets of research questions regarding the timing of when a candidate employs negative advertising in his or her bid to be the party’s presidential nominee. First, I examine intraparty negativity, that is negative ads against members of the candidate’s own political party. Second, I examine interparty negativity, which is negativity directed toward a member (or multiple members) of the party opposing the candidate airing the ad.

In considering both attacks on one’s own party as well as attacks against the opposition’s party, I offer the following four research questions:

1. To what degree do candidates air different types of negative advertisements based on the number of candidates remaining in the nominating contest?
2. Do candidates air different types of negative ads depending on the degree to which they are behind the frontrunner in the nominating contest?
3. Are candidates more likely to engage in negative advertising after they have been the direct target of an attack themselves?
4. Are candidates more likely to air negative advertisements against both their own party and the opposing party as the end of the nominating contest approaches?

In terms of RQ 4, we might hypothesize that candidates are more likely to air negative advertisements on both their own party members and the opposing party as the end of the nominating contest approaches. As the end of the contest looms, nominating contest candidates may become more desperate and need to attack their fellow partisans in order to remain viable

candidates themselves. However, we might also hypothesize that candidates competing in the nominating contest would be more likely to attack their co-partisans early in the contest in order to make a name for themselves. They might need to distinguish themselves from their fellow party members in order to be seen as major contenders by the media and party establishment.

Thinking about the timing of attacks on opposing party members, we can imagine a scenario in which candidates would wait to attack members of the opposing party until the end of the nominating contest approaches. In this way, the general election would be closer in proximity and the attacks of opposing partisans might be more likely to resonate with the electorate. However, we can also imagine a scenario in which candidates attack members of the opposing party early in the nominating contest to assert a kind of implicit role as the emerging champion of their one party.

Thinking about RQ1 and whether the number of candidates remaining in the nominating contest affects the likelihood a candidate will air negative ads, we can hypothesize that candidates might be more likely to air intraparty negative ads when there are fewer candidates remaining in the nominating contest. As competition narrows and there are fewer competitors for their party's nomination, it becomes easier to define who each candidate is competing against. When there are more than three candidates competing in the nominating contest, it might be difficult to know which candidate(s) should be the focus of an intraparty attack. Furthermore, a candidate attacking within his/her own party risks a potential backlash effect, in which the negative ad damages the attacked candidate but also damages the attacker, because the attacker is seen as dragging the campaign down into the mud. When only two candidates remain in the nominating contest, both of these concerns are alleviated (Gandhi et al. 2011). Each candidate has a clearly defined opponent and a backlash effect is drastically reduced. With only

two candidates in the race, the candidate sponsoring the negative advertisements might experience some decline in support as a result of his/her negativity, but there are no candidates untarnished.

However, as discussed previously, we might conversely expect that candidates need to air negative ads against members of their own party when many candidates are present in the race. These negative ads might serve as a way to distinguish candidates from one another on both personal and policy differences. In terms of interparty negativity, we might hypothesize that candidates would be more likely to air attacks against members of the opposing party when there are large numbers of candidates competing in the nominating contest. In these circumstances, candidates may simply wish to establish broad, ideological differences between themselves and their potential general election opponents without engaging in the specifics of policies.

RQ2 asks whether negativity is affected by how far a candidate trails the frontrunner in his/her nominating contest. Thinking first about intraparty negativity, we might imagine that candidates who are leading the nominating contest are less likely to air negative ads because they have the most to lose from these types of attacks. By engaging and attacking the candidates who trail them in the polls, frontrunners might be seen as doubting their own pathway to the nomination. Candidates who trail by large margins, however, have a clear incentive to attack the frontrunner. In doing so, they may establish themselves as a credible alternative to the frontrunner at best, or at worst gain extra publicity from their attack.

That said, however, frontrunners might wish to attack those trailing them closely if they believe doing so will help to end the nominating contest quickly. If frontrunners are able to bury their opposition, they can focus their attention on the general election contest in terms of resources and reputation. In terms of interparty negativity, we might imagine that frontrunners

are more likely to air negative ads against members of the opposing party in order to be seen as the eventual general election contender. Immediately following his victory in the 2012 New Hampshire primary, Republican frontrunner Mitt Romney focused his entire speech on the shortcomings of President Barack Obama. By attacking the sitting president, his general-election opponent if he were to win the Republican nomination, Romney was attempting to make his winning of the Republican nomination appear inevitable.

RQ3 asks whether candidates who have been the brunt of either an intra- or interparty attack would be more likely to air attack advertisements themselves. Candidates who have been attacked about their personal characteristics or policy positions, especially in television advertisements, might feel compelled to “set the record straight” in their own campaign advertisements. These ads would almost certainly be viewed as negative, as they would likely mention the “erroneous” ad aired by the opposing candidate (whether intra- or interparty) and lay out why that ad was unfair in some way. On the other hand, however, candidates who have not been the direct attack of an ad might still be compelled to air negative advertisements as a way to attempt to gain publicity and notoriety in a crowded nominating contest.

In addition to questions about when one candidate will attack another candidate during an intraparty presidential nominating contest, questions about who is being attacked are also paramount. In a multi-candidate contest, candidates must not only decide if and when to attack, but also whom they are going to attack. Contrary to general election campaigns, where an attack by the Democratic candidate is obviously targeting the Republican candidate, the same does not hold true of attacks in nominating campaigns. When candidates choose to attack, they must then either mention one of their opposing candidates by name, or refer to unpopular issue positions their opponents have taken in the past. This second approach requires the viewer of the

advertisement to have a higher degree of political sophistication and knowledge, in order to know who the target of the ad is.

In addition to examining which candidates are doing the attacking and when they are doing it, I will also analyze the targets of those attacks. Based somewhat on the hypotheses of Haynes and Rhine (1998, 701) and Ridout and Holland (2010), I offer the following research question:

1. Are candidates who lead their party's nominating contest (i.e. are frontrunners) more or less likely to be the target of negative advertising?

As mentioned previously, we might imagine frontrunners to be the most likely target of both intra- and interparty negative advertisements. Intraparty opponents need to establish themselves as viable alternatives to the current frontrunner for their party's nomination, while interparty opponents might attack the candidate they believe to be most likely to be their general election competitor.

Issue Convergence in Nominating Contests

In addition to examining the tone of nominating campaigns in this chapter, I also examine issues raised throughout the nominating contest. By many accounts, the issue content is the true “substance” of the campaign. I argue that examining issues within the context of a presidential nominating contest is particularly interesting in light of the fact that voters cannot use partisanship as a heuristic on which to base their votes. During general election campaigns, academic literature shows that issue ownership is paramount. Democratic candidates tend to focus on issues owned by their party, like welfare, education, and healthcare, while Republican candidates tend to focus on issues owned by theirs, such as taxes, national security, and gun

rights. Presidential nominating contests provide no such party context. Therefore candidates make conscious, presumably strategic decisions about what types of issues on which to focus.

This chapter considers the two substantive concerns related to issues raised during presidential nominating contests. First, I ask: Do candidates in presidential nominating contests raise issues owned by their parties, or do they raise issues owned by the opposing party? Second, to what degree do candidates speak to one another about issues on the campaign trail? In other words, are candidates frequently speaking past one another, or is there a sense of dialogue throughout the course of the campaign?

In their article on issue convergence, Kaplan, Park, and Ridout (2006) note the tension between theories of issue ownership and theories of democracy with respect to campaigns. Based on theories of issue ownership within a general election framework, like those put forth by Petrocik (1996), campaigns should emphasize issues on which their own party is advantaged and their opponent's party is less well regarded. Democratic theory, on the other hand, argues that in order for elections to fulfill the needs for responsiveness, campaigns must promote dialogue, and campaigns must thus be in conversation with one another over the issues of the day. Kaplan, Park, and Ridout (2006) develop a measure of "issue convergence" based on the messages candidates put forth in their televised campaign advertising and argue that issue engagement occurs more frequently than indicated by previous research. They claim that, "consistent with democratic theory, competition appears to encourage candidates to adopt similar campaign strategies for the allocation of resources across issues" (2006, 735).

The second portion of this chapter aims to determine the degree to which these findings hold in an intra-party campaign environment such as presidential nominating contests. It seems likely that removing an opposing party would increase the prospects that candidates speak to one

another. It is often more important in a nominating contest than in a general election environment for candidates to distinguish themselves from one another in some manner. Thus, it may be the case that candidates talk past one another *more* in nominating contests than Kaplan, Park, and Ridout (2006) find that they do in general election campaign settings.

Also within this context, I aim to address questions of campaign dialogue and issue convergence within primary campaigns. The work of Sigelman and Buell (2004) as well as Kaplan, Park, and Ridout (2006) examine the degree to which campaigns discuss the same issues or whether they talk past one another. Yet this, too, is done strictly within the general election framework, comparing Republican candidates to Democratic candidates. Ultimately, both sets of authors argue that candidates actually discuss similar issues more often than was previously thought to be the case. I would expect this to be even more the case when candidates are from the same party, so I aim to address the degree to which candidates speak to one another in a primary election environment. Examining how issues emerge in a primary campaign and the degree to which candidates talk to one another is an important substantive aspect of the campaign. The types of issues discussed in the primary campaign are not only interesting in and of themselves but may also influence the trajectory of discourse in the general campaign (Aldrich 1980).

Data and Methods

Data for this chapter come from the 2008 Wisconsin Advertising Project (WiscAds) database of televised campaign advertising. To examine the tone of the contest, I largely rely upon the WiscAds coding of advertisements as "contrast", "promote", or "attack." For the following analyses on negativity of nominating contests, I consider any advertisement to be

negative if it was coded by WiscAds to be either contrast or attack.⁷ As mentioned earlier, negativity in presidential nominating contests is complex because of the fact that the target of the negativity can be any number of candidates.

In addition to the possibility that a negative ad is targeted at a fellow candidate for the nomination, negative ads might also be targeted at the presumptive nominee of the opposing party. To deal with this nuance, I follow the lead of Ridout and Holland (2010) who code advertisements as either intraparty or interparty negative.⁸ In doing so, I am able to speak to the type of negativity exhibited during the presidential nominating contest, and I report results based on inter- and intraparty negativity separately.

Initial results simply describe the negativity of each party's nominating contest across years. I provide maps that show where the largest volume of advertising was for each party's nominating contest, as well as its negativity. I do this for each of two time periods: first, the period from the start of the nominating contest through Super Tuesday (March 4, 2008), then for the period after Super Tuesday until the end of the nominating contest (June 3, 2008). I argue that geographic variation in advertising is driven almost entirely by the timing of a particular state's presidential primary or caucus.⁹ Other than considering the timing of each state's contest, then, I do not take the location of the advertisements into account for the remainder of the chapter. I also report the percentage of each candidate's advertising that was negative toward

⁷WiscAds coded advertisements as "promote" if they mentioned only the favored candidate. Ads were coded as attack if they did not mention a favored candidate but instead only mentioned an opposing candidate. Contrast ads were those that mentioned both a favored and opposing candidate. Future research will check for whether results in this chapter are robust to the exclusion of contrast ads.

⁸ Thank you to Travis Ridout for providing me with his data that contained many of the 2008 advertisements coded in this fashion.

⁹One could argue that the difference between primaries and caucuses could lead to varying levels of negativity, which is something I plan to test in the future. I also plan to test for whether the results presented here are robust to state-level public opinion as opposed to just national-level figures about who leads and trails at a particular point in time.

fellow party members (intraparty) and negative toward opposing party candidates (interparty), as well as negative overall (intraparty plus interparty).

Moving to a multivariate approach, I predict intraparty and interparty negativity separately. In doing so, I run logit models at the ad-level, meaning that each airing of a television commercial is its own observation. I am able to utilize fixed effects at the level of media markets to account for the fact that advertisements within markets are not independent of one another. Despite the fact that I am working with a binary dependent variable, I also estimate OLS models because when including fixed effects for media market within logit models, cases are dropped in media markets where all the ads in that particular market were either positive or negative. The OLS specifications of the models then serve as robustness checks for the logit models and are presented in Appendices B and C.

Key independent variables in all the models include:

- Measure(s) of time. Some models include just a linear measure of time, counting the number of days from the beginning of the presidential nominating contest. Additional models include a squared measure to account for any non-linear effects of time.
- The number of candidates remaining in the nominating contest.¹⁰
- A binary variable indicating whether the candidate airing the advertisement is currently the frontrunner in his/her party's nominating contest.
- A continuous measure of how far the candidate airing the advertisement is behind the current frontrunner of his/her party's nominating contest.¹¹

¹⁰ These data come from “The Green Papers” website (<http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P08/candidates.phtml>). A table of candidates and their dates of withdraw can be found in Appendix A.

¹¹ The data for the binary frontrunner variable as well as the variable measuring the continuous distance by which a candidate trails the frontrunner data are from a series of national polls compiled by www.pollster.com. I thank Charles Franklin for providing them for me.

- A binary variable indicating whether the candidate has been the direct target of a negative advertisement at any point prior to the airing of that particular ad.

Ultimately, then, I make several significant changes to existing empirical work that examines the negativity of presidential nominating contests. First, following the lead of Ridout and Holland (2010), I utilize data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project to examine the degree to which candidates are engaging in negative campaigning. I attempt to improve upon the Ridout and Holland methodology, however, by estimating models of candidate negativity at the ad-level. This allows me to take into account the fact that a different number of advertisements are aired on different days of the campaign and does not aggregate advertisements and then reduce negativity to a binary measure.

Second, in all tables and analyses, I use the airing as the unit of analysis instead of the creative. Simply put, a creative is a unique advertisement aired by a candidate, party, or independent group. Thus, while a candidate may air hundreds of spots, they may all be the same commercial, which would be considered one creative. Using the airing as the unit of analysis as opposed to the creative presents a more realistic picture of the advertising environment. It acknowledges that candidates do not air each of the ads they create with the same frequency.

For example, Joe Biden produced six different creatives that he aired during his run for the Democratic nomination, one of which contained negative content. He aired these six ads a total of 3,165 times, 940 of which contained negative content. If we were to measure the negativity of Biden's campaign based on the negativity of his creatives, we would conclude that 16.7 percent of his ads were negative. However, if we take into account the total number of ads aired, Biden's negativity increases to 29.7 percent. Finally, throughout my analyses, I run

separate models for each year and each of the two parties, which allows the coefficients (slopes) in my models to vary over time and by party.

To examine the issue content of advertisements during the 2008 nominating contest, I recode the data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project assigning each unique creative a "major issue" code. By coding the data in this fashion, I allow each unique advertisement to discuss only one issue. I do this in an effort to highlight the most important issue covered, but also because ads that tend to focus on more than one issue at a time lack actual policy content. Advertisements that covert multiple issues simultaneously tend to be laundry lists of valence issues as opposed to state any specific policy position. Campaign advertisements characterized by the presence of multiple issues, I argue, tend to be most similar to advertisements discussing personal characteristics because of the lack of policy content.¹² The issue codes I developed for this portion of the analysis include:

- Economic issues (including deficit, taxes, and big government)
- Foreign affairs (including war, terrorism, and torture)
- Healthcare
- Environment or Energy
- Immigration
- Other social policy (including abortion, gay rights, education, and social security)
- Multiple categories equally
- Personal characteristics (including experience, change, hope, and leadership)
- Other/Unknown

The analyses on issue content will be largely descriptive in nature. I will first examine which issue is most prevalent within each candidates' advertising during the nominating contest overall. Then, I examine six early nominating states more closely: Iowa, New Hampshire, Michigan, Nevada, South Carolina, and Florida. In these analyses, I rely upon previous work on

¹² This transcript of an ad I coded as "multiple issues" highlights the concerns I noted. It is an Obama ad and the narration is done by voiceover. "His candor is refreshing. His scrupulous honesty is far more presidential than the dodging of other candidates. Barack Obama, his healthcare plan takes on powerful interests and that tells voters something important about him. On Wall Street, he got tough on CEOs, telling them to protect the middle class. Because for Barack Obama, it's not politics as usual, it's change we can believe in."

issue convergence (Sigelman and Buell 2004 and Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006) and use the same formula to calculate issue convergence between pairs of candidates. Their formula is:

$$100 - \left(\sum_{i=1}^n |P_{C1i} - P_{C2i}|/2 \right)$$

where P_{C1} and P_{C2} are the percentage of total attention that each of two candidates gave to a certain issue, i , respectively. The formula sums the absolute value of the issue differences across the nine issues I code for, divides that value by two, and then subtracts the result from 100. The range of values then goes from zero to 100. A score of zero indicates that the two candidates did not cover the same issues in their advertising at all. A score of 100 indicates that the two candidates spent exactly the same proportion of their advertising on the same issues.

I calculate issue convergence scores for a pair of candidates only when both candidates advertised in a particular state. Because of the multicandidate nature of presidential nominating contests, I calculate an issue convergence score for each pair of candidates in each of the six states instead of calculating and reporting just one issue convergence score for the contest (or one score for each state as Kaplan, Park and Ridout 2006 do). Secondary analysis weights the issue convergence scores for each pair of candidates in each state by the total number of ads aired by the candidates in the state to calculate an overall issue convergence score for the two candidates during the early phase of the 2008 presidential nominating contest.

2008 Data

In 2008, both the Democratic and Republican parties had highly competitive presidential nominating contests. On the Republican side, a total of 12 candidates competed for the nomination (McCain, Brownback, Gilmore, Giuliani, Huckabee, Hunter, Keyes, Paul, Romney, Tancredo, F. Thompson, and T. Thompson), while on the Democratic side, eight candidates vied

for the nomination (Obama, Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Kucinich, Richardson, and Vilsack). Candidates in both parties began airing television advertisements earlier than in previous nominating contests. Hunter aired the first television ad of the Republican nominating campaign on February 15, 2007, while Richardson aired the first ad of the Democratic campaign on April 23, 2007.¹³

In subsequent analyses on negativity, I consider essentially three distinct campaigns: the Republican contest from the date of first airing through the Super Tuesday contests on March 4; the Democratic contest from the date of first airing also through the Super Tuesday contests on March 4; and the Democratic contest after March 4 concluding on June 3, after the final Democratic primary contests were held in Montana, New Mexico, and South Dakota. The Republican contest wrapped up much more quickly and, for all intents and purposes, was concluded after the March 4 primaries in Rhode Island, Ohio, Texas, and Vermont (Shear and Slevin 2008). In total, Democratic candidates aired a total of 251,335 advertisements over the course of the campaign, 174,639 of those coming before Super Tuesday, while Republican candidates aired 77,366 ads over the course of their contest.¹⁴

When I move to consider the issue content of the campaigns, I focus on six states that held their presidential nominating contests early. Looking at the campaigns in individual states is interesting because it allows us to consider the degree to which candidates overlapped their discussion of specific issues at a particular point in the campaign. However, in looking at states in isolation from one another (as opposed to the campaign as a whole or even pre- or post-Super

¹³Independent groups aired ads earlier in 2007 than these, but because the I aim to examine candidate strategy, I drop all advertisements aired by anything other than the candidates' campaigns.

¹⁴ Republican presidential nominee John McCain did air a total of 6,141 campaign advertisements between Super Tuesday and the conclusion of the Democratic nominating contest. While I discuss these ads in some contexts to provide a comparison to the Democratic contest, I do not consider them ads in the presidential nominating contest and, as such, do not run multivariate statistical models on these data.

Tuesday), we sacrifice the ability to examine the effect of many of the independent variables we examine in the negativity analysis because they do not vary enough over the course of each state's campaign.

Results

Negativity of Advertising during 2008 Nominating Campaigns

Looking at empirical results from the 2008 presidential nominating contests for both the Democratic and Republican parties, we notice just how different those two contests were, particularly with respect to the volume of advertising aired throughout the United States. Figure 1 shows the volume and negativity of the 2008 Democratic nominating contest by media market across the United States prior to and including ads aired on Super Tuesday. Figure 2 shows the exact same map for the 2008 Republican contest. Between the start of the campaign and Super Tuesday, seven Democratic candidates aired a total of 174,639 television ads. During the comparable timeframe, eight Republican candidates aired a total of 77,366 ads, or less than half of the Democratic total. Figures 3 and 4 show the number of campaign ads aired by Democratic and Republican candidates respectively for the time period after Super Tuesday (March 5) to the conclusion of the presidential nominating contests (June 3, 2008). During this time, two Democratic candidates (Obama and Clinton) aired 76,696 ads, while McCain aired a total of 6,141 campaign ads.

In addition to the difference in advertising volume within the Democratic and Republican nominating contests following Super Tuesday, it is also interesting to note the geographic differences between where the two parties aired ads between March and June. Figure 3 shows that Clinton and Obama continued to compete in the nominating contest, airing ads in states that

had not yet participated in either a primary or caucus. Of the 11 states that had Democratic primaries or caucuses after March 4, Democratic candidates aired advertisements in nine of them (Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Indiana, North Carolina, West Virginia, Kentucky, Oregon, Montana, and South Dakota; not in Wyoming or Idaho).

As we can see in Figure 4, McCain's ads following Super Tuesday were not aired in states that continued to hold primaries and caucuses, but rather in battleground states of the 2008 general election contest. Of the 11 states that held Republican primaries or caucuses after Super Tuesday, McCain aired ads in only three of them (Pennsylvania, Oregon, and New Mexico), while also airing ads in Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio.¹⁵ Because the Democratic contest was so lengthy and two viable candidates remained in the race up until the final state held its primary contest, at least some portion of nearly every state in the country saw advertising from Democratic candidates.¹⁶ Contrast this with the Republican contest, which was completed in early March 2008. Because McCain won the nomination relatively quickly, many states across the country did not receive any advertising from Republican candidates. This fact will become even more important when I consider the effects of campaign advertising on individuals in my third empirical chapter.

Despite the fact that from the maps it appears as though the Democratic contest was significantly more negative than was the Republican contest, depending how we measure negativity, this is not necessarily the case. When we examine just the total number of airings and the percent of those airings that contained a negative message, we see that 15.5 percent of the

¹⁵ Despite the fact that Obama won all six of these states in the general election, they were all considered competitive, especially during the early stages of the general election campaign. According to statewide polls collected by Pollster.com, between March and June, all six of these states had McCain and Obama within ten percentage points of one another.

¹⁶ Two prominent exceptions are Michigan and Florida, which did not receive any significant number of advertisements from Democratic candidates. Democratic candidates agreed not to campaign in these two states after the states moved their nominating contests forward in the calendar year, which resulted in their losing their delegates at the nominating convention. Later, the delegates were reinstated (Banville and Gustafson 2008).

Republican airings contained either an explicit attack on another candidate or a contrasting statement between two candidates. Table 1 illustrates the differences between the Democratic and Republican contests, as well as the negativity of each individual candidate's advertising. Again, it is important to note here that the percentage of negative ads is not based on the total number of creatives (unique advertisements) each individual candidate aired, but the total number of airings the candidate placed on broadcast television. Without taking the number of airings into consideration, we are likely to distort each individual candidate's negativity of advertising. Overall, the Democratic candidates were slightly more negative than the Republican candidates were, as 17.8 percent of their airings contained a negative attack on either a co-partisan or on a member of the opposing party; the difference between the negativity of the Republican and Democratic contests, however, is much less stark than it appears from the maps.

Despite the fact that the Democratic candidates' ads overall were 17.8 percent negative, most of the individual Democrats aired a higher percentage of negative ads. This is due to the fact that Obama aired the lowest percentage of negative ads, but the largest number of ads overall. Dodd aired the largest percentage of negative ads while directing most of the negativity toward fellow Democrats. Biden and Edwards went negative in a lower percentage of their total ads than did Dodd, but still directed most of their negativity toward co-partisans. As Clinton was the clear frontrunner and Obama emerged as her most serious challenger, it seems reasonable that Biden, Dodd, and Edwards would want to air negative ads against their fellow partisans in an effort to be seen as viable challengers and possibly unseat one of the top two Democrats vying for the nomination. Clinton aired nearly the same percentage of negative ads as did Biden and Edwards, but nearly all her negativity was directed at Republicans. Clinton's negativity aimed to

further demonstrate her status as Democratic frontrunner as she aired general-election-type advertisements during the nominating phase of the campaign.

On the Republican side, the two candidates airing the largest percent of negative ads were Giuliani and Romney. Giuliani concentrated most of his negativity toward fellow Republicans while Romney directed most of his negative ads toward the Democratic field. McCain's negative ads were split nearly evenly between targeting co-partisans and members of the opposing party. Interestingly the two candidates that ultimately went on to win their parties' nominations aired a lower percentage of negative ads than did most of their serious challengers. While I cannot say from these data alone whether that fact is representative of a larger trend or simply idiosyncratic to 2008, I do argue that candidates who are frontrunners or imagine themselves to be frontrunners are more likely to air negative ads against members of the opposing party. Candidates vying for their parties' nominations and are struggling to make themselves known are more likely to air negative ads against members of their own party in an effort to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans.

I now turn to the multivariate analyses predicting when a candidate will air a negative advertisement against a member of his or her own party, the results of which are found in Table 2. The first thing to note is that the number of cases in the statistical models is quite large, meaning that nearly every independent variable in the model will achieve traditional levels of statistical significance. Thus, instead of focusing on p-values of the beta coefficients in the models, I instead turn to examining predicted probabilities of negativity presented in Figure 5. The results presented in Table 2 and Figure 5 are for the Pre-Super Tuesday portion of the nominating contest.¹⁷ On the x-axis in each of the graphs in Figure 5, the key independent

¹⁷ Table 2 does also present results for a Democratic model of intra-party negativity after Super Tuesday, but many of the key independent variables I want to analyze do not vary during the time period, so substantive conclusions

variable is varied across its range, while the other variables in the model are held at their values for each case. The predicted probability of an airing being negative is then displayed on the y-axis. Figure 5 shows then, that for Democratic candidates during the pre-Super Tuesday phase of the nominating contest, the two independent variables that substantively drive intraparty negativity are the distance the candidate trails the frontrunner and the number of candidates remaining in the nominating contest.

When Democratic candidates trail the frontrunner in their nominating contest by just a few points, they are not likely at all to air a negative ad against the frontrunner. When they trail the frontrunner by twenty points, their probability of airing a negative ad is approximately 0.35. This likelihood jumps to nearly 1.00, however, for Democratic candidates who trail the frontrunner by fifty points. Candidates who are trying to gain traction in a crowded field, then, might be trying to use negative ads to try to bring down one of the frontrunners within their own party. Candidates who trail the leaders by smaller margins may be more reluctant to air negative ads because the mere fact of going negative might harm them at the same time. Candidates who are extremely far behind may not worry about any potential backlash and simply be trying to get noticed by any means necessary. The number of candidates remaining in the Democratic nominating contest also has a substantively significant effect. When there are seven Democratic candidates in the nominating contest, the likelihood of airing a negative ad is negligible, but when there are only two candidates remaining in the Democratic contest, the likelihood of one of the two Democrats airing an intraparty negative ad goes up to over 0.40. When there are more than two candidates in an electoral contest, going negative might create a situation in which a third candidate can benefit. The candidate that was neither the target of the negative ad nor the

from this model are limited. Instead, I focus on the Pre-Super-Tuesday portion of the contest for both Republicans and Democrats.

attacker may be seen as untarnished and be able to gain in the polls as a result. When only two candidates remain in the race, this situation is abated and negativity tends to increase (Gandhi et al 2011.)

Turning now to the 2008 Republican contest prior to Super Tuesday, still looking at the results in Table 2 and the predicted probabilities in Figure 5, we see three variables that have a substantively significant effect on intraparty negativity: the number of candidates remaining in the contest; the distance the candidate trails the frontrunner; and the number of days in the contest. The effect of distance behind the frontrunner is slightly less for Republicans than Democrats, but still in the same direction and still substantively significant. When Republican candidates trail the frontrunner by twenty points, the likelihood of them airing a negative advertisement is 0.16, but when they trail the frontrunner by fifty points, the likelihood of them airing a negative ad against a co-partisan jumps to 0.45. I do not make much of the difference between the Democrats and Republicans on this particular figure, but as both parties' intraparty negativity is higher among candidates who trail the frontrunner by large margins, I think we can safely say that intraparty negativity is a tactic used mostly by those candidates looking to make a name for themselves and get noticed. Candidates who trail the frontrunner by smaller margins tend to want to portray themselves as frontrunners and may not want to draw attention to the fact they are not leading the contest, which airing negative ads against fellow partisans may do.

Just as in the Democratic contest, the number of candidates remaining in the Republican nominating contest is substantively significant. However, the direction of the effect is different for the two parties. When there are 12 candidates in the Republican nominating contest the likelihood of a Republican airing an intraparty negative ad is approximately 0.60; by the time there are only four Republican candidates remaining in the nominating contest, the likelihood of

any of them airing a negative ad against one of their fellow Republicans is negligible. I argue that this particular result is likely idiosyncratic due to the nature of 2008 Republican contest and the manner in which candidates dropped out of the race. Candidates that were seen to be serious contenders for the Republican nomination actually dropped out earlier than some of the more "ideological" or "single-issue" candidates in the contest. Unlike on the Democratic side where the three most well-funded and well-known candidates (Obama, Clinton, and Edwards) were the last three remaining in the contest, on the Republican side, the final three candidates remaining in the contest were McCain, Paul, and Keyes. Neither Paul nor Keyes had the resources available to really challenge McCain and thus did not air ads against him, which likely explains this particular puzzling result.

I now shift focus to examining interparty negativity – again, that is negativity between members of opposing parties. Results of these models are in Table 3, but because of the large number of cases in the models, I want to focus on predicted probabilities as a way of examining substantive effects of these independent variables on interparty negativity. Graphs of these predicted probabilities can be found in Figure 6. For both the Democrats and Republicans, intraparty negativity is affected most by the number of days the nominating contest has endured; the distance by which the candidate trails the frontrunner; and the number of candidates remaining in the nominating contest. However, the direction of the effects of days and the number of candidates remaining differ for the two parties. I argue that the differences we see between the two parties is due to the fact that, despite both being open contests, the 2008 Democratic and 2008 Republican nominating contests were actually quite different from one another.

Looking first at the Democratic contest, we see that at the outset of the nominating campaign (Day 0), the likelihood of Democratic candidates airing ads attacking members of the Republican Party is 0.93. By the time the nominating contest approaches Day 300, the likelihood of a Democratic candidate airing a negative ad against a Republican dropped to approximately 0.10. As the number of candidates in the Democratic contest decreases, those candidates become decreasingly likely to air ads against Republican candidates. When seven candidates are in the contest, the likelihood of airing an interparty negative ad is approximately 0.35; when only two candidates remain in the race, that likelihood drops to approximately 0.08. The distance a Democratic candidate trails the frontrunner by has a small, but substantively significant effect on his/her likelihood to air a negative ad against Republicans. When Democrats trail the frontrunner by a negligible amount the likelihood that they attack members of the opposing party is 0.23, while when Democrats trail the frontrunner in their own party by thirty points, the likelihood drops to 0.05.

All three of these findings make sense when we consider the context of what ultimately happened in the 2008 Democratic nominating contest. The invisible primary stage of the contest began with a well-known politician, Clinton, leading the field. The nominating contest then became at least somewhat about who could become the alternative to Clinton. When Obama emerged as that alternative by winning Iowa, other would-be serious candidates such as Biden, Dodd, and Richardson were forced to reconsider their candidacies. Edwards remained in the contest until he finished third in his native state, South Carolina after which he suspended his campaign. Then the protracted Democratic contest continued as Clinton and Obama contested nearly each and every remaining primary and caucus up through June 3, 2008. Considering the results of the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 6 in this context, we can tell a

compelling story about Democratic candidates airing negative ads against Republican candidates during their nomination contest. Clinton aired most of the interparty negative ads early in the contest as she was the frontrunner and the presumed Democratic nominee. As such, she wanted to establish herself as the general election candidate and begin setting the tone for the upcoming general election. However, as the Democratic nominating contest continued and the election winnowed to two candidates, both Clinton and Obama had to focus on winning the nomination and therefore both candidates spent less time attacking Republicans.

Considering the probability of intraparty negativity from Republican candidates against Democrats, we see that the distance behind the frontrunner and the number of candidates in the contest have the most substantive effect, while the number of days in the contest has a smaller, but still substantively significant effect. When there are 12 candidates in the Republican nominating contest, the likelihood of them airing a negative ad against a Democratic candidate is approximately 0.90; by the time there are eight candidates remaining in the race, the likelihood of them airing a negative ad against a Democratic candidate drops to less than 0.05. When Republicans trail the frontrunner in their own nominating contest by a negligible amount, they air negative ads against Democrats at a likelihood of only 0.05; however, as the distance by which they trail the frontrunner increases, they become increasingly more likely to air negative ads against Democratic candidates. For instance, when Republican candidates trail the frontrunner by twenty points, their likelihood of airing ads against Democrats increases to 0.15, and when they trail the frontrunner by fifty points, the likelihood increases to 0.45.

The nature of the Republican nominating contest was much different than that of the Democratic contest and may explain some of the differences we see between the two parties. Four serious contenders vied for the Republican nomination Giuliani led the field at the outset of

the contest, he did not actively compete in any of the first several primary and caucus states and ultimately did not win a single state in the contest. Other serious candidates included Huckabee (who won Iowa), Romney (who won the early states of Michigan and Nevada), and McCain (who won New Hampshire and South Carolina). Despite the fact that three different candidates won states early, the Republican contest was over relatively quickly. Giuliani dropped out of the contest before Super Tuesday, Romney dropped out immediately after. Huckabee remained in the contest through early March, but knew his chances to actually win the Republican nomination were not good, saying he believed in "miracles" (Huckabee 2008). Looking at the predicted probabilities shown in Figure 6 in light of this context, we see that McCain was able to air more negative ads against Democratic opponents as the nominating contest progressed, even prior to Super Tuesday. As candidates dropped out of the Republican contest, it was not to make way for two strong candidates to battle to become the eventual nominee, it was largely all the strong candidates giving way to one candidate—the eventual nominee. When only two candidates remained in the Democratic contest, they were the two most well-funded candidates of the field and they continued to battle one another for over four months. Contrast this with the Republican contest. When just two candidates remained here, it was McCain and Paul, and Paul never won a state and never polled above six percentage points in most public opinion polls.

Interestingly, many of the signs on the variables switch between models predicting intraparty negativity and those predicting interparty negativity. This indicates that, by and large, candidates who attack members of their own party tend not to attack members of the opposing party and vice versa. Table 1 gives us some inclination that this may be the case; we see that most candidates appear to favor attacking either within or against their own party, but that few candidates attack heavily both within and against their own parties.

Finally, I turn to examining who is the target of a direct attack of a negative ad by a co-partisan. To do so, I return to descriptive statistical methods. Table 5 shows that on the Democratic side, only three candidates were ever the direct target of an intraparty negative ad: Obama, Clinton, and Edwards. Four candidates on the Republican side were the explicit target of intraparty negativity: McCain, Giuliani, Huckabee, and Romney. The first column shows the percentage of total airings that was a direct personal attack on any of the candidates in the nominating contest.

Clinton was the most attacked candidate in either political party; a total of 8,292 television spots directly attacked her, which amount to 3.3 percent of the total airings in the Democratic contest. On the Republican side, Huckabee was the most attacked candidate, and he was mentioned in a total of 1,117 airings, or 1.4 percent of the total Republican campaign airings. Previously, we considered whether it would be the case that frontrunners would be more or less likely to be the target of attacks from fellow partisans. The second and third columns of Table 5 illustrate the complexity of the relationship between frontrunner status and being the target of an intraparty negative ad; it is certainly not the case that candidates are attacked by members of their own party only when they are leading. We first notice that Edwards, Huckabee, and Romney were the targets of negative advertising from within their own party while never being the frontrunner in their respective parties' nominating contests. Perhaps it is the case that other candidates in the Democratic and Republican contests, respectively, still viewed these candidates as potential threats to their paths to the nomination and aimed at attacking before Edwards, Huckabee, and Romney achieved frontrunner status. All of the attack ads against John McCain came when he was leading the Republican nominating contest, and

over half (65.4 percent) of the attacks against Clinton came when she was leading the Democratic nominating contest.

From this analysis, it appears that it is not just the frontrunner that is likely to be the target of attack, but that any of the candidates seen as potential nominees are likely to be attacked. We can definitively say from this analysis that candidates who trail the frontrunners by large margins are not likely to be attacked by their fellow partisans. In other words, candidates rarely swing at candidates below them in the polls.

Before moving to consider issue ownership and issue convergence in the 2008 nominating contests, I want to consider the degree to which the results on negativity are specific to 2008 or whether they might be applicable to other years. I argue that the results common to both the Democratic and Republican contests are likely to occur in other nominating contests as well. Candidates who trail the frontrunner of their own party by substantial margins are more likely to attack their fellow partisans than are candidates who trail only by a few points. Candidates extremely far behind in the polls cannot lose ground in the contests and only stand to gain from such attacks. Conflicting results between the Democratic and Republican parties in the 2008 nominating contest make assessing the influence of the number of candidates on negativity difficult. I argue that, by and large, negativity against fellow partisans is likely to increase as the number of candidates remaining in the race decreases while negativity against members of the opposing party is likely to be at its highest when there are many candidates still vying for their parties' nominations. Thus, I argue that the 2008 Republican nominating contest is the anomaly and future nominating contests would look more like the Democratic results presented previously.

Issue Ownership and Convergence in the 2008 Nominating Contests

Looking now at the overall issue content of the campaign, Table 5 shows the frequency with which each candidate discussed various issues throughout the campaign. The plurality of all advertisements focuses on personal characteristics of the candidates, and not substantive issues. However, the most interesting thing to take away from this table is the fact that nearly all of the serious candidates in the contest addressed nearly all the issues mentioned in the campaign itself. From this, it seems as though serious candidates must be equipped to discuss many different issues and cannot simply focus on one, or even two, narrow issues. For example, Tancredo who focused on only immigration issues in his television advertisements is likely easily dismissed as one-dimensional and not interested, or perhaps capable, of leading the country and dealing with the broad and complex set of issues. On the Democratic side, Biden aired the majority of his ads about foreign policy issues, while never discussing any other social or economic issues. This may have been because he aimed to distinguish himself from his Democratic counterparts and not simply mimic their advertising strategies. However, based on results of the 2008 Democratic nominating contest, it does not seem as though he was able to gain much traction in his effort to make the race about foreign policy issues.

Despite the fact that most candidates mentioned most issues in their televised campaign advertisements, some heterogeneity is present both between the two parties and also among candidates of the same party. The broad nature of "economic issues" made it such that nearly every candidate discussed some aspect of the topic, but it is perhaps more interesting to look at differences between the discussion of social policy issues, as well as healthcare and the environment, and foreign policy issues. Democrats traditionally own all social policy issues, while Republicans own issues of foreign affairs.

Table 5 shows that overall, Democratic candidates did air a larger proportion of their ads focusing on healthcare and the environment than did Republican candidates. Democratic candidates discussed healthcare issues in 4.5 percent of their ads while Republicans talked about healthcare in 1.8 percent of their ads. Democrats focused on the environment and energy policy in 8.8 percent of their ads; this is compared to Republican candidates who focused on these issues in less than half of one percent of their ads. Republicans did talk about foreign affairs with slightly more likelihood than their Democratic counterparts. Republican candidates focused on foreign affairs (including war, terrorism, and torture) in 5.9 percent of their ads while Democratic candidates did so in 4.5 percent of their ads. Democratic candidates discussed policies on other social issues like education, Social Security, abortion, and gay rights in 5.6 percent of their ads while Republicans did so in 9.4 percent of their ads.

Immigration is particularly interesting in that neither party has ownership of that particular issue (Druckman et. al. 2009). Republicans however, were much more likely to focus on issues of immigration, discussing the issue in 8.4 percent of their ads compared to less than one-half of one percentage of the airings of Democratic candidates address issues of immigration. Overall then, we see mixed evidence for the hypothesis that in presidential nominating contests candidates will mostly discuss issues that favor their party, but the main takeaway from Table 5 is that all candidates must be prepared and equipped to discuss all major issues of the day if they are to be considered as serious contenders for their parties' nominations.

I now turn to focusing more in-depth on the issue content of the television advertising in the first six state contests during the presidential nominating contest – Iowa, New Hampshire, Michigan, Nevada, South Carolina, and Florida. In doing so, I explore the issue content of each contest as well as discuss the number of candidates advertising in each race and the degree to

which they discussed similar issues as their opponents. Table 6 shows the issue convergence scores for Democratic candidates in the six early nominating contest states, while Table 7 shows the results for Republican candidates. In both tables, the numbers above the black boxes correspond to the issue convergence scores between two candidates in each of the six early nominating contest states. The scores below the black boxes weight each of the top scores by the total number of ads the candidates aired in each state and reports just one issue convergence score for each pair of candidates. First, I will discuss the Democratic contests in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada.¹⁸

In Iowa, five Democratic candidates aired televised campaign advertisements.¹⁹ Clinton and Obama aired the largest number of ads and focused the plurality of these ads on personal characteristics, as they attempted to introduce themselves to the electorate in the first nominating contest of the race. Despite the heavy focus on personal characteristics, however, both Clinton and Obama also mentioned every other issue I coded for except for immigration. In this way, they both attempted to portray themselves as well-rounded candidates capable of handling any and all issues facing the country. Edwards, too, spent the plurality of his campaign ads in Iowa on personal characteristics, but spent a significantly higher percentage of his ads discussing economic issues than did either Clinton or Obama, perhaps attempting to establish himself as the "populism" candidate in a crowded field of Democrats. Richardson covered all the major issues in his Iowa ads except for healthcare. He focused heavily on foreign policy issues highlighting the fact that he was the only Democratic candidate who had a plan to bring every soldier back from Iraq. Biden and Dodd aired ads covering fewer issues than the other Democrat candidates.

¹⁸ Michigan and Florida are not present here because the Democratic candidates did not compete in those two states. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) punished both states for moving their primaries earlier in the nominating contest than the party wanted. As such, the candidates said they would not campaign in either state.

¹⁹ Kucinich is not present in any of the subsequent analysis of issue convergence as he did not air any candidate-sponsored advertisements in the first six primary or caucus states.

Biden focused only on personal characteristics and foreign policy affairs, and based on results in Iowa, was unsuccessful in his attempt to center the election around foreign policy issues. Dodd tried to cover multiple issues in most of his ads, but also spent a large percentage of his ads discussing energy and environmental concerns. Neither Dodd nor Biden was able to get much traction with these strategies and likely suffered from focusing so exclusively on just one or two issues.

The heterogeneity of issues covered by Democratic candidates in Iowa is illustrated by the issue convergence scores in Table 6. The highest issue convergence score between two Democratic candidates in Iowa belonged to Clinton and Obama (82). Again, this is because they both discussed nearly all the major issues of the campaign, while still both spending the plurality of their advertisements introducing themselves and discussing how their personal characteristics prepared them to be the Democratic presidential nominees. The lowest issue convergence score among Democrats who aired ads in Iowa belonged to Biden and Edwards (25). Here, the score is low because of Biden's near-exclusive focus on foreign policy and Edwards's heavy emphasis on economic issues.

In New Hampshire, Biden aired only eight advertisements, so he is removed from these analyses. Among the other five Democratic candidates who aired television ads, issue convergence scores were generally high, meaning that all candidates discussed similar issues with similar frequencies. Clinton, Edwards, and Obama continued to introduce themselves to the electorate bringing their personal histories and backgrounds into the conversation a plurality of the time. Dodd mentioned multiple issues in a plurality of his ads, while still mentioning environmental and energy issues in over 20 percent of his ads. Richardson, as he did in Iowa, focused most of his ads on foreign affairs. Neither Dodd nor Richardson got much purchase

electorally from honing their advertising in just one or two issues. Democratic candidates that did win the most votes in New Hampshire were Clinton, Obama, and Edwards, who discussed a wide variety of issues in their television advertising.

The only two Democratic candidates who aired televised ads in Nevada were Clinton and Obama. In this state, both candidates continued to air mostly personal ads, but here Clinton also aired a large percentage of ads about the environment and energy issues specifically discussing her opposition to dumping nuclear waste at Yucca mountain. Obama did not air any ads about the environment, but continued to air ads about economic issues, foreign affairs, and healthcare. Clinton's direct environmental appeal may have helped her appeal to some voters in Nevada, but it seems unlikely that it alone was responsible for her caucus victory.

In South Carolina, Edwards attempted to keep his campaign alive by advertising heavily. He out-advertised both Clinton and Obama by a 2-1 margin and spent the majority of his advertisements reminding people of his personal story and of his roots in the state. Clinton and Obama both also aired ads about their personal characteristics, but Clinton's environmental focus remained high while Obama continued to cover economic, social, and foreign policy issues. Edwards's advertising blitz did not appear to pay off electorally as he finished third in the state and was forced to drop out of the contest.

Looking at these four states together, issue convergence scores tended to be high, especially among the three most serious Democratic candidates— Obama, Clinton, and Edwards. In most states, these candidates discussed nearly all the issues of the day, despite highlighting the occasional state-specific issue (like Clinton's focus on Yucca mountain in Nevada). Issue convergence scores were lowest among candidates who tended to have a single-issue focus, like Biden and Richardson on foreign policy. It seems to be the case that in order for candidates to be

taken seriously and ultimately have electoral success, they need not to focus only on one issue, but be prepared to show the electorate that they have policy positions on a variety of issues facing the country. Interestingly, this runs counter to conventional wisdom of campaign consultants who claim that candidates should stay on message and only have, “one, and only one message to communicate to voters” (Bradshaw 2004, 52).

In Iowa on the Republican side, neither Giuliani nor McCain aired any televised campaign ads. Of the remaining candidates, the issue convergence was quite low. Only Romney, Huckabee, and Thompson aired ads that focused specifically on individual issues. Hunter and Tancredo aired relatively few ads and all of Tancredo's focused on issues of immigration while Hunter's attempted to cover multiple issues simultaneously and lacked much policy specificity. Paul discussed economic issues in some of his ads, but still most of his also contained a plethora of issues and lacked specifics. Huckabee, Romney, and Thompson each spent roughly a third of their campaign ads in Iowa discussing their personal characteristics and introducing themselves to the caucus electorate. Beyond that, however, there were few similarities in the ad content between the three candidates. Huckabee spent the majority of his ads discussing social issues, specifically his pro-life values. Romney focused instead on economic issues and immigration. Thompson discussed immigration relatively frequently, but he also had many ads that attempted to address multiple issues simultaneously.

Looking just at Iowa, but comparing the Democratic and Republican candidates and issue convergence scores, it is worth noting that the Republican candidates appear much more internally diverse than do the Democratic candidates. Again, this runs counter to much of the conventional wisdom about the two parties. Political science literature (Brown 1995) tends to claim that the Democratic Party is comprised a coalition of minorities while the Republican Party

is a more homogenous constituency. If varying groups of voters care about different issues, then based solely on the issue content of campaign advertising prior to the Iowa caucus, this certainly does not seem to be the case.

Unlike in Iowa, in New Hampshire Giuliani and McCain both advertised, as did Huckabee, Hunter, Paul, Romney, and Tancredo. Again, Tancredo and Hunter were single-issue candidates, with Tancredo focusing on immigration and Hunter using his few ads to discuss economic concerns. Paul aired ads covering a variety of topics and is the only candidate to have focused at all on environmental or energy concerns in New Hampshire. Both Huckabee and McCain used the majority of their ads to introduce themselves to the electorate and discuss the personal characteristics. This similarity, combined with the fact that they both used most of the remainder of their ads to discuss economic issues, earned them the highest issue convergence score in the state. Several pairings of candidates did not overlap at all in their issue content in New Hampshire, and were thus assigned issue convergence scores of zero.

By and large, issue convergence scores for Republicans remained quite low indicating that very few of the ads aired by Republican candidates in the early primary and caucus states overlapped in terms of issue content. In Michigan, just three candidates aired ads and the issue convergence scores were zero for Huckabee and McCain, 16 for Huckabee and Romney, and 19 for McCain and Romney. In South Carolina, the highest issue convergence score belonged to Paul and Thompson at 75, while the lowest score was zero for McCain and Paul. Finally, in Florida, the issue convergence score for Giuliani and Romney was 58, while the score was 11 for McCain and Romney, and 2 for Giuliani and McCain.

Again, comparing issue convergence scores across the early primary and caucus states between Democratic and Republican candidates, somewhat surprisingly we see much more

convergence among Democratic candidates than we do among Republican candidates. In no state, did we see an issue convergence score for zero between Democratic candidates. However, among Republicans, in every state except Florida there was at least one pairing of candidates who did not overlap at all in their issue content, and in Florida an issue convergence of two was calculated for McCain and Giuliani.

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that multiple factors influence whether a candidate airs negative advertisements against members of his/her own party as well as against members of the opposing party. The more influential independent variables include how long the nominating campaign has continued; the number of candidates remaining in the contest; and the distance by which the candidate airing the ad trails the frontrunner. However, these effects are not constant across parties. In particular, when candidates dropped out of the Democratic nominating campaign, the remaining candidates were more likely to attack one another. Yet when candidates dropped out of the Republican nominating campaign, the remaining candidates were less likely to attack one another. I argue that this is due to the unique nature of each party's 2008 nominating contest. The final three Democratic candidates remaining in the contest were the three most well-funded and well-known candidates. On the Republican side, most of the would-be serious candidates dropped out more quickly leaving McCain and two relative unknown Republicans as the final three candidates in that contest.

Additionally, in terms of negativity, we have also seen that not all candidates competing for their party's nomination are equally likely to be attacked by members of their own party. While it is not the case that only frontrunners get attacked, those candidates not seen as

legitimate contenders by members of their own party are likely to get a free ride in terms of attacks. In this sense, candidates do not waste resources.

Examining the issue content of televised campaign advertising within the context of the 2008 presidential nominating contests both descriptively by candidate, as well as within the early-nominating-contest states, confirms several additional things. First, nearly all candidates aired advertisements across a wide variety of issues. Candidates who aired ads in just one or two issue domains (Kucinich and Biden on the Democratic side and Hunter and Tancredo on the Republican side) did not ultimately have very much success at the polls. Candidates must be equipped and prepared to address a diverse set of issues and do not appear to be able to escape talking about the issues of the day. Second, Republican issue convergence scores were, by and large, lower than were Democratic issue convergence scores. This is particularly interesting because it runs counter to the conventional wisdom that argues Democrats are more heterogeneous than are Republicans.

Finally, thinking about issue convergence among co-partisans, the candidates on the Democratic side that had the highest issue convergence score were the two candidates who stayed in the nominating contest longest. The issue content of Clinton and Obama campaign advertisements overlapped more than that of any other pair of Democratic candidates. This could possibly be due to the extended nature of the Democratic contest and the inability to talk past one another on the campaign trail, and even in televised campaign advertising over the course of an 18-month campaign. On the Republican side, the eventual nominee, McCain, overlapped most with Huckabee and Romney, but the highest issue convergence scores belonged to the pairing of Hunter and Paul, two candidates that did not have much electoral success at the polls. Again, the most electorally successful candidates discussed many issues, including social,

economic, and foreign policy issues, while single-issue candidates did not have much success at the polls.

Additional work on the substance of presidential nominating contests should likely consider issue content even more specifically. As defined currently, "economic issues" is extremely broad and contains a variety of subtopics, such as taxes, debt, deficit spending, and the overall size of government. Examining this particular subset of campaign ads might further illuminate differences between the Democratic and Republican parties with respect to how they discuss issues in campaign advertising. Further work might also seek to include more nominating contests and ask whether candidates might employ intra- and interparty negativity differently when there is an incumbent president.

Looking forward to the third empirical chapter, I aim to explore further the variation in geography and timing presented here. However, instead of considering these factors from the perspective of the candidates, I think about them in terms of members of the electorate. I ask whether individuals who live in regions of the country that were exposed to higher levels of campaigning (and/or negativity) learned more about the candidates than did those individuals who live in regions of the country that did not see as much advertising (and/or negativity). Likewise, I examine whether individuals living in states that had primaries or caucuses toward the end of the nominating contest remembered more about the candidates than did individuals living in states like Iowa and New Hampshire.

Table 1:
2008 Advertising Negativity by Candidate

Candidate	Total Airings	Intraparty Negative	Interparty Negative	Total Percent Negative
Biden	3,165	29.7%	0.0%	29.7%
Clinton	82,789	4.1%	24.0%	28.0%
Dodd	4,028	35.4%	7.5%	42.9%
Edwards	14,732	20.5%	8.4%	28.0%
Kucinich	27	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Obama	140,658	2.0%	7.4%	9.4%
Richardson	5,936	5.6%	18.3%	23.9%
All Democrats	251,335	4.8%	13.1%	17.8%
Giuliani	7,127	27.6%	9.8%	37.4%
Huckabee	8,400	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
Hunter	114	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
McCain	13,581	3.7%	4.4%	7.3%
Paul	7,172	2.0%	0.0%	2.0%
Romney	36,841	4.7%	17.6%	22.3%
Tancredo	99	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Thompson	4,032	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
All Republicans	77,366	5.6%	10.0%	15.5%

Table 2:
Intraparty Negativity, 2008

Democrats, Pre Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0364	(0.0045)*	0.7421	(0.0295)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0139	(0.0006)*
Number of Candidates	-1.8891	(0.0421)*	-1.6139	(0.0462)*
Frontrunner	1.6478	(0.0638)*	1.7302	(0.0671)*
Distance Behind	0.3651	(0.0081)*	0.3834	(0.0088)*
Previously Targeted	0.2222	(0.1383)	0.6083	(0.1434)*
N	91,308		91,308	
Pseudo R ²	0.4808		0.4917	
Republicans, Pre Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	1.3335	(0.0289)*	1.9277	(0.0488)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0347	(0.0016)*
Number of Candidates	1.3501	(0.0419)*	1.4810	(0.0435)*
Frontrunner	0.0496	(0.0825)	-0.0899	(0.0836)
Distance Behind	0.0784	(0.0045)*	0.0668	(0.0046)*
Previously Targeted	-0.7188	(0.0519)*	-0.8270	(0.0532)*
N	44,531		44,531	
Pseudo R ²	0.2983		0.3004	
Democrats, Post Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	2.1594	(0.0436)*	-42.5236	(1.8244)*
Days ²	--	--	-7.0798	(0.2885)*
Frontrunner	-1.5694	(0.0435)*	-1.8421	(0.0456)*
N	39,638		39,638	
Pseudo R ²	0.3177		0.4437	

* p<0.05

Table 3:
Interparty Negativity, 2008

Democrats, Pre Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	-0.2754	(0.0045)*	-0.6145	(0.0152)*
Days ²	--	--	-0.0066	(0.0003)*
Number of Candidates	0.4376	(0.1275)*	0.2834	(0.0143)*
Frontrunner	1.1246	(0.0291)*	1.2150	(0.0293)*
Distance Behind	-0.6615	(0.0017)*	-0.0600	(0.0017)*
Previously Targeted	2.3358	(0.0624)*	2.2388	(0.0601)*
N	149,716		149,716	
Pseudo R ²	0.1977		0.2020	
Republicans, Pre Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.3336	(0.0080)*	-2.2428	(0.0557)*
Days ²	--	--	-0.0942	(0.0022)*
Number of Candidates	2.0455	(0.0494)*	1.5699	(0.0695)*
Frontrunner	0.5914	(0.0656)*	0.2849	(0.0856)*
Distance Behind	0.0744	(0.0035)*	0.0145	(0.0056)*
Previously Targeted	-2.7986	(0.0964)*	-0.4043	(0.1172)*
N	65,189		65,189	
Pseudo R ²	0.2453		0.3858	
Democrats, Post Super Tuesday	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0715	(0.0119)*	0.2824	(0.0350)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0258	(0.0040)*
Frontrunner	-2.0790	(0.0279)*	-2.0557	(0.0280)*
N	73,675		73,675	
Pseudo R ²	0.1644		0.1651	

* p<0.05

Table 4:
Direct Target of Attack, 2008

Candidate	Number of Airings Attacking	Obama Leading	Clinton Leading
Obama	7,557 (3.0%)	3,342 (44.2%)	4,215 (55.8%)
Clinton	8,292 (3.3%)	2,867 (34.6%)	5,425 (65.4%)
Edwards	565 (0.2%)	0 (0.0%)	565 (100.0%)
Total Airings	251,335	136,878	114,457
Candidate		McCain Leading	Giuliani Leading
McCain	906 (1.2%)	906 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Giuliani	252 (0.3%)	140 (55.6%)	112 (44.4%)
Huckabee	1117 (1.4%)	492 (44.0%)	625 (56.0%)
Romney	654 (0.8%)	542 (82.9%)	112 (17.1%)
Total Airings	77,366	42,150	35,216

Table 5:
Issue Content by Candidate

	Economic Issues	Foreign Affairs	Health- care	Environ- ment or Energy	Immigr- ation	Other Social Policy	Personal Character -istics	Multiple Issues	Other/ Unknown	Total Airings
Biden		76.0%					24.0%			3,165
Clinton	27.4%	1.7%	1.6%	11.7%		1.5%	29.7%	18.7%	7.7%	82,789
Dodd		7.5%		21.6%			22.5%	48.5%		4,028
Edwards	26.1%	0.4%		9.3%			57.4%	6.9%		14,732
Kucinich	22.2%	51.9%	25.9%							27
Obama	24.3%	2.8%	7.1%	6.4%	0.2%	8.9%	29.3%	16.0%	4.9%	140,939
Richardson	11.3%	39.9%			18.3%	4.9%	5.2%	13.3%	7.1%	5,936
All Democrats	24.4%	4.2%	4.5%	8.8%	0.1%	5.6%	30.4%	16.6%	5.4%	251,616
Giuliani	44.3%	33.8%			6.6%		7.2%	8.1%		7,127
Huckabee	7.1%				5.9%	66.0%	13.4%	7.6%		8,400
Hunter	42.1%							57.9%		114
McCain	24.3%	2.3%	7.6%	0.2%			54.4%	3.4%	7.8%	19,722
Paul	17.9%	9.7%		0.7%	10.4%			61.3%		7,220
Romney	36.5%	3.7%			12.3%	6.3%	30.8%	9.2%	1.2%	36,841
Tancredo					100.0%					99
Thompson					15.8%		24.0%	57.4%	2.7%	4,032
All Republicans	27.9%	5.9%	1.8%	0.1%	8.4%	9.4%	29.5%	14.5%	2.5%	83,555
All Candidates	25.3%	4.6%	3.9%	6.6%	2.2%	6.5%	30.1%	16.1%	4.7%	335,171

Table 6:
Issue Convergence of Democratic Candidates in Early Nominating Contest States

	Biden	Clinton	Dodd	Edwards	Obama	Richardson
Biden		IA: 32 NH: -- NV: -- SC: --	IA: 30 NH: -- NV: -- SC: --	IA: 25 NH: -- NV: -- SC: --	IA: 31 NH: -- NV: -- SC: --	IA: 44 NH: -- NV: -- SC: --
Clinton	23		IA: 63 NH: 50 NV: -- SC: --	IA: 66 NH: 81 NV: -- SC: 38	IA: 82 NH: 67 NV: 52 SC: 49	IA: 46 NH: 40 NV: -- SC: --
Dodd	28	59		IA: 51 NH: 61 NV: -- SC: --	IA: 47 NH: 33 NV: -- SC: --	IA: 42 NH: 55 NV: -- SC: --
Edwards	20	60	54		IA: 66 NH: 68 NV: -- SC: 35	IA: 45 NH: 41 NV: -- SC: --
Obama	25	71	43	57		IA: 51 NH: 21 NV: -- SC: --
Richardson	44	44	44	44	44	

An issue convergence score is only calculated when both candidates ran issues in a particular state. The overall score is not reported (--) when the two candidates involved never aired ads in the same state as one another.

Table 7:
Issue Convergence of Republican Candidates in Early Nominating Contest States

	Giuliani	Huckabee	Hunter	McCain	Paul	Romney	Tancredo	Thompson
Giuliani		IA: -- NH: 33 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: 23 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: 50 MI: -- SC: -- FL: 2	IA: -- NH: 63 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: 64 MI: -- SC: -- FL: 58	IA: -- NH: 16 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: -- MI: -- SC: -- FL: --
Huckabee	33		IA: 0 NH: 18 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: 75 MI: 0 SC: 13 FL: --	IA: 5 NH: 18 MI: -- SC: 14 FL: --	IA: 49 NH: 53 MI: 16 SC: 44 FL: --	IA: 10 NH: 0 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 38 NH: -- MI: -- SC: 27 FL: --
Hunter	23	2		IA: -- NH: 32 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 90 NH: 24 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 7 NH: 35 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 0 NH: 0 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 41 NH: -- MI: -- SC: -- FL: --
McCain	23	34	32		IA: -- NH: 35 MI: -- SC: 0 FL: --	IA: -- NH: 71 MI: 19 SC: 24 FL: 11	IA: -- NH: 0 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: -- NH: -- MI: -- SC: 23 FL: --
Paul	63	9	73	22		IA: 17 NH: 52 MI: -- SC: 21 FL: --	IA: 0 NH: 22 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 41 NH: -- MI: -- SC: 75 FL: --
Romney	61	44	19	34	29		IA: 15 NH: 19 MI: -- SC: -- FL: --	IA: 53 NH: -- MI: -- SC: 44 FL: --
Tancredo	16	9	0	0	5	17		IA: 24 NH: -- MI: -- SC: -- FL: --
Thompson	--	33	41	23	56	49	24	

An issue convergence score is only calculated when both candidates ran issues in a particular state. The overall score is not reported (--) when the two candidates involved never aired ads in the same state as one another.

Figure 1:
2008 Democratic Party Advertising prior to Super Tuesday,
Volume and Tone by Media Market




Figure 2:
2008 Republican Party Advertising prior to Super Tuesday,
Volume and Tone by Media Market




Figure 3:
2008 Democratic Party Advertising after Super Tuesday,
Volume and Tone by Media Market




Figure 4:
2008 Republican Party Advertising after Super Tuesday,
Volume and Tone by Media Market




Figure 5:
Predicted Probabilities of Intraparty Negativity Prior to Super Tuesday
2008 Democrats and Republicans





Figure 6:
Predicted Probabilities of Interparty Negativity Prior to Super Tuesday
2008 Democrats and Republicans



Appendix A:
Table of Candidates and Dates of Withdraw

Candidate	Party	Date of Withdraw
Tom Vilsack	D	2/23/2007
Chris Dodd	D	1/3/2008
Joe Biden	D	1/3/2008
Bill Richardson	D	1/10/2008
Dennis Kucinich	D	1/25/2008
John Edwards	D	1/30/2008
Hillary Clinton	D	6/7/2008
Barack Obama	D	.
Jim Gilmore	R	7/14/2007
Tommy Thompson	R	8/12/2007
Sam Brownback	R	10/18/2007
Tom Tancredo	R	12/20/2007
Duncan Hunter	R	1/19/2008
Fred Thompson	R	1/22/2008
Rudy Giuliani	R	1/30/2008
Mitt Romney	R	2/7/2008
Mike Huckabee	R	3/4/2008
Alan Keyes	R	3/26/2008
Ron Paul	R	6/12/2008
John McCain	R	.

Appendix B:
OLS Specification of Intraparty Negativity Models
(Robustness Check of Table 2)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Democrats, Pre Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0122	(0.0002)*	0.0215	(0.0009)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0002	(0.0000)*
Number of Candidates	-0.0375	(0.0006)*	-0.0334	(0.0007)*
Frontrunner	0.0826	(0.0013)*	0.0815	(0.0013)*
Distance Behind	0.0091	(0.0001)*	0.0091	(0.0001)*
Previously Targeted	-0.1114	(0.0026)*	-0.1102	(0.0026)*
N	174,639		174,639	
Adjusted R ²	0.2659		0.2664	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Republicans, Pre Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0080	(0.0003)*	0.0391	(0.0008)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0007	(0.0000)*
Number of Candidates	-0.0033	(0.0019)	0.0288	(0.0020)*
Frontrunner	-0.0031	(0.0033)	-0.0222	(0.0033)*
Distance Behind	0.0036	(0.0002)*	0.0025	(0.0002)*
Previously Targeted	-0.0063	(0.0025)*	-0.0339	(0.0025)*
N	77,366		77,366	
Adjusted R ²	0.1141		0.1361	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Democrats, Post Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0386	(0.0007)*	0.0415	(0.0023)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0003	(0.0003)
Frontrunner	-0.0622	(0.0016)*	-0.0621	(0.0016)*
N	76,696		76,69	
Adjusted R ²	0.1233		0.1233	

* p<0.05

Appendix C:
OLS Specification of Interparty Negativity Models
(Robustness Check of Table 3)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Democrats, Pre Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	-0.0142	(0.0003)*	-0.0527	(0.0015)*
Days ²	--	--	-0.0008	(0.0000)*
Number of Candidates	0.0453	(0.0010)*	0.0282	(0.0012)*
Frontrunner	0.1253	(0.0022)*	0.1298	(0.0022)*
Distance Behind	-0.0058	(0.0001)*	-0.0055	(0.0001)*
Previously Targeted	0.0480	(0.0044)*	0.0428	(0.0044)*
N	174,639		174,639	
Adjusted R ²	0.1661		0.1693	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Republicans, Pre Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0129	(0.0004)*	-0.0381	(0.0009)*
Days ²	--	--	-0.0012	(0.0000)*
Number of Candidates	0.0757	(0.0022)*	0.0228	(0.0023)*
Frontrunner	0.0247	(0.0040)*	0.0560	(0.0039)*
Distance Behind	0.0019	(0.0002)*	0.0037	(0.0002)*
Previously Targeted	-0.0781	(0.0030)*	-0.0328	(0.0030)*
N	77,366		77,366	
Adjusted R ²	0.2475		0.2826	
	Model 1		Model 2	
Democrats, Post Super Tuesday	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Days	0.0107	(0.0011)*	0.0705	(0.0036)*
Days ²	--	--	0.0069	(0.0004)*
Frontrunner	-0.2131	(0.0025)*	-0.2103	(0.0025)*
N	76,696		76,696	
Adjusted R ²	0.1287		0.1321	

* p<0.05

Chapter 4: Campaign Effects and the 2008 Presidential Nominating Contests

In this third empirical chapter, I aim to integrate the structural and substantive characteristics of presidential nominating campaigns and examine their effects on voters. While there is an extensive literature on campaign effects, much of this scholarship considers very short-term effects within the confines of a general election environment. Within that, much of this literature considers the effects of campaigns on voter turnout or candidate choice. My focus is longer-term effects of nominating contests on more nuanced variables like knowledge about candidates and issues, as well as willingness to rate those candidates.

The impetus for this chapter and the analyses contained within can be illustrated via an example from the Democratic nominating contest of 2008. During the 2008 campaign cycle, then-Senator Barack Obama was relatively unknown to the vast majority of potential Democratic primary and caucus voters. When he declared his candidacy, he was a significant underdog, as then-Senator Hillary Clinton was decidedly the frontrunner. Throughout the course of the 2008 Democratic nominating contest, however, over \$76 million were spent on televised campaign advertisements supporting Obama, who made approximately 785 campaign stops.

Of the \$76 million, over \$9 million of it was spent in Iowa, and approximately 160 of the visits were to Iowa media markets. In his book about the strategy of the 2008 presidential nominating contest and general election, Obama's campaign manager, David Plouffe recognizes the importance of Iowa to Obama's presidential nomination bid and comments on the amount of resources and time devoted to the state, saying, "We married these unprecedented investments in [Iowa] staff with others in good old bricks and mortar. Usually, campaigns establish regional offices in Iowa that the staff can use as bases. ... Then, at the very end of the race, they finally

descend full time on their areas. We envisioned a much more comprehensive network of Obama offices throughout Iowa.” (2009, 64-65).

Ultimately, Obama clinched the Democratic nomination and went on to win the state of Iowa in the general election, obtaining the highest Democratic vote share in the state in 20 years, since Michael Dukakis in 1988. While this evidence is anecdotal in nature, I argue that part of the reason Obama had success in some states that are not traditionally Democratic (and greater success than previous Democratic candidates in traditionally Democratic states) may be the extremely hard-fought nominating contest between Obama and Clinton. In other words, I find it hard to imagine that the millions of dollars spent and the hundreds of visits made in Iowa did not have some impact on voters who lived there, long after the nominating contest itself was over.

Because presidential primaries and caucuses occur at different times in different states, we can examine the effects of the nominating contest under various circumstances. For example, individuals living in Iowa and New Hampshire experience a very different nominating campaign than do individuals living in Pennsylvania and Florida. Yet much of the behavioral literature on campaigns considers only the campaign season for the general election. In doing so, this scholarship essentially “resets” the campaign to zero at the start of the general election campaign and treats the individuals living in Iowa, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Florida the same.

In this final empirical chapter, I ask questions about how nominating contests affect the general election. Specifically, I ask: Are individuals who experienced high levels of nominating campaign activity more willing to rate the general election candidates than are individuals who saw little to no nominating campaign activity? Are individuals who experienced higher levels of nominating campaign activity more likely to report having seen campaign ads or discussed candidates than those individuals who have not experienced a vigorous nominating campaign?

Are individuals more likely to want to vote for a candidate in the general election whom they watched campaign aggressively during the nominating season? In answering these questions, I rely on panel survey data as well as information about the nature of the presidential nominating contest, such as televised advertising and campaign visits. Using various methodological approaches, I estimate the degree to which campaigns affected individuals throughout the duration of the 2008 presidential election – from the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest throughout the outcome of the general election.

Scholarly literature in political science is divided on the degree to which campaigns matter. Much of the early literature finds minimal effects (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), but more recent literature finds that campaigns can and do affect voter behavior (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Shaw 1999; Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2009). Scholars have examined the degree to which mobilization affects an individual's propensity to turn out to vote and argued that politicians strategically mobilize their supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). A more recent study by Bergan and colleagues (2005) supports these claims and argues that campaigns rely on heavily partisan messages. In their campaign mobilization efforts, politicians focus on neighborhoods where they expect their supporters to reside (Bergan, Gerber, et al. 2005). Finally, other research on campaign effects focuses on whether cross-pressured, or persuadable, voters are those that are most susceptible to being affected by campaigns (Hillygus and Shields 2009).

Gerber and Green (2000) find that voter turnout can be increased substantially by personal canvassing and by direct mail, but that personal contact has the largest effect and can increase the likelihood of an individual voting by nearly ten percentage points (see also Gerber and Green 2005; Imai 2005). This study confirmed earlier studies (Gosnell 1927; Rosenstone

and Hansen 1993) that found a significant effect of campaign contact on levels of voter turnout. Despite the swath of research over the past few decades putting aside the minimal effects hypothesis and showing that campaigns can and do affect the electorate, what nearly all this literature has in common is its exclusive focus on the environment for the general election.

Existing studies of presidential nominating contests tend also to look at that contest in isolation. Most of Aldrich's (1980) work considers the institutional structure of the nominating contest and how the rules associated therewith affect what types of candidates are able to succeed in the nominating contests. One aspect of this work that does span the nominating and general election environments is that considering the issues candidates raise during various phases of their campaigns. Here, Aldrich argues that there is "a sharp disjuncture between policies advanced during the nomination and the general election campaigns" (1980, 209). This is along the lines of what I propose to do in this chapter, though instead of focusing on the candidates and the issues they raise, I consider the effect the differing types of campaigns might have on individual members of the electorate.

Bartels's (1988) work thoroughly examines the dynamic nature of the presidential nominating process. In doing so, he considers the timing of primaries and caucuses in the different states and argues that momentum is key in determining which candidate ultimately wins his/her party's presidential nomination. While this scholarship does provide a "reasonably complete picture of the ideological, regional, demographic, and other factors that shape primary outcomes across the range of primary states" (1988, 11), the work does not extend beyond the nominating contest to posit what, if any, effect the dynamic nominating process might have on general election outcomes. Again, I aim to take advantage of the dynamic nature of the nominating contest to consider how individuals learn about candidates more generally.

Geer's (1989) Nominating Presidents provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of how members of the electorate understand and learn about politics in a multi-candidate environment. Using a wealth of exit poll data from the 1976, 1980, and 1984 presidential nominating contests, Geer argues that "when voters in primaries are faced with a choice between two candidates, they appear as informed as are voters in general elections... [However], as the number of competing candidates increases, the more likely it is that voters will be unfamiliar with all the possible choices facing them" (1989, 57). While I am convinced by the findings here, I want to push beyond the nominating environment and ask whether members of the electorate remember what they have seen during the nominating contest when asked about the two candidates remaining in the general election contest.

More recently, Cohen et al. (2008) examine the presidential nominating process and argue that despite the reforms of the latter half of the 20th century, political parties still hold most of the influence over the presidential selection process. They do claim that campaigns matter, but almost solely via the mechanism of endorsements by political party activists. In the presidential nominating contest world presented by Cohen and his co-authors, voters are not influenced by "polls, media, or fund-raisers, but [instead are influenced by the] autonomous judgments of a relatively small world of party members" (2008, 311). Here, while the authors are implicitly considering the degree to which campaigns matter, they are doing so only within the context of the nominating contest.

One literature that does consider the effects of the nominating environment on the general election environment is that discussing divisive primaries. Primaries are presumed to be inherently divisive. Rather than build coalitions, candidates must appeal to factions and are forced to attack one another (Polsby 1983). In the process, they provide ammunition to the

opposition party and expend precious resources that could best be targeted to the general election campaign (White 1961). Although studies of presidential elections generally conclude that divisive primaries do more harm than good (Kenney and Rice 1987; Lingle 1980; Lingle, Owen, and Sonner 1995; but see also Atkeson 1998), the empirical evidence supporting the divisive primary hypothesis varies considerably across the electoral office considered (Bernstein 1997; Kenny and Rice 1984; Kenney 1988). Born (1981) finds that divisive primaries help challengers but harm incumbents. Atkeson (1998) concludes that divisive presidential primaries have no effect on general election performance once candidate quality and the prior vulnerability of the incumbent or his party are taken into account.

Like the literature on divisive primaries, I am interested in effects of the nominating campaign on individuals' behavior and opinions persisting into the environment for the general election campaign. I am interested in the degree to which campaigns matter in the nominating stage of the 2008 presidential election, but also the degree to which campaigns may affect individuals over a long period of time. Furthermore, while I am interested in the effect of campaigns on voter turnout and vote choice in presidential primaries, my specific focus in this chapter is the effect of primary campaigns on dependent variables other than turnout and vote choice. Specifically, I am interested in whether nominating campaigns can educate voters about candidates and issues and, to the degree to which they can, whether those effects persist into the environment for the general election campaign.

Data and Methods

Data for this chapter come from a variety of sources. Since we are examining campaign effects on individuals, public opinion data come from the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis

Project (CCAP). Because of the panel nature of the study, as well as its duration, it is well-suited for studying the long-term effects of campaigns, specifically those effects related to the presidential nominating contests. The first wave of the CCAP study was administered in December of 2007, before any votes were cast in the presidential nominating contests, but during a time when significant campaigning was going on in early primary and caucus states like Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. Subsequent waves of the survey were conducted in January, March, September, October, and November (post-election). For this chapter, I am utilizing the Baseline, March, October, and post-election waves of the CCAP data, which includes a total of 18,404 respondents.²⁰

In order to merge the CCAP data with campaign data such as advertising and candidate visits, we need to have geographic-level information at the media-market level. In order obtain this for CCAP respondents, I had to utilize information in the survey pertaining to the zip code in which respondents lived. Using a zip code conversion file from the Missouri Census Data Center (Missouri 2012), I was able to place zip codes into counties and then counties into their appropriate media markets.²¹ Because of missing or erroneous zip code information, however, I did have to drop some individuals from the dataset. After doing so, I was left with a total of 17,876 respondents. Using information from Truck Ads (TruckAds 2012) and the county-level data, I was able to place each respondent in his/her media market. In 2008, there were just eight

²⁰ I could have used a smaller portion of the CCAP dataset that contained more thorough measures of campaign exposure, but there were only approximately 1,800 respondents in that portion of the data. In choosing to use the entirety of the CCAP sample, I am forgoing more extensive television exposure measures in favor of a larger sample size.

²¹ A total of 8,924 zip codes did not fall within the geographic boundaries of one county, so I placed respondents living in this zip codes in the county where the plurality of the zip code fell. I do not believe this assumption had severe adverse affects on the quality of the data for a couple of reasons. First, for 6,987 of the zip codes affected (78 percent) 75 percent or more of the 2010 population fell into the county to which I ultimately assigned the respondent. Second, it affected only 4,215 respondents (23 percent of the total number of respondents).

counties in the United States that overlapped media market boundaries.²² Because I am unable to determine which market the individuals lived in (without more sophisticated geographic techniques), I randomly assigned each of these respondents to one of the two media markets in which they could possibly live.²³

Next, I created a television consumption variable for each CCAP respondent. In each wave of the survey (with the exception of the post-election wave), respondents were asked whether they watched television in the day prior to the survey. The exact question was: "We are interested in the kinds of things people watch on TV. Did you watch any of these stations at these times yesterday?" (CCAP 2008). Table 1 shows all the stations and time slots that appeared in the CCAP survey instrument. Respondents were permitted to select any and all of the time-period and station combinations that applied to their television viewing the day prior to the survey. From respondent answers about how much television they watched on the day prior to the survey, I created a scale of media consumption. Individuals who scored higher on the scale watched more television and were thus likely exposed to more televised campaign advertisements, provided they lived in an area of the country that received ads. Full information on the creation and validation of the scales can be found in Appendix A.

Data on televised campaign advertisements come from the Wisconsin Advertising Project, which tracked all such advertising in the presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections in all media markets during the 2008 campaign (WiscAds 2008). Data on the number of candidate visits came from the Washington Post's database (Washington Post 2008). From

²² These counties are: Apache, AZ; El Dorado, CA; Kern, CA; Riverside, CA; Solano, CA; Edgar, IL; Lea, NM; and Oneida, NY. The county-level assignment into media markets changed slightly between 2008 and 2012 based on the TruckAds website. For this analysis, I used the information I gleaned from the site in 2008. I have since pulled the 2012 county to media market assignment and will perform a sensitivity analysis in the future to see if this has a meaningful effect on my results.

²³ A total of 135 individuals were affected by the county-level splits between media markets. This accounts for less than one percent (0.76 percent) of the overall sample.

both of these sources, I was able to glean information about the timing and geographic location of advertisements, or visits, as well as which candidate was doing the advertising, or visiting.

The first series of multivariate models tests whether respondents living in media markets that received television advertising and candidate visits differed from respondents living in states that did not receive campaign ads or visits from candidates in the nominating contest. I test for these effects at two stages of the nominating contest, using the same set of respondents. First, I examine the effects of campaigns during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Then, I test for the same effects toward the end of March, after the Republican campaign was concluded, but before the end of the Democratic nominating contest.

The second series of models tests the degree to which any effects linger, by taking advantage of the panel nature of the CCAP data and testing for effects late in the 2008 general election and after the 2008 general election campaign concluded. In testing for these campaign effects, I run probit models that control for respondent demographics and for campaign activities (ads and visits). I cluster the standard errors by media markets to account for non-independence of observations.²⁴ At the individual level, I control for demographics: age, education, income, gender, race, and party identification. All demographic variables are categorical. Therefore, I include them in the model as series of dummy variables.

The reference category for age is the 18-29 year olds, while the variables included in the models are: ages 30-44, ages 45-59, and ages 60 and older. The reference category for education is those who have high school degrees or less, while the other variables are: individuals who attended some college; those who graduated from college; and those with more than a bachelor's

²⁴ I explored the possibility of running these as multi-level models with HLM7. However, in running null model diagnostics, less than five percent of the variance was explainable by the level-2 (media market) variables. Furthermore, the reliability statistic of the null multi-level model for all the dependent variables I considered was low, indicating that the group means did not vary substantially across level-2 units when holding constant the sample size per group (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 46).

degree. The reference category for race is whites, while the variable of interest is those who are non-white (nonwhite). The reference category for income is those individuals who live in households where the annual income is less than \$40,000 per year. Income variables in the model then are: household income \$40,000 - \$79,999; household income greater than \$80,000; and those who refused to provide information on their household income.

Party identification is included as either a dummy variable for Republicans or for Democrats depending on the dependent variable, making the comparison group non-Republicans, or non-Democrats. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the demographic variables. As with many public opinion surveys, respondents are slightly older and more female than is the United States population, but these do not pose significant threats to the validity of subsequent analyses. Controlling for demographics limits the bias in multivariate analyses. In the final analysis that looks at changes in opinion over time, because the survey is a panel study, respondents essentially serve as their own controls.

Campaign variables, measured at the media-market level, include the number of advertisements and the number of candidate visits. To simplify the models, I construct dummy variables that capture whether the individual's media market received any campaign advertising or visits prior to when the survey was taken. Doing so tests whether the presence of advertising or visits impacts the dependent variables of the models and not whether the amount of advertising or the actual number of visits has an influence.²⁵ Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the campaign variables of all models. These variables include televised campaign advertising and candidate visits during the 2008 presidential nominating contest.

²⁵ Subsequent research might consider examining advertising and visits as continuous variables, but if the effects are non-existent (or small) with these variables measured as dummies, I do not think the added benefit of doing so will be great.

The number of ads and visits in the table is the cumulative number of ads that aired and visits that were made by the start date of the particular CCAP wave.²⁶ Because of the cumulative nature of the data, both visits and ads increase between the Baseline study and March, and then again between March and the end of the nominating contest. More interesting than the increase, however, is the percentage of ads versus visits that were made by Obama as opposed to McCain. Much more parity exists between the candidates with respect to visits than with respect to ads. On average, Obama (and other members of his campaign) made just over half of the visits made by the two candidates, while he aired over 80 percent of the total ads aired by the two candidates. In subsequent analysis, I discuss why this might be the case. Table 3 also shows the total numbers of ads and visits made by both parties' nominees during the general election campaign.

In the models for which I report results in the remainder of this chapter, I also include an interaction term that captures the respondent's propensity to watch network television²⁷ and the total campaign ads aired in the respondent's media market simultaneously.²⁸ I run this model for several dependent variables for respondents in the baseline and March waves of the CCAP survey. Since the individuals responding to the survey are the same, we are exploiting the geographic variation in when candidates air ads and visit various media markets and where the respondents live. All dependent variables are operationalized as binary, which makes probit models appropriate. Dependent variables for the baseline and March waves include:

- Saw campaign ads favoring McCain (1=Yes, saw ad)
- Saw campaign ads favoring Obama (1=Yes, saw ad)

²⁶ The start dates of the various waves of the CCAP study were as follows: Baseline = December 17, 2007; March = March 21, 2008; October = October 22, 2008; Post = November 5, 2008.

²⁷ The relationship between an individual's propensity to watch network television and his/her propensity to watch other non-network television is not strong (pairwise correlation of -0.1761). I use the network measure because the WiscAds data includes only those ads aired on broadcast (or network) television.

²⁸ Because of potential multicollinearity between the dummy ads measure and the propensity to view variable, I also run all models without the interaction term. While coefficients change slightly, levels of statistical significance remain unchanged between corresponding models.

- Discussed McCain's candidacy (1=Yes, discussed candidate)
- Discussed Obama's candidacy (1=Yes, discussed candidate)
- Willing to rate McCain (1=Yes, rated)²⁹
- Willing to rate Obama (1 = Yes, rated)
- Likelihood of voting for Obama over McCain (1=Voting for Obama)

Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the dependent variables at each wave of the study. The percentage of respondents who reported having seen an ad aired by either of the two candidates increased in each wave of the study. Likewise, the percentage of respondents who reported discussing the candidates was lowest at the start of the baseline wave and increased in each subsequent wave of the study. Over the course of the election, respondents also became more willing to rate the candidates. For this particular variable, I am not interested in what the rating was (positive or negative), but just that the respondent indicated some attitude toward the candidate.

Increases in all these variables as the campaign continued indicate that as the campaign progressed, overall, individuals were more likely to engage in various forms of participation. What remains to be seen, however, is whether any of this increase can be attributed to televised campaign advertising or visits made by candidates in the respondents' local areas. Vote choice, or individuals' propensities to say they were planning to vote for Obama, did not increase across waves of the study. This indicates that the relationship between this variable and the total amount of ads and visits may not be linear in nature.

The second series of models for which I present results takes advantage of the panel nature of the CCAP data to measure the degree to which changes in advertising or visits over

²⁹ Individuals who indicated that their rating of either candidate was "Neutral" were coded as zero.

time influence changes in dependent variables above. Since the respondents are the same in each wave, I am able to measure these changes by calculating changes in the dependent variables across time and predicting those changes as a function of changes in the levels of advertising and visits. I do not control for any individual-level demographics in these models because they do not vary between waves.³⁰

These models utilize all the dependent variables mentioned above and calculate changes that occur between January and March, as well as changes between March and either October or November, depending on when the relevant question was asked in the CCAP study. In the January to March models, there is just one independent variable: the change in the number of ads or visits between the two survey waves. The March to October/November models include two independent variables: the change in the number of ads or visits between the end of the primary (June 3, 2008) and March, and the number of general-election ads or visits present between June 4, 2008, and the date of the survey implementation (October 21, 2008) or the entire general election (post-election wave). In this way, I am able to calculate the influence of additional ads or visits within the nominating contest as well as the influence of general-election ads or visits. Thus, the analysis begins to address questions about whether campaigns can have long-term effects.

The Geography of Advertising and Visits

In addition to presenting descriptive statistics about the key independent variables in tabular format, I argue that it is also extremely useful to be able to examine the data

³⁰ I could include party identification as an indicator variable because it is measured at each wave. However, I choose not to because I am not confident that any changes we see in an individual's party identification are not also driven by the advertisements they may have viewed or the candidate visits they may have experienced. In other words, I do not think including party identification in these models would gain us anything and may actually bias the estimates of the other variables in the model.

geographically, via maps. Doing so allows us to see facets of the nominating campaigns that are masked when just considering the total numbers of television airings and candidate visits that occurred at particular points during the campaign. Because the focus of this chapter is the effect of the nominating contests on the general election, I display only the advertisements aired and candidate visits by McCain and Obama at two points during the nominating contest. First, I describe the geographic patterns of each candidate's advertising during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Then, I show a map that considers the advertising of both candidates simultaneously. Next, I present the same maps showing advertising over the entirety of the nominating contest. After that, I present six additional maps examining candidate visits during both the invisible primary and entire nominating contests. Finally, I explain several key comparisons between figures that will be important throughout the remainder of the chapter.

In Figures 1 and 2, the dots depict the total number of television ads that both Obama and McCain aired in each media market during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. In each figure, the colors show percentage of McCain's, or Obama's overall ads that were aired in each particular market. The darker the colors, the higher percentage of the candidate's ads were aired in that particular geographic market. Figure 1 shows that, prior to the Baseline wave of the CCAP study—January 1, 2007 through December 17, 2007—McCain aired ads in only three media markets—the three that covered New Hampshire. He aired the majority of his ads in the Boston media market, which covers the southern, most populous portion of New Hampshire. During much of the invisible primary stage of then nominating contest McCain did not air any ads in Iowa. Figure 2 shows Obama's advertising during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Obama advertised in more markets than did McCain, but still aired

ads in only a few states. He concentrated his advertising in southern New Hampshire, but also in Iowa. Additionally, Obama aired ads in Nevada and South Carolina.

Figure 3 combines the information from Figures 1 and 2 to show, within each market, whether McCain or Obama aired a larger number of ads. The dots in Figure 3 still correspond to the total number of airings in each market, while the colors represent which of the two candidates, McCain or Obama, had the advertising advantage during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Even very early in the nominating contest, Obama had an advertising advantage over McCain. In none of the markets that either one of the two eventual nominees contested did McCain out-advertise Obama. The two candidates were roughly equal in their advertising in the Boston media market, covering southern New Hampshire, and the Burlington media market, which covers western New Hampshire.

Figures 4 and 5 present the same information as Figures 1 and 2, but instead of covering just the ads aired during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, they depict the total number of ads aired during the entire presidential nominating contest, from January 1, 2007 through June 4, 2008. In Figure 4, we see that McCain's ads during the nominating contest were concentrated in approximately 15 states. Because McCain secured the Republican nomination in March, he did not need to advertise in states that had contests later such as Kentucky, Indiana, and North Carolina. Even prior to the conclusion of the primaries and caucuses, he shifted his advertising efforts to states he thought would be competitive during the general election campaign.³¹ Figure 5 shows that Obama's advertising during the nominating contest was much more diffuse than was McCain's. He had a much longer nominating battle than did McCain,

³¹ Because of the Electoral College and the winner-take-all system in place by state, it is illogical for presidential candidates to campaign in states they do not believe they are capable of winning.

requiring him to continue to advertise in states that had primaries or caucuses throughout the summer, such as Montana, North Carolina, and Oregon.

Figure 6 shows the total number of ads aired by McCain and Obama during the entirety of the presidential nominating contest, via the dots, as well as which candidate aired more ads in each individual market. Obama dominated McCain in advertising during the nominating contest, airing over three times as many ads as McCain in most markets. The only markets in which McCain out-advertised Obama were in Florida and Michigan, two states in which the Democratic presidential nominees did not compete. McCain's advertising was close to on par with Obama's in South Carolina and southern New Hampshire (the Boston media market). Thus, while much was made of the advertising and spending disparity between Obama and McCain during the general election, Figure 6 shows the disparity in resources began even earlier.

Turning now to candidate visits, Figures 7 and 8 show the visits that McCain and Obama made during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Figure 7 shows the percentage of visits that McCain made in each media market during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. We see that McCain concentrated his early visits in two types of places— states with early primaries or caucuses, and media markets containing large cities with wealthy individuals. McCain made the largest percent of his visits to the Boston media market, which fulfills both criteria. He also made a large percentage of his visits to the New York, NY and Washington, DC media markets as well as the Cedar Rapids, IA media market. Figure 8 shows Obama's visits for the same time period. The geographic distribution of his visits looks roughly similar to McCain's. Obama, like McCain, made the largest percentage of his visits to the Boston media market. Obama, however, made a larger percentage of his visits to Cedar

Rapids than did McCain. This makes sense given that Obama relied heavily on winning Iowa as part of his overall nominating-contest strategy, while McCain largely ignored the state.

Figure 9 shows the ratio between McCain and Obama's visits during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Again, the dots represent the total number of visits made to each media market by the two candidates combined while the colors correspond to which of the two candidates visited a particular market more. We see that the most visits were made to Iowa and New Hampshire as they hosted the first caucus and primary respectively. Large numbers of visits were also made to the Washington, DC and New York, NY media markets. Obama out-visited McCain in Iowa, while the two candidates were roughly equal in the numbers of visits they made to New Hampshire.

Figures 10 and 11 show the visits McCain and Obama made during the entirety of the presidential nominating contest. Figure 10 shows that while McCain did visit New Hampshire and Iowa frequently, he also concentrated a large percentage of his visits in his home state of Arizona. He also frequently visited large, wealthy cities such as New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles. Figure 11 shows Obama's visits during the entire presidential nominating contest and looks somewhat similar to McCain's visits. Obama spent a large percentage of his visits in Iowa and New Hampshire, as well as in New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles. Obama spent a smaller percentage of his visits in Arizona than did McCain, but spent a higher percentage of his visits in Chicago, IL, which is the largest city located in his home state.

Figure 12 combines the data presented in Figures 10 and 11 to show which candidate had an advantage with respect to the number of visits in each individual market. Here, we see that neither one candidate nor the other dominated, as Obama did with respect to television advertisements. Much of the country in Figure 12 is purple, meaning that neither candidate had

two or more times the number of visits than did the other candidate. Parity can especially be seen in the large markets, such as New York and Washington, DC. In terms of early-primary and caucus states, Obama had a slight visiting advantage in Iowa as compared to McCain. McCain concentrated his efforts during the primary season in New Hampshire as opposed to Iowa, so this discrepancy is not surprising. Despite the fact that Obama focused more on Iowa than New Hampshire, the two eventual nominees were roughly equal in the number of times they visited media markets in New Hampshire.

The maps presented here provide three distinct comparisons we can consider within the 2008 presidential contest. This in turn allows us to consider varying hypotheses about how campaigns function over time and how members of the electorate might learn from those campaigns. The first comparison is with respect to timing and deals mostly with the differences in location of ads and visits at particular points in the nominating contest and during the general election campaign. The second deals with differences between Democrats and Republicans and focuses largely on issues of parity between the candidates. The third deals with differences between campaign tactics, specifically ads versus visits, and considers the dispersion within states of these two activities. Taken separately and in combination with one another, these comparisons and the corresponding maps provide the foundation for remainder of this chapter.

With respect to timing with the 2008 presidential election, we can first compare the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest with the entirety of the nominating contest. The volume of advertising dramatically increases between Figures 1 and 2 and Figures 4 and 5, indicating that while only a small number of people saw ads during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, a much larger number began to see advertisements once the actual primary voting and caucuses got underway. This is not surprising given that in neither the

Republican nor the Democratic nominating contest did the same candidate win both Iowa and New Hampshire. On the Democratic side, Obama won Iowa while Clinton won New Hampshire; on the Republican side, Huckabee won Iowa while McCain won New Hampshire. Thus, both the Democrats and Republicans needed to advertise in subsequent states to introduce themselves to additional voters and attempt to attract votes when the nominating contest reached new states.

When thinking about differences between Democratic and Republican advertising and visits, we naturally consider issues of parity and the degree to which one party is able to out-advertise or out-visit the other. It seems logical to imagine that one candidate does not want to be out-campaigned by the other, and that both candidates would strive to make as many visits and air as many advertisements as their resources allow. Looking at the maps, it appears to be the case that parity is much more readily achievable in visits than it is in advertising. Part of this may be due to the fact that the overall number of visits is simply smaller, but, more likely, it is due to the different constraints on advertising versus visits.

Candidates who have more resources— as Obama did throughout the 2008 nominating and general-election phases of the campaign— are likely to be able to out-advertise their opponents drastically, while they are unlikely to be able to out-visit their opponents drastically. In crude terms, the fundamental constraint on advertising is money, while the fundamental constraint on visits is time. Candidates are able to raise much more money than their opponents, but they are unable to have more time in which to visit. Obama's advertising advantage, even during the nominating contest can be seen most clearly in Figure 6. Despite the fact that Obama had more resources than McCain, those resources, however, do not translate to the number of visits made by each candidate, the ratio of which can be seen in Figure 12.

Finally, when thinking directly about the comparison between televised ads and candidate visits, we need to consider the fact that visits may have a different purpose than ads. Existing political science research shows that televised campaign advertising can affect turnout (Franz et. al. 2007) and vote choice (Franz and Ridout 2010). Candidate appearances, however, are also often fundraising visits, especially during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Again, Figures 1 and 2 show the ads aired during the invisible primary. Not surprisingly, ads are concentrated in early-primary and caucus states like Iowa and New Hampshire. Figures 7 and 8, on the other hand, show candidate visits for the same time period. Here we see that many of the visits are concentrated in areas where large-dollar donors are likely to live, such as New York, NY, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, CA. None of those geographic areas saw any televised campaign ads during the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, yet each of the markets saw multiple visits from McCain and Obama.

A second way we can see the differing goals of ads versus visits is by looking at the dispersion of ads versus visits within individual states. Via advertising, candidates appear either to target or not to target particular states. If they advertise in one media market in a state, they tend to advertise in all (or at least the majority of) the media markets in that state. Consider McCain's advertising versus his visits in Pennsylvania, which was a general-election battleground state. By looking simply at whether a media market is red or not red, we see that McCain advertised in all six media markets in Pennsylvania throughout the course of the nominating contest. However, compare this with Figure 10, which shows McCain's visits to Pennsylvania over the same time period. Here, we see that McCain visited only half of the media markets that are located in Pennsylvania.

I argue that this means that candidates are viewing the purpose of television ads and visits much differently. Candidates air ads in an attempt to reach voters, either to mobilize or to persuade them. While candidates may also visit particular areas of a state in order to rally supporters, more often they are attempting to raise money via candidate visits. Another example of this can be seen by looking at Obama's advertising versus his visits in Florida. Again, candidates in the Democratic nominating contest agreed not to campaign in Florida (or Michigan) during the nominating contest. As such, Obama did not air any ads in the state of Florida, as is evidenced by Figure 5. However, the agreement not to campaign did not apply to visits, as Obama visited six out of Florida's nine media markets sometime during the nominating phase of the 2008 election.

To summarize, I argue that the maps displayed in Figure 1 through 12 can teach us three main things. First, candidates air ads and visit very different parts of the country during the invisible primary stage of the nominating phase of the election than they do once the actual voting begins. Second, candidates are more likely to achieve parity in the number of visits they make rather than the amount of television advertising they air, as the first is constrained largely by time and the second by money. Third, candidates largely air ads with the goal of affecting either turnout or vote choice, while they visit particular areas with the goal of raising money. Subsequent analysis will aim to determine the degree to which advertisements or visits affect respondents differently. Ultimately, I argue that both types of campaign activity are capable of influencing voters, but that advertising is more likely to affect voters' participation and their willingness to rate candidates as it provides an information subsidy to members of the electorate.

Results

On the whole, the effects we see of campaigns on voter behavior are not likely to be large. Fundamental factors such as demographic characteristics, interest in politics, and education are much more likely to determine whether members of the voting public report having seen television advertisements, are willing to rate the candidates, or regularly discuss the candidates. Socio-demographic characteristics as well as party identification variables are likely to be the most significant predictors for whom an individual plans to vote. That said, I argue that campaigns can and do matter, particularly at the margins.

The effects of both television advertising and candidate visits are still likely to be small. I also argue they are more likely to be found when measuring the degree to which members of the electorate discuss or are willing to rate candidates than they will be when predicting for which candidate an individual intends to vote. The most stringent test of whether campaigns matter is presented in the final set of analyses. Here, I take advantage of the panel nature of the CCAP data and utilize the geographic and timing variation in where and when campaign activities occurred to assess whether campaign activities had any effect on individual behavior.

Bivariate Results

Before presenting the multivariate results controlling for the demographic characteristics of individuals in the study, I first present bivariate relationships showing whether or not the presence of advertising or visits has any relationship with changes in the levels of the dependent variables. The first column of Table 5 reshows the percentages of individuals in the study who reported having seen ads, discussed the candidates, or were willing to rate the candidates.³² Results displayed in the top half of Table 5 do not indicate that the effects of either televised campaign advertising or candidate visits are likely to be large.

³² These are the same percentages presented in Table 4, but are recopied here for ease of presentation.

Looking at the baseline wave results first, the variable where the presence of advertising would be expected to have the largest effect – a dummy variable asking specifically whether an individual had seen a campaign ad – does increase when ads were actually present the individual’s media market. However, the percentage of people reporting having discussed the candidates is lower in media markets where campaign ads aired. Additionally, individuals do not appear more likely to rate the candidates in markets where ads aired than they are overall. In bivariate relationships, visits do not appear to have a positive influence on any of the dependent variables I consider.

Between the Baseline wave and the March wave of CCAP, individuals living in many more media markets experienced both televised campaign ads and candidate visits. However, the effect of those ads and visits remains to be seen. When just examining the relationship between the dependent variables and campaign variables in a bivariate setting, it again does not appear that either campaign variable has much of a positive effect on individuals’ propensity to report having seen an ad, to discuss either of the candidates, to be willing to rate either of the candidates, or to report wanting to vote for Obama. It seems possible that, by March, the nominating campaigns had permeated the national news and conversation so much that any additional effect of living in a media market that experienced active campaigning was minimal. In the next section of this chapter, I consider the effect of both advertising and candidate visits on the participation, rating, and vote choice variables in a multivariate context.

The bottom half of Table 5 presents the same bivariate relationships as above, but with the dummy variable measured differently. Here, the dummy variable is coded as one only when the media market in which the individual lives received over the mean number of ads (or visits) of all media markets receiving ads (or visits) during the specified timeframe. As such, the

variable can be seen to measure a high level of advertising (or visits) compared to the rest of the country. The percentages of individuals who report having seen an ad appear to be higher among those who lived in environments with high levels of advertising during the nominating campaign. There still does not appear to be much of an influence of advertising or visits on an individual's propensity to discuss the candidates or be willing to rate the candidates.

Interestingly, the percentage of people who indicated they were likely to vote for Obama also appears to increase when nominating-contest advertising was present. In other words, individuals living in areas that saw nominating-contest ads were more likely to say they were planning to vote for Obama than were individuals in areas where no nominating-contest ads had been aired. The next section of the chapter will explore whether any of these bivariate relationships hold up when controlling for individual-level characteristics such as demographics and party identification.

Multivariate Results of Baseline and March Waves

Results of multivariate probit models controlling for individual demographics including age, race, sex, education, income, and campaign variables are shown in Tables 6-9. As described above, the models also include a measure of each individual's propensity to watch network television as well as an interactive term between the propensity to watch television and campaign ads aired in the market. Table 6 shows the results for the models predicting whether an individual reports having seen a televised campaign ad for McCain or Obama at both the time of the baseline survey and in March. The effect of either visits or ads is presented in the row labeled "Campaign Variable" and whether that variable is Baseline ads, Baseline visits, March ads, or March visits is determined by the column of the table.

In terms of the demographic variables, there are few surprises. Individuals who are older tend to report having seen ads more than do younger respondents. Women are less likely to report having seen ads, although this variable does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in all models. Non-white individuals report being more likely to have seen an Obama ad but not a McCain ad, which is interesting and could be due to the fact that Obama was the first serious African American candidate and the first non-white candidate to win a major party's nomination for the presidency. It seems reasonable to believe that non-white members of the electorate might remember seeing one of his campaign ads more than they would remember seeing an ad from McCain. Income does not have a statistically significant effect on an individual's propensity to indicate having seen a campaign ad.

The ViewNetwork variable is positive and statistically significant for nearly all models presented here, indicating that respondents who watch more television are more likely to report having seen a televised campaign advertisement. The effect of the campaign variable performs as expected. Individuals who lived in areas where campaign ads were aired were more likely to report having seen them than were individuals living in areas in which no campaign ads aired. The fact that this variable was statistically significant but that the number of visits had no effect on an individual's propensity to report having seen a televised campaign ad, lends face validity to the data as a whole.

Table 7 shows the results of models using the same set of independent variables, but predicting whether or not respondents reported having discussed the candidates. Focusing specifically on the variable of interest— ads or visits— we see that the only statistically significant effect of campaign advertising can be found in the model predicting whether an individual discussed McCain in the baseline wave of the survey. It could be the case that early

on in the campaign, individuals tend to discuss the candidates they have heard of before, especially in areas of the country that receive large amounts of campaign ads. During the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest, McCain was much more well-known than was Obama. McCain is a long-time Senator who had mounted a presidential campaign previously, while Obama had been in the Senate for less than one term.³³

With respect to the effects of demographic variables in these models, education had a positive and statistically significant impact on an individual's propensity to discuss the candidates across all models. Individuals with more education were more likely to discuss both McCain and Obama. Another interesting aspect of this set of models is the effect of being non-white on the results. Non-whites were less likely to report discussing McCain, while they were more likely to report discussing Obama across multiple specifications of the model. As mentioned earlier, I attribute this to the historical nature of Obama's candidacy.

Table 8 presents the results for models predicting whether individuals were willing to rate the two eventual nominees. The first thing to notice is that neither ads nor visits had a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, indicating that neither the presence of televised campaign ads nor candidate appearances led respondents to form opinions about either McCain or Obama. This is somewhat surprising, given the existing political science literature that finds that respondents learn from campaign ads (Geer 2006).

In terms of demographic variables, education had a statistically significant positive effect on willingness to rate across all models and both candidates. In the March models, individuals with higher incomes were also more likely to rate the candidates. Interestingly, race behaved differently in these models than in previous analyses. Here, being non-white negatively affected

³³ Further analysis could test for whether campaign advertising had a positive and statistically significant effect on an individual's likelihood of discussing Hillary Clinton as a candidate, which would provide a direct test of this hypothesis.

an individual's willingness to rate the candidates, although the effect was not statistically significant in all the models. My sense here is that race is behaving more as we expect, which is to say that non-whites are often less participatory in politics than are whites. In other words, I argue what we are seeing here is a differential between racial groups with respect to participation in politics overall.

Table 9 presents results for models predicting vote choice. To keep the models parallel to those previous, I simply measured vote choice as a binary variable, where one indicated that the respondent was planning to vote for Obama over McCain in a head-to-head matchup. In these models, the predictor with the largest coefficient was party identification. However, even when controlling for individuals' parties, individuals with more education, non-whites, and women indicate higher levels of support for Obama. Additionally, even early in the campaign, Obama had an advantage among young people as all age categories above 30 were less likely to report planning to vote for Obama than were 18-29 year olds.

Interestingly, these are the only other models where the campaign variable had any effect at all, but the effect is not seen with respect to televised campaign ads, but only with respect to candidate visits. Areas that experienced high levels of visits were more likely to report voting for Obama than were areas that were not visited by the candidates. This seems to me to be an artifact of the early stages of the nominating contest as well as the differing levels of recognition between the two candidates. In areas where active campaigning was happening, individuals were hearing about Obama, were becoming more aware of who he was, and were expressing more of a willingness to vote for him. Individuals living in areas of the country that did not experience any campaign activity had not yet been introduced to Obama and, possibly, were therefore less likely to express support for him in a head-to-head matchup with McCain.

Taken together, these results indicate that the presence of campaign ads does affect an individual's propensity to report having seen an ad, but not to discuss the candidates or be willing to rate the candidates. Individuals residing in areas of the country that experience large volumes of campaign advertising or large numbers of appearances by the candidates themselves are not more likely to talk about the candidates or to form opinions about them. Perhaps it is the case that other, unmeasured, factors are more likely to influence these outcomes. The next set of analyses controls for any and all individual-level variation by examining changes within individual respondents. In this way, the respondents serve as their own controls and I examine whether changing amounts of advertising and visits over time has any effect on individuals' propensities to report having seen ads, discuss the candidates, be willing to rate the candidate, or report planning to vote for Obama.

Results Examining Changes between Baseline/March Waves and October/Post-Election Waves

As discussed previously, this set of models uses a differences-in-differences approach to examine the degree to which advertising or visits affects the series of dependent variables I have been considering throughout this chapter. Dependent variables are all binary and respondents are coded as one if they go from not engaging in the variable during the first wave considered to engaging in the variable during the second wave considered. Individuals were coded as zero under all other circumstances.³⁴ Only individuals who provided ratings at all three waves under consideration were included in the sample size. In all subsequent analyses, then, I consider two time periods: first the Baseline period to the March wave of CCAP and then the March wave to

³⁴ Taking willingness to rate as an example, the circumstances were as follows: 1) being unwilling to rate the candidate at either of the two waves in question; 2) rating the candidate at the first wave of the study but not at the second; and 3) rating the candidate in both waves of the study.

either the October or Post-Election wave (depending when the relevant question was asked in the survey).³⁵

When examining the first time period, I include only one independent variable, which is the increase in the number of ads or visits between the beginnings of the two waves of the study. When considering the second time period, I include two independent variables: the increase in the number of ads or visits between the beginning of the March wave and the official end of the nominating contest (June 4, 2008); and the total number of general-election ads or visits that had occurred by the start of the relevant wave. For October, then, I include any visits and ads that happened prior to October 21, 2008, and for the post-election wave, I include all ads and visits.

Table 10 presents the results of the models predicting whether an individual reported having seen a televised campaign ad from either the McCain or Obama campaigns. Interestingly, this is the only dependent variable I consider wherein the difference in the number of ads or visits is negatively associated with changes in the dependent variable, but these negative results appear only with respect to individuals reporting whether they had seen an ad from the Obama campaign. First, neither the change in the number of ads nor the change in the number of visits between the Baseline and March waves of the survey had any statistically significant effect on an individual's likelihood to report having seen an ad in March as compared to December.

The number of ads seen between the March survey and the end of the nominating contest, however, had a positive effect on an individual's likelihood to report having seen a McCain ad, while candidate visits during either the nominating stage or the general election had no effect on whether an individual reported having seen a televised McCain ad. The results for whether

³⁵ Ideally I would like to have a wave of the survey that ended exactly at the time at which the nominating contest ended. I could have utilized the additional waves of the survey that do exist (January and September) but I elected not to in the interest of keeping the analysis less complicated.

individuals reported having seen an Obama ad between March and October are different. Here, both the number of ads the individual was exposed to and the number of visits in the respondent's media market between March and June (the end of the nominating contest) had a statistically significant negative relationship with their propensity to report having seen an ad in October, but not in March.

Table 11 presents the results of change models for the dependent variable asking whether respondents had discussed the candidates. Just as with the previous models, neither the change in the number of ads aired nor the change in the number of visits between the Baseline wave and the March wave had any statistically significant impact on whether a respondent was likely to report discussing either McCain or Obama between the two study waves. The number of nominating-contest ads and the number of nominating-contest visits, however, were both positively associated with an increased likelihood of discussing McCain.

In other words, respondents living in areas of the country that received larger numbers of advertisements and visits during the late stage of the presidential nominating contests were more likely to report having discussed McCain than were respondents living in areas that received large numbers of ads or visits during the first part of the general-election campaign. Interestingly, the Democratic nominating contest is the one that persisted and for which most of the late campaigning was done. Yet neither effects of nominating ads or visits nor general election ads or visits are observed for individuals being more likely to discuss Obama in October as compared to March.

Table 12 presents the results of models measuring the degree to which respondents were willing to rate the candidates as either positive or negative.³⁶ As with previous models, the

³⁶ As stated previously, a neutral rating was measured as "unwilling" as were "don't know" or "prefer not to answer" responses.

change in ads and visits did not have a statistically significant relationship with willingness to rate the candidates between the Baseline and March waves of the study. However, between the March and Post-Election waves of the study, large amounts of general-election advertising led to increased willingness to rate both McCain and Obama. The number of visits made by Obama's campaign during the end of the nominating campaign and during the general-election campaign were also positively associated with individuals' willingness to rate him as a candidate.

The results of models predicting changes in candidate preference for respondents are displayed in Table 13. Since voting for Obama is essentially equivalent to not voting for McCain, only one set of results are presented. Increased advertising between the Baseline and March waves of the CCAP study leads to a small, but statistically significant increase in an individual's propensity to report his/her intention to vote for Obama in a head-to-head matchup with McCain. I argue this is likely due to the fact that voters are learning about Obama, which increases his viability as potential Democratic nominee and general-election candidate.

These four tables taken together indicate that campaign effects are small and somewhat sporadic, but that they can be found, especially when taking advantage of a panel dataset containing a large number of respondents spread across the country. In this setup, individuals serve as their own controls, eliminating the need to control for any demographic or other individual-level factors. This in turn allows me to isolate the effect of campaign-level variables such as advertising and candidate appearances.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, I argue that there is a compelling case to be made that campaign activities such as televised advertising and candidate visits can and do have positive effects on what individuals

know about candidates and how they learn about those candidates. However, these effects are most likely to be seen when considering variables such as willingness to rate the candidates and whether or not members of the electorate discussed particular candidates. The effects of advertising and visits are not likely to be seen when measuring the propensity of an individual to vote for a particular candidate, since so much of the variation in this particular variable is soaked up by "fundamentals" such as party identification, issue positions, and demographic differences.

Additional research could certainly consider any and all of these dependent variables at even more time periods, taking advantage of existing data. Further work could also be done to replicate these models and results, using rolling cross-sectional data and matching techniques. Finally, there is certainly more that could be done to fine-tune some of the exposure and measurement issues present in this chapter, particularly at the individual level. For example, I do not utilize any information about when during the survey field period the respondent was interviewed. While I do attempt to gauge the frequency with which individuals watched television, I cannot be sure that, given the segmentation that exists in today's media environment, the ViewNetwork measure I created is precisely measuring the likelihood that an individual respondent watched television programs that were likely to contain campaign ads.

Ultimately, academic researchers will always conduct benefit-cost analyses of campaign spending, particularly in early-primary and early-caucus states. It is straightforward to calculate the amount of money spent by a candidate and divide that amount by the number of votes he or she received in order to calculate the amount of money spent per voter. However, I argue that this is the wrong way to think about campaign effects. Winning is the only goal for candidates, who rarely think about getting the best value for their money, especially in nominating contests.

For an unknown candidate looking to make a name for himself, as Obama was, winning

Iowa is key, and any amount of ads and visits it takes to make that happen will be worth the price. Likewise, for a candidate looking to show his party, and the country, that he has recovered from the collapse of his campaign six months prior, as McCain was, winning New Hampshire is paramount. The goal of this analysis, then, was to determine whether those ads and visits mattered beyond each state's individual primary or caucus. Ultimately, I argue that campaigns do matter and that members of the electorate, regardless of their political party affiliation learn from and form opinions about candidates based, at least in part, on those candidates' ads and the visits they make across the country while competing for their party's presidential nominations.

Table 1: CCAP Question Grid About Television Consumption

	ABC	NBC	CBS	FOX	Other
4:00 p.m.					
4:30 p.m.					
5:00 p.m.					
5:30 p.m.					
6:00 p.m.					
6:30 p.m.					
7:00 p.m.					
8:00 p.m.					
9:00 p.m.					
10:00 p.m.					
11:00 p.m.					

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for CCAP Demographic Variables

Age	Overall N	Overall %		
18-29 years old	1,444	8.1%		
30-44 years old	4,093	23.1%		
45-59 years old	7,076	39.9%		
60+ years old	5,114	28.8%		
Total	17,727	100.0%		
Sex				
Female	9,919	56.0%		
Male	7,808	44.0%		
Total	17,727	100.0%		
Race				
White	14,347	80.9%		
Black	1,657	9.3%		
Hispanic	1,019	5.7%		
Other	704	4.0%		
Total	17,727	100.0%		
Education				
High school grad or less	4,858	27.4%		
Some college	6,737	38.0%		
Bachelor's degree	3,827	21.6%		
More than bachelor's degree	2,305	13.0%		
Total	17,727	100.0%		
Income				
Less than \$40,000	3,891	27.5%		
\$40,000 - \$79,999	4,835	34.2%		
\$80,000 or more	3,985	28.2%		
Refused	1,428	10.1%		
Total	14,139	100.0%		
Party Identification	Baseline N	Baseline %	March N	March %
Strong Democrat	3,036	21.5%	3,310	23.3%
Weak Democrat	1,954	13.9%	1,908	13.4%
Lean Democrat	1,753	12.4%	1,746	12.3%
Independent	1,581	11.2%	1,474	10.4%
Lean Republican	1,269	9.0%	1,278	9.0%
Weak Republican	1,583	11.2%	1,659	11.7%
Strong Republican	2,462	17.5%	2,391	16.8%
Other/Not sure	468	3.3%	470	3.3%
Total	14,106	100.0%	14,236	100.0%

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Cumulative Campaign Variables

	Baseline	March	Total Primary	Total General
Total Visits	907	1,266	1,485	701 ⁺
Percent Visits Obama	48.0%	51.3%	52.8%	52.4%
Number of Markets Visited	96	125	147	117
Total Advertisements	15,588	114,559	180,390	775,466
Percent Ads Obama	86.7%	87.4%	86.8%	56.9%
Percent Negative Ads	13.2%	6.1%	8.4%	72.2% [*]
Number of Markets in which Ads Aired	10	113	137	112

+ For the general election visits, all visits made by Vice Presidential candidates and potential First Ladies were added to the candidate's total.

* For the general election, since there are just two candidates, all ads that would be assigned to be targeting McCain are simply added to those favoring Obama and vice versa.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables

	Baseline N	Baseline %	March N	March %	October N	October %	Post N	Post %
Participation Variables								
Saw McCain Ad	1,087	20.8%	1,481	31.7%	6,517	70.2%	--	--
Saw Obama Ad	1,958	37.4%	2,480	53.0%	7,568	81.6%	--	--
Discussed McCain	1,218	24.4%	3,938	56.7%	5,540	73.6%	--	--
Discussed Obama	2,360	47.3%	5,240	75.4%	6,183	82.1%	--	--
Willingness to Rate								
McCain	9,491	65.1%	11,196	77.8%	--	--	12,410	81.4%
Obama	11,447	78.5%	12,462	86.6%	--	--	13,784	90.4%
Vote Choice								
Likelihood of Voting for Obama	1,653	52.0%	6,242	49.0%	6,667	51.9%	--	--

-- indicates that the question was not analyzed for that particular wave

Table 5: Bivariate Relationships between Dependent Variables and Various Measures of Advertising and Visits, Baseline and March Waves

	Baseline %	Baseline % with Ads Present	Baseline % with Visits Present	March %	March % with Ads Present	March % with Visits Present
Participation Variables						
Saw McCain Ad	20.8%	36.8%	21.0%	31.7%	33.2%	31.4%
Saw Obama Ad	37.4%	54.6%	38.0%	53.0%	50.4%	52.7%
Discussed McCain	24.4%	22.1%	24.0%	56.7%	56.8%	56.6%
Discussed Obama	47.3%	42.6%	48.3%	75.4%	75.1%	75.3%
Willingness to Rate						
McCain	65.1%	63.0%	65.4%	77.8%	77.9%	77.9%
Obama	78.5%	76.7%	78.9%	86.6%	86.9%	86.7%
Vote Choice						
Likelihood of Voting for Obama	52.0%	55.0%	54.0%	49.0%	48.5%	50.2%
	Baseline %	Baseline % with > Mean Ads Present	Baseline % with > Mean Visits Present	March %	March % with > Mean Ads Present	March % with > Mean Visits Present
Participation Variables						
Saw McCain Ad	20.8%	44.5%	24.8%	31.7%	33.7%	29.6%
Saw Obama Ad	37.4%	66.8%	44.7%	53.0%	54.1%	54.3%
Discussed McCain	24.4%	24.5%	23.3%	56.7%	54.8%	57.3%
Discussed Obama	47.3%	43.0%	48.3%	75.4%	73.5%	77.7%
Willingness to Rate						
McCain	65.1%	64.1%	67.1%	77.8%	76.9%	77.1%
Obama	78.5%	77.1%	79.6%	86.6%	86.3%	86.5%
Vote Choice						
Likelihood of Voting for Obama	52.0%	62.8%	59.5%	49.0%	49.5%	50.3%

Table 6: Multivariate Results of Models Predicting Whether Individuals
Report Having Seen a Campaign Ad,
McCain and Obama, Baseline and March CCAP Waves

Dependent Variable = Seen McCain Ad	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	0.690	(0.085)*	0.631	(0.085)*	0.569	(0.083)*	0.482	(0.081)*
Party ID (Republican)	-0.016	(0.048)	-0.027	(0.050)	0.043	(0.049)	0.042	(0.049)
Age 30-44	0.151	(0.156)	0.118	(0.147)	0.296	(0.145)*	0.286	(0.145)*
Age 45-59	0.298	(0.134)*	0.232	(0.130)	0.397	(0.143)*	0.386	(0.143)*
Age 60 plus	0.598	(0.131)*	0.519	(0.133)*	0.484	(0.148)*	0.475	(0.148)*
Female	-0.115	(0.054)*	-0.115	(0.055)*	-0.109	(0.048)*	-0.107	(0.048)*
Non-white	0.100	(0.058)	0.048	(0.069)	-0.001	(0.058)	0.005	(0.058)
Edu some college	0.016	(0.055)	0.005	(0.054)	0.025	(0.061)	0.023	(0.061)
Edu bachelors	-0.143	(0.071)*	-0.139	(0.072)	-0.084	(0.074)	-0.084	(0.074)
Edu bachelors plus	-0.176	(0.074)*	-0.165	(0.073)*	-0.164	(0.076)*	-0.162	(0.076)*
Income 40-80	-0.067	(0.058)	-0.068	(0.058)	-0.051	(0.057)	-0.050	(0.057)
Income 80 plus	-0.009	(0.065)	-0.008	(0.064)	-0.130	(0.066)	-0.125	(0.065)
Income refused	-0.207	(0.078)*	-0.189	(0.074)*	-0.066	(0.090)	-0.065	(0.089)
View*Advertising	-0.560	(0.441)	--	--	-0.383	(0.200)	--	--
Campaign Variable	1.113	(0.193)*	0.175	(0.219)	0.209	(0.096)*	-0.043	(0.042)
N	3,999		3,999		3,616		3,616	
Pseudo R ²	0.058		0.036		0.021		0.020	
Dependent Variable = Seen Obama Ad	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	0.554	(0.073)*	0.545	(0.072)*	0.153	(0.097)	0.250	(0.089)*
Party ID (Democrat)	0.093	(0.045)*	0.095	(0.045)*	0.246	(0.041)*	0.264	(0.041)*
Age 30-44	0.048	(0.122)	0.036	(0.119)	-0.077	(0.106)	-0.067	(0.105)
Age 45-59	0.185	(0.111)	0.155	(0.108)	-0.106	(0.099)	-0.099	(0.098)
Age 60 plus	0.264	(0.114)*	0.232	(0.110)*	-0.177	(0.098)	-0.172	(0.099)
Female	-0.029	(0.043)	-0.027	(0.043)	0.007	(0.044)	0.005	(0.045)
Non-white	0.208	(0.054)*	0.163	(0.055)*	-0.036	(0.065)	-0.043	(0.068)
Edu some college	-0.010	(0.058)	-0.016	(0.060)	-0.178	(0.059)*	-0.175	(0.060)*
Edu bachelors	-0.032	(0.060)	-0.031	(0.061)	-0.143	(0.075)	-0.145	(0.074)
Edu bachelors plus	-0.066	(0.072)	-0.066	(0.071)	-0.198	(0.070)*	-0.200	(0.067)*
Income 40-80	-0.005	(0.052)	-0.007	(0.054)	-0.024	(0.053)	-0.029	(0.053)
Income 80 plus	-0.052	(0.067)	-0.062	(0.071)	-0.047	(0.058)	-0.055	(0.057)
Income refused	-0.158	(0.075)*	-0.154	(0.075)*	-0.089	(0.086)	-0.090	(0.086)
View*Advertising	-0.097	(0.250)	--	--	-0.411	(0.240)	--	--
Campaign Variable	0.795	(0.124)*	0.231	(0.116)*	-0.116	(0.134)	0.065	(0.175)
N	3,999		3,999		3,616		3,616	
Pseudo R ²	0.029		0.020		0.015		0.014	

Table 7: Multivariate Results of Models Predicting Whether Individuals
Report Having Discussed the Candidates,
McCain and Obama, Baseline and March CCAP Waves

Dependent Variable = Discussed McCain	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	0.105	(0.090)	0.067	(0.090)	0.095	(0.084)	0.142	(0.074)
Party ID (Republican)	0.085	(0.049)	0.081	(0.051)	0.451	(0.031)*	0.454	(0.031)*
Age 30-44	-0.157	(0.107)	-0.166	(0.105)	0.036	(0.071)	0.036	(0.071)
Age 45-59	-0.081	(0.082)	-0.089	(0.080)	-0.038	(0.067)	-0.036	(0.067)
Age 60 plus	0.022	(0.087)	0.011	(0.086)	-0.040	(0.064)	-0.036	(0.065)
Female	-0.108	(0.042)*	-0.105	(0.043)*	-0.084	(0.035)*	-0.086	(0.035)*
Non-white	-0.110	(0.053)*	-0.109	(0.053)*	-0.298	(0.046)*	-0.305	(0.045)*
Edu some college	0.181	(0.065)*	0.176	(0.064)*	0.143	(0.046)*	0.143	(0.046)*
Edu bachelors	0.257	(0.066)*	0.252	(0.066)*	0.198	(0.052)*	0.197	(0.053)*
Edu bachelors plus	0.329	(0.077)*	0.328	(0.078)*	0.200	(0.059)*	0.197	(0.060)*
Income 40-80	-0.033	(0.068)	-0.032	(0.068)	-0.008	(0.043)	-0.009	(0.043)
Income 80 plus	0.177	(0.065)*	0.181	(0.067)*	0.148	(0.048)*	-0.143	(0.048)*
Income refused	0.037	(0.076)	0.043	(0.077)	0.066	(0.068)	0.060	(0.069)
View*Advertising	-1.192	(0.301)*	--	--	0.232	(0.163)	--	--
Campaign Variable	0.391	(0.099)*	-0.041	(0.071)	-0.119	(0.080)	0.054	(0.047)
N	4,397		4,397		6,111		6,111	
Pseudo R ²	0.017		0.016		0.040		0.040	
Dependent Variable = Discussed Obama	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	-0.133	(0.082)	-0.149	(0.080)	-0.363	(0.072)*	-0.338	(0.067)*
Party ID (Democrat)	0.396	(0.047)*	0.395	(0.048)*	0.225	(0.031)*	0.222	(0.031)*
Age 30-44	-0.279	(0.080)*	-0.280	(0.080)*	-0.302	(0.099)*	-0.304	(0.099)*
Age 45-59	-0.295	(0.086)*	-0.295	(0.086)*	-0.326	(0.095)*	-0.325	(0.095)*
Age 60 plus	-0.434	(0.078)*	-0.435	(0.078)*	-0.452	(0.093)*	-0.448	(0.093)*
Female	0.023	(0.040)	-0.024	(0.040)	0.063	(0.034)	0.061	(0.034)
Non-white	0.204	(0.047)*	0.206	(0.045)*	-0.057	(0.053)	-0.065	(0.054)
Edu some college	0.170	(0.059)*	0.170	(0.059)*	-0.174	(0.042)*	0.174	(0.042)*
Edu bachelors	0.265	(0.067)*	0.266	(0.068)*	0.246	(0.051)*	0.245	(0.051)*
Edu bachelors plus	0.378	(0.077)*	0.378	(0.077)*	0.326	(0.054)*	0.323	(0.054)*
Income 40-80	0.022	(0.054)	0.022	(0.054)	0.003	(0.050)	0.002	(0.050)
Income 80 plus	0.007	(0.056)	0.007	(0.059)	0.043	(0.056)	0.038	(0.058)
Income refused	-0.029	(0.069)	-0.032	(0.069)	-0.044	(0.053)	-0.050	(0.066)
View*Advertising	-0.541	(0.280)	--	--	0.123	(0.181)	--	--
Campaign Variable	0.007	(0.047)	-0.001	(0.066)	-0.123	(0.069)	0.056	(0.056)
N	4,397		4,397		6,111		6,111	
Pseudo R ²	0.044		0.043		0.027		0.026	

Table 8: Multivariate Results of Models Predicting Whether Individuals
Were Willing to Rate the Candidates,
McCain and Obama, Baseline and March CCAP Waves

Dependent Variable = Rate McCain	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	-0.119	(0.044)*	-0.118	(0.044)*	0.161	(0.060)*	0.155	(0.056)*
Party ID (Republican)	0.072	(0.029)*	0.074	(0.029)*	0.184	(0.028)*	0.182	(0.028)*
Age 30-44	-0.040	(0.052)	-0.038	(0.052)	0.061	(0.055)	0.060	(0.055)
Age 45-59	-0.001	(0.045)	-0.000	(0.045)	0.203	(0.053)*	0.201	(0.053)*
Age 60 plus	0.012	(0.045)	0.014	(0.045)	0.371	(0.052)*	0.368	(0.053)*
Female	-0.037	(0.028)	-0.036	(0.028)	-0.172	(0.028)*	-0.173	(0.028)*
Non-white	-0.066	(0.032)*	-0.072	(0.032)*	-0.197	(0.032)*	-0.192	(0.033)*
Edu some college	0.112	(0.033)*	0.112	(0.033)*	0.164	(0.036)*	0.163	(0.036)*
Edu bachelors	0.115	(0.036)*	0.115	(0.036)*	0.252	(0.046)*	0.252	(0.046)*
Edu bachelors plus	0.173	(0.040)*	0.169	(0.040)*	0.368	(0.059)*	0.369	(0.059)*
Income 40-80	0.029	(0.037)	0.027	(0.037)	0.102	(0.036)*	0.103	(0.036)*
Income 80 plus	0.056	(0.040)	0.051	(0.040)	0.126	(0.036)*	0.130	(0.036)*
Income refused	0.061	(0.048)	0.057	(0.046)	0.188	(0.054)*	0.192	(0.055)*
View*Advertising	-0.031	(0.245)	--	--	-0.024	(0.151)	--	--
Campaign Variable	0.046	(0.105)	0.048	(0.035)	0.034	(0.066)	-0.040	(0.041)
N	11,067		11,067		11,217		11,217	
Pseudo R ²	0.004		0.005		0.036		0.036	
Dependent Variable = Rate Obama	Baseline Ads β	(S.E.)	Baseline Visits β	(S.E.)	March Ads β	(S.E.)	March Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	-0.047	(0.051)	-0.050	(0.050)	0.012	(0.071)	0.026	(0.064)
Party ID (Democrat)	0.065	(0.031)*	0.065	(0.031)*	0.146	(0.042)*	0.151	(0.043)*
Age 30-44	-0.036	(0.054)	-0.036	(0.054)	0.008	(0.063)	0.005	(0.062)
Age 45-59	-0.015	(0.050)	-0.014	(0.050)	0.126	(0.060)*	0.123	(0.060)*
Age 60 plus	-0.049	(0.050)	-0.048	(0.050)	0.164	(0.064)*	0.160	(0.064)*
Female	-0.054	(0.027)*	-0.054	(0.027)*	-0.214	(0.033)*	-0.216	(0.033)*
Non-white	-0.010	(0.039)	-0.011	(0.038)	-0.125	(0.042)*	-0.114	(0.043)*
Edu some college	0.099	(0.031)*	0.099	(0.031)*	0.189	(0.044)*	0.188	(0.045)*
Edu bachelors	0.131	(0.035)*	0.131	(0.035)*	0.388	(0.052)*	0.339	(0.052)*
Edu bachelors plus	0.121	(0.051)*	0.120	(0.051)*	0.388	(0.053)*	0.392	(0.052)*
Income 40-80	0.031	(0.033)	0.031	(0.033)	0.144	(0.044)*	0.146	(0.044)*
Income 80 plus	0.059	(0.036)	0.057	(0.036)	0.247	(0.047)*	0.257	(0.047)*
Income refused	0.044	(0.050)	0.042	(0.050)	0.128	(0.060)*	0.139	(0.060)*
View*Advertising	-0.080	(0.125)	--	--	0.084	(0.159)	--	--
Campaign Variable	-0.025	(0.036)	0.014	(0.033)	0.007	(0.068)	-0.087	(0.045)
N	11,067		11,067		11,217		11,217	
Pseudo R ²	0.003		0.003		0.033		0.034	

Table 9: Multivariate Results of Models Predicting Whether Individuals
Were Likely to Vote for Obama,
Baseline and March CCAP Waves

Dependent Variable = Vote Obama	Baseline		Baseline		March		March	
	Ads β	(S.E.)	Visits β	(S.E.)	Ads β	(S.E.)	Visits β	(S.E.)
ViewNetwork	-0.504	(0.121)*	-0.486	(0.119)*	-0.769	(0.061)*	-0.730	(0.056)*
Party ID (Republican)	1.667	(0.069)*	1.667	(0.070)*	1.860	(0.034)*	1.858	(0.034)*
Age 30-44	-0.282	(0.129)*	-0.275	(0.127)*	-0.351	(0.071)*	-0.346	(0.071)*
Age 45-59	-0.330	(0.143)*	-0.324	(0.142)*	-0.422	(0.062)*	-0.416	(0.062)*
Age 60 plus	-0.484	(0.120)*	-0.480	(0.119)*	-0.456	(0.070)*	-0.450	(0.070)*
Female	0.198	(0.056)*	0.196	(0.056)*	0.048	(0.037)	0.048	(0.037)
Non-white	0.445	(0.079)*	0.421	(0.080)*	0.588	(0.048)*	0.573	(0.048)*
Edu some college	0.089	(0.084)	0.087	(0.084)	0.194	(0.043)*	0.197	(0.044)*
Edu bachelors	0.204	(0.093)*	0.194	(0.093)*	0.330	(0.052)*	0.328	(0.052)*
Edu bachelors plus	0.234	(0.100)*	0.223	(0.100)*	0.417	(0.059)*	0.410	(0.058)*
Income 40-80	-0.054	(0.083)	-0.060	(0.084)	-0.116	(0.040)*	-0.120	(0.040)*
Income 80 plus	-0.183	(0.087)*	-0.211	(0.089)*	-0.105	(0.048)*	-0.119	(0.046)*
Income refused	-0.199	(0.103)	-0.210	(0.106)*	-0.032	(0.063)	-0.045	(0.062)
View*Advertising	0.415	(0.437)	--	--	0.153	(0.140)	--	--
Campaign Variable	0.155	(0.098)	0.187	(0.058)*	-0.037	(0.072)	0.116	(0.044)*
N	2,468		2,468		10,086		10,086	
Pseudo R ²	0.328		0.330		0.384		0.385	

Table 10: Report Having Seen Ads,
Changes from Baseline to March and March to October

	Seen McCain Ad	(S.E.)	Seen McCain Ad	(S.E.)	Seen Obama Ad	(S.E.)	Seen Obama Ad	(S.E.)
Ads: Baseline to March	.005	(.056)	--	--	.018	(.058)	--	--
Visits: Baseline to March	--	--	-0.081	(0.127)	--	--	0.027	(0.145)
N	1,392		1,392		1,392		1,392	
Ads: March to End of Primary	.061	(.033) ⁺	--	--	-0.169	(0.051)*	--	--
Ads: General Election to October	.009	(.007)	--	--	-0.001	(0.008)	--	--
Visits: March to End of Primary	--	--	0.185	(0.125)	--	--	-0.395	(0.206) ⁺
Visits: General Election to October	--	--	0.009	(0.053)	--	--	0.053	(0.076)
N	1,392		1,392		1,392		1,392	

+ =p<0.10; *p<0.05

Table 11: Report Discussing Candidates,
Changes from Baseline to March and March to October

	Discussed McCain	(S.E.)	Discussed McCain	(S.E.)	Discussed Obama	(S.E.)	Discussed Obama	(S.E.)
Ads: Baseline to March	-0.020	(0.028)	--	--	0.035	(0.037)	--	--
Visits: Baseline to March	--	--	-0.045	(0.031)	--	--	0.047	(0.054)
N	2,098		2,098		2,098		2,098	
Ads: March to End of Primary	0.065	(0.023)*	--	--	0.013	(0.023)	--	--
Ads: General Election to October	0.000	(0.005)	--	--	0.004	(0.006)	--	--
Visits: March to End of Primary	--	--	0.161	(0.072)*	--	--	-0.018	(0.074)
Visits: General Election to October	--	--	-0.048	(0.039)	--	--	-0.010	(0.044)
N	2,098		2,098		2,098		2,098	

+ =p<0.10; *p<0.05

Table 12: Willingness to Rate Candidates,
Changes from Baseline to March and March to Post-Election

	Rated McCain	(S.E.)	Rated McCain	(S.E.)	Rated Obama	(S.E.)	Rated Obama	(S.E.)
Ads: Baseline to March	0.007	(0.012)	--	--	-0.004	(0.016)	--	--
Visits: Baseline to March	--	--	-0.019	(0.017)	--	--	-0.007	(0.023)
N	9,080		9,080		9,080		9,080	
Ads: March to End of Primary	-0.016	(0.018)	--	--	0.024	(0.016)	--	--
Ads: General Election to October	0.010	(0.002)*	--	--	0.011	(0.003)*	--	--
Visits: March to End of Primary	--	--	0.048	(0.048)	--	--	0.094	(0.045)*
Visits: General Election to October	--	--	0.048	(0.076)	--	--	0.196	(0.017)*
N	9,080		9,080		9,080		9,080	

+ =p<0.10; *p<0.05

Table 13: Propensity to Vote for Obama,
Changes from Baseline to March and March to October

	Vote for Obama	(S.E.)	Vote for Obama	(S.E.)
Ads: Baseline to March	0.073	(0.044) ⁺	--	--
Visits: Baseline to March	--	--	0.083	(0.067)
N	2,010		2,010	
Ads: March to End of Primary	0.029	(0.058)	--	--
Ads: General Election to October	0.011	(0.009)	--	--
Visits: March to End of Primary	--	--	0.005	(0.220)
Visits: General Election to October	--	--	-0.049	(0.076)
N	2,010		2,010	

+ =p<0.10; *p<0.05

Figure 1: Percentage of McCain's Television Ads in Each Media Market before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 2: Percentage of Obama's Television Ads in Each Media Market before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 3: Ratio of Obama's to McCain's Television Advertising before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 4: Percentage of McCain's Television Ads in Each Media Market, January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)




Figure 5: Percentage of Obama's Television Ads in Each Media Market, January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)




Figure 6: Ratio of Obama's to McCain's Television Advertising
January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)




Figure 7: Percentage of McCain's Visits in Each Media Market before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 8: Percentage of Obama's Visits in Each Media Market before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 9: Ratio of Obama's to McCain's Visits before December 17, 2007
(Start of Baseline Wave of CCAP)




Figure 10: Percentage of McCain's Visits in Each Media Market,
January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)




Figure 11: Percentage of Obama's Visits in Each Media Market, January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)





Figure 12: Ratio of Obama's to McCain's Visits
January 1, 2007 - June 4, 2008 (Entire Nominating Contest)



Appendix A: Creation and Validation of Television Consumption Scale

I created two scales, one for network television consumption (ABC; NBC; CBS; and FOX) and the other for "other" news consumption (Other). These scales were created by adding together the number of half-hour increments a respondent reported watching network (other) television channels and then dividing by the total amount of time in the time window, which was 16 half-hours or eight hours total. Individuals who reported watching more hours of television than existed in the overall time window were set to the maximum television viewing, which was 16 half-hours. Originally, these scales were created for each respondent in each wave of the survey. However, most of the individuals were asked the media consumption scales over multiple waves of the survey, which allowed me to test whether a respondent's media consumption in one time period was related to his or her reported media consumption in a later wave of the survey.

The Crohnbach's alpha testing the reliability of the Network media consumption scales across waves of the study was 0.826 while the Cronbach's alpha of the "Other" media consumption scale was 0.790. Because these scores were both sufficiently high (George and Mallery 2003), I created the just one Network and one "Other" television consumption measure for each respondent.³⁷ I dropped the 149 respondents who did not complete the media consumption questions in any wave of the survey, meaning that my final dataset contains a total of 17,727 respondents.

Table A displays the descriptive statistics of the television consumption measures separated by the number of waves in which the respondent was answered the questions about his/her television viewing habits. An F-test to detect whether the means were different based on

³⁷ A total of 8,538 respondents were asked the questions in all waves, so the reliability of the scale was based of those respondents. The scales for respondents who were not asked the television consumption measures in all waves are based solely on the waves those respondents were asked the battery of questions.

the total number of waves the respondent answered the media questions indicated that for the ViewNetwork measure, there was a statistically significant difference ($F=6.381$; $p=0.000$), but for the ViewOther measure, no statistically significant differences were found ($F=1.648$; $p=0.159$). Despite the statistically significant differences between the means of the ViewNetwork measures, I argue the scales are capturing the same latent variable - underlying television consumption - and can thus be used as an independent variable to indicate the likelihood a respondent was to view televised campaign advertisements during the 2008 presidential nominating contest.³⁸

³⁸ The alternative would be to drop respondents who were only asked the media consumption questions in one or two waves. I choose not to do this because it would drastically limit the size of my sample, especially for some of the dependent variables.

Table A: Descriptive Statistics of Television Consumption Scale,
by Waves of Consumption Questions Answered

# of Waves Respondent Completed TV Consumption Questions	Media Consumption Scale	Number of Respondents	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum- Maximum
Five	ViewNetwork	8388	0.2759	0.2450	0.00-1.00
Four	ViewNetwork	4301	0.2795	0.2563	0.00-1.00
Three	ViewNetwork	2407	0.2889	0.2643	0.00-1.00
Two	ViewNetwork	789	0.2846	0.2734	0.00-1.00
One	ViewNetwork	1842	0.3082	0.3147	0.00-1.00
Five	ViewOther	8388	0.2591	0.2351	0.00-1.00
Four	ViewOther	4301	0.2673	0.2449	0.00-1.00
Three	ViewOther	2407	0.2660	0.2561	0.00-1.00
Two	ViewOther	789	0.2787	0.2746	0.00-1.00
One	ViewOther	1842	0.2624	0.3304	0.00-1.00

N=17,727 for each scale

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation project aims to expand the literature on presidential nominating contests in three main areas: structure, substance, and effect. In Chapter 2 on the structure of presidential nominating contests, I examined the relationships between fundraising, media coverage, and public opinion, both within parties and between individual candidates. I did not find systematic differences in the relationships between fundraising, media coverage, and public opinion between candidates who were ultimately electorally successful and those who were not. However, in that chapter, I did show that the total amount of money raised by potential nominees was not the only fundraising variable we should consider when taking into account which candidates are viable contenders for their parties' nominations. Instead, I argued that we should think about whether those funds were raised via small-or large-dollar contributions and also examine whether the candidates' fundraising increases or declines throughout the invisible primary stage of the nominating contest. Examining these more nuanced aspects of the fundraising process better enables us to understand which candidates are poised to make serious runs toward the presidential nomination.

Chapter 3 tackled the substance of presidential nominating contests and examined the degree to which candidates engaged in negative advertising while competing for their parties' nominations, along with what types of issues they covered during the nominating phase of the campaign. With respect to negativity, I found that the two parties differed greatly in terms of when candidates were more likely to air negative ads against fellow partisans. The Democratic contest became more negative the longer it persisted, as Clinton and Obama attempted to articulate their differences via a series of negative and contrast advertisements. The Republican

contest, on the other hand, was most negative at its outset, as candidates attempted to set themselves apart from a crowded field.

Across both parties, however, only those candidates who were seen as serious contenders by the rest of the field were attacked by their fellow partisans. Candidates who trailed the frontrunners by large margins in public opinion polls by and large were not the targets of negative ads. With respect to the issue content of television advertisements, candidates who focused almost exclusively on one or two issues did not tend to have much electoral success at the polls. The candidates who were most successful in winning votes aired advertisements about a variety of issues.

The third empirical piece of the dissertation— Chapter 4— considered the effect that presidential nominating contests had on individuals during the general-election phase of the contest. Extant literature on presidential campaigns assumes effects of advertising to be short-lived and often considers only the last two weeks of the campaign when looking for effects. I argue that this is dissatisfying, and I look for longer-term effects. I argue that members of the electorate can and do learn from campaigns. Furthermore, the information that individuals learn during the invisible and visible primary stages of the campaign carries over into the general election season. Studying the effects of televised campaign advertising during the final two weeks of October, only on variables such as turnout and vote choice, overlooks significant impacts that early campaigning can have. Campaign advertisements and visits from candidates that happen early in the campaign can and do have significant effects on whether individuals discuss candidates or are willing to rate the them.

Overall, I aim to contribute to the literature on presidential nominating contests by considering the process from the very beginning — the invisible primary stage— all the way

through the general election. I argue that examining the complex relationships between fundraising, media coverage, and public opinion is essential, particularly given the frontloading of presidential primaries and caucuses, as well as in the increased role that money plays in the nominating process. Once primary voting begins, momentum certainly has a role to play, but prior to that point, a significant amount of important campaigning has already occurred. Extant literature on issue content and negativity tend to focus exclusively on the general election environment, which ignores the intraparty nature of nominating contests. I argue that much more theory is needed if we are to understand why candidates use negativity against members of their own parties. Similarly, more work should be done to understand the nuance of how issues are addressed and discussed in television advertising.

Finally, despite the fact that much existing literature on campaigns argues that members of the electorate have short memories, I argue that it is paramount to consider the long-term effects of these campaigns. Prior to any votes being cast in the 2008 presidential nominating contest, over \$88.5 million had already been spent on television advertising supporting the eventual Democratic and Republican nominees. To simply discount this activity when studying effects of campaigns seems erroneous. While I agree that it is unlikely that activity during the nominating contest will predict whether an individual will vote, or for whom an individual will vote, I do argue that early campaign activity can, and does, have an effect on how much information members of the electorate have about candidates.

One question that must be addressed in a dissertation that examines just one presidential election is the degree to which the research is generalizable to both previous and subsequent elections. The 2008 contest is particularly interesting for several reasons, but we must still think about the degree to which this contest is similar to others. First, 2008 saw open presidential

nominating contests among both the Democratic and Republican parties. The fact that there was no incumbent president or vice president vying for his party's nomination combined with the unpopularity of out-going President George W. Bush made the election exciting from a very early stage.

Second, while we could not have known this in January of 2007, in neither party's presidential nominating race did the candidate who was the frontrunner at the beginning of the invisible primary stage end up winning the nomination. This fact alone problematizes the "inevitability" argument. On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton appeared to have an insurmountable advantage in name recognition, fundraising, and popular support, while on the Republican side, Rudy Giuliani had a similar advantage. Yet Giuliani's star faded quickly when it became apparent that he could not overcome the decision not to compete in both Iowa and New Hampshire. Clinton competed in every state's primary or caucus, but in the end could not convince superdelegates to propel her to the Democratic nomination, so she dropped out before the Democratic National Convention.

Finally, the ubiquity of data pertaining to the 2008 presidential election was unparalleled by comparison to previous contests. With respect to public opinion, both aggregated polling data and individual-level surveys abounded. I relied on data from Pollster.com for information about public support of potential presidential nominees from a very early stage of the invisible primary. Individual-level survey data asking about whom respondents would support in a general-election matchup was also available for a time-period prior to any actual voting in primaries or caucuses. With respect to campaign activity, I am fortunate enough to be able to rely on observational data as opposed to survey-based measures. Self-reported measures of campaign exposure are notoriously unreliable (Price and Zaller 1992; Bartels 1993; Vavreck 2007). By using candidate

tracking information about when and where candidates visit and Wisconsin Advertising Project data about the content and location of television advertisements, I am able to overcome many of the endogeneity concerns inherent when dealing with self-reported measures of campaign activity.

Given the uniqueness of the 2008 presidential nominating contests, what can we say, then, about whether the results presented here are relevant in other years and other elections? I argue that, by and large, the results are applicable to previous years and, perhaps more importantly, will be applicable to subsequent elections as well. Rules changes to the presidential nominating contest in the mid-20th century moved the nomination out of the hands of the convention and into the hands of the voting public through primaries and caucuses. Ongoing changes to the rules for delegate selection within presidential nominating contests will continue to alter how candidates run their nomination campaigns. I argue that 2008's Democratic contest, in particular, foreshadowed the type of nominating contests that will be likely in future years.

After the 2008 contest, Republicans changed the way they apportion delegates, requiring states that hold their primaries or caucuses early in the year to use some form of proportional representation when allocating convention delegates (FairVote 2011). Since many candidates compete in early primary and caucus states, it is difficult for any one candidate to amass a huge number of delegates quickly. This means it is more likely that, going forward, Republican presidential nominating contests will persist for longer periods of time before one candidate emerges as the party's nominee.

We certainly saw this in the 2012 Republican nominating contest as Mitt Romney did not amass the total number of delegates required to be the GOP nominee until May 29, 2012 (Gibson

2012).³⁹ While Romney's clinching of the nomination in late May might not be completely attributable to proportional allocation of delegates, it certainly seems as though that change in rules was at least partially responsible. If delegates on both the Democratic and Republican side are now allocated by proportional means, it seems likely that nominating contests will continue longer, which I argue makes the invisible primary, and fundraising during the invisible primary, increasingly important to study.

I also believe that open presidential nominating contests will be more common, rather than less, in future years. The current mood in American presidential politics is that outsiders make better presidential candidates than do insiders. For example, George W. Bush was seen as a less experienced politician when he won the Republican Party nomination in 2000, but he chose Former Defense Secretary and Washington-insider Dick Cheney to be his running mate. After winning the nomination in 2008, Obama, having served less than a full term as the junior Senator from Illinois, was clearly the outsider. He chose long-time Senator Joe Biden as his vice-presidential candidate. After Bush was term-limited out of office, Cheney chose not to run for president. If the trend continues that vice-presidential candidates are more experienced, and older, I argue that it becomes more likely that we see more open contests for president. If Obama wins reelection in the 2012 general election, then I believe the 2016 contest will again be highly competitive on both sides.

Up until this point in the concluding chapter, there has been little talk about the fundamentals of elections and campaigns— things like party identification, candidate issue positions, the status of the economy, or other criteria that political prognosticators consider essential when trying to forecast election outcomes. In large part, that is because many of those items are ineffectual in helping to predict the outcome of presidential nominating contests. In the

³⁹ John McCain clinched the Republican nomination on March 4, 2008 (Jackson 2008).

general election environment, the single largest predictor of which candidate a voter will choose is that individual's party identification. However, this predictor means literally nothing in the nominating contest, when all candidates are from the same party. Additionally, issue positions commonly vary much more between candidates from opposing parties than they do between candidates of the same parties. Because of the broad similarities between issue positions of candidates of the same political party, it is difficult to know exactly which candidates have the issue position that align with the majority, or plurality, of their parties' voters.

One area in which I think fundamentals play an interesting role in presidential nominating contests is with respect to demographic differences. Often as the course of the nominating contest progresses, it becomes apparent that various demographic groups tend to support one candidate over another. In 2008, for example, it was working-class whites and Hispanics who tended to vote for Clinton while upper-income individuals and African Americans tended to vote for Obama. Further research could explore the degree to which groups are targeted by candidates or how the voting patterns of various demographic groups coalesce over the course of ongoing primaries and caucuses.

Finally, where does research on presidential nominating contests go from here? Much has been made about campaign finance reforms, specifically *Citizens United versus Federal Election Commission* (Citizens United 2010). Good-government groups, mainstream media sources (Dionne 2012; When Other Voices 2012), and even President Obama (Malcolm 2010) lament the fact that the Supreme Court's ruling allows for unlimited spending on campaign advertising from corporate and union treasuries. Emerging scholarship, however, argues that the ruling may not have quite as large an effect as the popular press, and President Obama, seem to think. Studying the period prior to the *Citizens United* decision and examining states that had

bans on corporate spending in the political arena with those that did not, La Raja (2010) argues that "when we observe corporate political spending in states with or without a ban on political spending, it appears that the 'floodgates' have not been thrown wide open to corporate financing of politics" (23). Furthermore, in terms of observed political outcomes such as partisan advantage, business climate, and social policy, La Raja does not find significant differences between states that had corporate spending bans and those that did not.

Spencer and Wood (2012) examine independent expenditures in 2010 legislative and gubernatorial races and argue for a more nuanced understanding of the effects of the *Citizens United* decision. They claim that, "Independent expenditures have received the lion's share of campaign finance press in the past two years...[but] it is sometimes easy to forget that they are only part of a very complex mosaic of overlapping laws designed to structure our election process" (24). In other words, when studying the effects of *Citizens United* and other such laws affecting campaign finance laws, it is important to form hypotheses based on plausible counterfactuals. Instead of assuming that every aspect of the American electoral landscape will change because of a new piece of campaign finance legislation or a Supreme Court ruling, political scientists should help to define the areas in which we expect public policy to affect changes to the political process and go about trying to measure and study those specific outcomes.

Given the complicated nature of presidential nominating contests and the increasing amount of data available about fundraising, media coverage, and election strategy, I argue that much more work can be done to better understand how candidates operate and how nominees are chosen in an intra-party environment. I aim to continue several avenues of research that emerge from this dissertation project and also take on a couple of new projects that are loosely related to

the research presented here. First, I think there is more work that can be done on the effects of presidential primaries and caucuses on members of the voting public, using additional survey information as well as more nuanced measures of individual-level exposure to campaigns.

Second, I think the topic of issue content of presidential nominating contests could be explored more. A more detailed coding scheme about what issues are present as well as the manner in which they are discussed might show more nuance in terms of the degree to which candidates talk past one another or are engaging with their fellow partisans on the campaign trail.

I am also intrigued by the idea of examining the voting patterns of demographic groups, using exit poll data, to better understand how members of the electorate view candidates competing within an intra-party environment. It seems likely that examining these patterns of support may be able to shed some light on the comparative ideologies of candidates, which is a challenging aspect of presidential nominating contests. Finally, I want to explore the degree to which individuals who gave money to a losing presidential contender “come home” and ultimately support their party’s nominee. Much was made during the 2008 contest of the fact that people who supported Clinton during the nominating contest might not vote at all or vote for McCain in the general election. Most research indicates that this is not a huge problem, but I am interested in exploring whether abstention is more common with respect to other forms of participation besides voting, particularly contributing money.

References

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 1989. "Viability, Electability, and Candidate Choice in a Presidential Primary Election: A Test of Competing Models." *The Journal of Politics* 51(04): 977-992.
- Adkins, Randall E., and Andrew J. Dowdle. 2001. "How Important Are Iowa and New Hampshire to Winning Post-Reform Presidential Nominations?" *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2): 431-444.
- Adkins, Randall E, and Andrew J Dowdle. 2002. "The Money Primary: What Influences the Outcome of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32(2): 256-275.
- Aldrich, John H. 1980. *Before the Convention: Strategies and Choice in Presidential Nomination Campaigns*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. 1997. *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate*. Simon & Shuster.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, and Nicholas Valentino. 1994. "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?" *The American Political Science Review* 88(4): 829-838.
- Arbour, Brian. 2009. "Even Closer, Even Longer: What If the 2008 Democratic Primary Used Republican Rules?" *The Forum* 7(2).
- Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 1998. "Divisive Primaries and General Election Outcomes: Another Look at Presidential Campaigns." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 256-271.
- Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Cherie D. Maestas. 2009. "Meaningful Participation and the Evolution of the Reformed Presidential Nominating System." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42(01): 59-64.
- Banville, Lee, and Dave Gustafson. 2008. "Mich., Fla. Delegates Partially Reinstated after Raucous DNC Showdown" *PBS Newshour Online*. Retrieved 14 December 2011 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/politics/jan-june08/delegates_05-31.html
- Bartels, Larry M. 1988. *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1993. "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure." *The American Political Science Review* 87(2): 267-285.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Bergan, Daniel E., Alan S. Gerber, et al. 2005. "Grassroots Mobilization and Voter Turnout in 2004." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69(5): 760-777.
- Biersack, Bob. "The Big Spender Always Wins?" *OpenSecrets*.
<http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/01/big-spender-always-wins.html> (Accessed April 3, 2012)
- Born, Richard. 1981. "The Influence of House Primary Election Divisiveness on General Election Margins." *Journal of Politics* 3:640-661.
- Bradshaw, Joel C. 2004. "Who Will Vote for You and Why: Designing Campaign Strategy and Message." In James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson (Eds.), *Campaigns and Elections American Style* (pg 37-56). Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Broder, David S. 24 April 2008. "The Democrats' Worst Nightmare." *The Washington Post*. Retrieved 3 June 2012 from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/23/AR2008042302980.html>>
- Brown, Robert D. 1995. "Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the American States." *The American Political Science Review* 89(1): 23-33.
- Ceaser, James W. 1979. *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James Woods. 2002. "The Role of Party Activists in the Evolution of the Abortion Issue." *Political Behavior* 24(4): 361-377.
- Center, Judith A. 1974. "1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy." *Political Science Quarterly* 89(2): 325-350.
- Christenson, Dino P., and Corwin D. Smidt. 2011. "Riding the Waves of Money: Contribution Dynamics in the 2008 Presidential Nomination Campaign." *Journal of Political Marketing* 10(1-2): 4-26.
- Citizens United versus Federal Election Commission. No. 08-205. Supreme Court of the United States. January 21, 2010.
- Clines, Francis X. 2000. "The 2000 Campaign: The Reform Party; Buchanan Wraps Himself in McCain's Flag of Reform." *The New York Times*.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/17/us/2000-campaign-reform-party-buchanan-wraps-himself-mccain-s-flag-reform.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (Accessed June 21, 2011).

- Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Converse, Philip E., Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe. 1969. "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election." *The American Political Science Review* 63(4): 1083-1105.
- Cooper, Alexandra L. 2001. "Nominating Presidential Candidates: The Primary Season Compared to Two Alternatives." *Political Research Quarterly* 54(4): 771-793.
- Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project. 2008. Common Content Codebook: 2007-2008 Panel Study. Simon Jackman and Lynn Vavreck, Principal Investigators.
- Dionne Jr., E. J. 2012. "How to Beat Citizens United." *The Washington Post*. April 22, 2012. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-beat-citizens-united/2012/04/22/gIQAXaGjaT_story.html> Accessed on July 3, 2012.
- Druckman, James N., Cari Lynn Hennessy, Martin J. Kifer, and Michael Parkin. 2009. "Issue Engagement on Congressional Candidate Web Sites 2002-2006" *Social Science Computer Review* 28(1): 3-23.
- FairVote.org. 2011. "Delegate Allocation Rules in 2012 GOP Nomination Race: The Spectrum from Proportional Representation to Winner Take All." Available from: <http://www.fairvote.org/delegate-allocation-rules-in-2012-gop#.T_B3V_X7WXs> Accessed July 1, 2012.
- Finkel, Steven E., and John G. Geer. 1998. "A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(2): 573-595.
- Franz, Michael M., Paul B. Freedman, Kenneth M. Goldstein, and Travis N. Ridout. 2007. *Campaign Advertising and American Democracy*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Franz, Michael M. and Travis N. Ridout. 2010. "Political Advertising and Persuasion in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections." *American Politics Research* 38(2): 303-329.
- Gandhi, Amit, Daniela Iorio, and Carly Urban. 2011. "Negative Advertising and Political Competition." *Working Paper*. Available from <<https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/curban/web/Sept22.pdf>> Accessed 2 June 2012.
- Geer, John G. 1988. "Assessing the Representativeness of Electorates in Presidential Primaries." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(4): 929-945.
- Geer, John G. 1989. *Nominating Presidents: An Evaluation of Voters and Primaries*. Greenwood Press.

- Geer, John G. 2006. *In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gibson, Ginger. 2012. "Mitt Romney Clinches GOP Nomination." *Politico*. Available from: <<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76845.html>> Accessed on July 1, 2012.
- George, Darren and Paul Mallery. 2003. *SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide and Reference. 11.0 update* (4th ed.) Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 94(3): 653-663.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2005. "Correction to Gerber and Green (2000), Replication of Disputed Findings, and Reply to Imai (2005)." *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 301-131.
- Goff, Michael J. 2004. *The Money Primary: The New Politics of the Early Presidential Nomination Process*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Gosnell, Harold F. 1927. *Getting-Out-the-Vote: An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hadley, Arthur T. 1976. *The Invisible Primary*. Prentice Hall.
- Haynes, Audry A., and Staci L. Rhine. 1998. "Attack Politics in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: An Examination of the Frequency and Determinants of Intermediated Negative Messages Against Opponents." *Political Research Quarterly* 51(3): 691-721.
- Hillygus, Sunshine D., and Todd G. Shields. 2009. *The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Huckabee, Mike. February 9, 2008. "CPAC 2008: Former Governor Mike Huckabee (R-AR)" *Federal News Service*. Available from <http://web.archive.org/web/20080501074620/http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/2008/speech_huckabee08.asp> Accessed June 2, 2012.
- Imai, Kosuke. 2005. "Do Get-Out-the-Vote Calls Reduce Turnout? The Importance of Statistical Methods for Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 283-300.
- Jackson, David. 2008. "McCain Clinches Nomination, Turns Attention to November." *USA Today*. Available from: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-03-04-gop-tuesday_N.htm> Accessed July 1, 2012.

- Johnston, Richard, Michael G. Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 2004. *The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, Noah, David K. Park, and Travis N. Ridout. 2006. "Dialogue in American Political Campaigns? An Examination of Issue Convergence in Candidate Television Advertising." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 724-736.
- Kenney, Patrick J. 1988. "Sorting Out the Effects of Primary Divisiveness in Congressional and Senatorial Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 4:765-777
- Kenney, Patrick J. and Tom W. Rice. 1984. "The Effect of Primary Divisiveness in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections." *Journal of Politics* 3:904-915.
- Kenney, Patrick J. and Tom W. Rice. 1987. "The Relationship between Divisive Primaries and General Election Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 31(1): 31-44.
- Kirschner, Laura, and Rob Richie. 2008. "Turnout and Delegate Allocation in the 2008 Presidential Primaries." *Fair Vote*.
http://www.fairvote.org/reports/Turnout_2008_Primaries_FairVote.pdf (Accessed July 28, 2010).
- La Raja, Raymond. 2010. "Will Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to Corporations?" *APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper*. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642175>. Accessed July 3, 2012.
- Lau, Richard R., Lee Sigelman, and Ivy Brown Rovner. 2007. "The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic Reassessment." *The Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1176-1209.
- Lau, Richard R., Lee Sigelman, Caroline Heldman, et al. 1999. "The Effects of Negative Political Advertisements: A Meta-Analytic Assessment." *The American Political Science Review* 93(4): 851-875.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Lengle, James, I. 1980. "Divisive Presidential Primaries and Party Electoral Prospects, 1932-1976." *American Politics Research* 8(3): 261-277.
- Lengle, James, I. 1981. *Representation and Presidential Primaries: The Democratic Party in the Post-Reform Era*. Greenwood Press.
- Lengle, James I., Diana Owen, and Molly W. Sonner. 1995. "Divisive Nominating Mechanisms and Democratic Party Electoral Prospects" *The Journal of Politics* 57 (2): 555-562.

- Lengle, James I., and Byron E. Shafer . 1976. "Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change" *The American Political Science Review* 70 (1): 25-40.
- Malbin, Michael. 2010. "All CFI Funding Statistics Revised and Updated for the 2008 Presidential Primary and General Election Candidates" *The Campaign Finance Institute*. http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-01-08/Revised_and_Updated_2008_Presidential_Statistics.aspx (Accessed April 3, 2012)
- Malcolm, Andrew. 2010. "Obama's State of the Union Address: Criticism of the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Ruling." *Los Angeles Times*. January 27, 2010. Available from: <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/01/obamas-state-of-the-union-address-criticism-of-the-supreme-court-campaign-finance-ruling.html>. Accessed July 3, 2012.
- Mayer, William G. 1987. "The New Hampshire Primary: A Historical Overview" in Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Media and momentum: The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- McQuail, Denis. 1979. "The Influence and Effects of Mass Media." In *Mass Communication and Society*, , p. 70-93.
- Missouri Census Data Center. 2012. [MABLE/Geocorr2K: Geographic Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography](http://mcde.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html). Accessed 29 May 2012. <
<http://mcde.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html>>
- Norrander, Barbara. 1989. "Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 570-587.
- Norrander, Barbara. 1996. "Presidential Nomination Politics in the Post-Reform Era." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(4): 875-915.
- Norrander, Barbara. 2006. "The Attrition Game: Initial Resources, Initial Contests and the Exit of Candidates During the US Presidential Primary Season." *British Journal of Political Science* 36(3): 487-507.
- Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study" *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 825-850.
- Plouffe, David. 2009. *The Audacity to Win: The Inside Story and Lessons of Barack Obama's Historic Victory*. Viking.
- Polsby, Nelson W. 1983. *The Consequences of Party Reform*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Price, Vincent and John Zaller. 1993. "Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implications for Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(2): 133-164.

- Ranney, Austin. 1972. "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 66(1): 21-37.
- Raudenbush, Stepehn W. and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods, Second Edition*. Sage Publications.
- Ridout, Travis N., and Jenny L. Holland. 2010. "Candidate Strategies in the Presidential Nomination Campaign" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40(4): 611-630.
- Roberts, Marilyn, and Maxwell McCombs. 1994. "Agenda Setting and Political Advertising: Origins of the News Agenda" *Political Communication* 11(3): 249-262.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Shafer, Byron E. 1988. *Bifurcated Politics: Evolution and Reform in the National Party Convention*. Cambridge, MA: A Russell Sage Foundation Study, Harvard University Press.
- Shafer, Byron E. 2010. "The Pure Partisan Institution: National Party Conventions as Research Sites" in L. Sandy Maisel and Jeffrey M. Berry, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups*. Oxford University Press.
- Shafer, Byron and Amber Wichowsky. 2009. "Institutional Structure and Democratic Values: A Research Note on a Natural Experiment." *The Forum* 7(2).
- Shaw, Daron R. 1999. "The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide Presidential Votes, 1988-96." *American Political Science Review* 93(2): 345-361.
- Shear, Michael D., and Peter Slevin. 2008. "McCain Clinches GOP Presidential Nomination" *The Washington Post Online*. Retrieved 14 December 2011 from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/04/AR2008030401984.html>>
- Sigelman, Lee and Emmett H. Buell Jr. 2004. "Avoidance or Engagement? Issue Convergence in U.S. Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 650-661.
- Sinderbrand, Rebecca. 2008. "Full Voting Rights Restored to Florida and Michigan" *CNN Politics*. 24 August 2008. Accessed 30 May 2012. <<http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/08/24/full-voting-rights-restored-to-florida-and-michigan/>>

- Spencer, Douglas and Abby Wood. 2012. "Citizens United, States Divided: Evidence of Elasticity in Independent Expenditures." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association: Chicago, IL. April 13, 2012.
- Steger, Wayne P., Andrew J. Dowdle, and Randall E. Adkins. 2004. "The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential Nominations." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3): 375-390.
- Truck Ads. 2012. TV Broadcast Market Areas. Accessed 29 May 2012.
<http://www.truckads.com/licensed_affiliates1.asp#map>
- University of Wisconsin Advertising Project. 2008. Presidential Advertising. Kenneth Goldstein, Principal Investigator.
- Vavreck, Lynn. 2007. "The Exaggerated Effects of Advertising on Turnout: The Dangers of Self-Reports." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2(4): 325-343.
- Vavreck, Lynn, Constantine J. Spiliotes, and Linda L. Fowler. 2002. "The Effects of Retail Politics in the New Hampshire Primary." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 595-610.
- Ware, Alan. 1979. "'Divisive' Primaries: The Important Questions." *British Journal of Political Science* 9(3): 381-384.
- Washington Post Politics. 2008. Campaign Tracker: Candidate Stops, by Date. Accessed 29 May 2012 <<http://projects.washingtonpost.com/2008-presidential-candidates/tracker/dates/>>
- "When Other Voices are Drowned Out." 2012. Editorial. *The New York Times*. March 25, 2012. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/when-other-voices-are-drowned-out.html>. Accessed July 3, 2012.
- White, Theodore Harold. 1961. *The Making of the President, 1960*. Atheneum.
- Wichowsky, Amber, and Sarah E. Niebler. 2010. "Narrow Victories and Hard Games: Revisiting the Primary Divisiveness Hypothesis." *American Politics Research* 38(6): 1052-1071.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.